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ABSTRACT

After the depression of 1893, some New South prophets advocated a more assertive,
foreign policy as a means to attain regional economic uplift. With the objective of
obtaining overseas markets, some of the prophets even supported the use of force to
create American colonies as an appropriate goal of American foreign policy. The
acquisition of new territories, and hence, new markets, the prophets maintained, would be
an economic boon to southern producers of cotton, textiles, and other goods. And the
economic stimulus accompanying an increase in foreign trade would lift the region out of
poverty, promote the growth of southern port cities, and provide additional capital for the
modernization of the South.
Most southerners, however, did not share this optimistic vision in the potential of
overseas expansion to cure many of the South’s most serious problems. Instead, an
aggressive, assertive foreign policy produced more fear and anxiety than hope. From their
own historic experience with African slavery, Civil War, defeat, humiliation, and
Reconstruction, most southerners found it difficult to fully embrace the imperialist vision.
Southern white racism, the fear of expanded federal power (especially the creation of a
large military and bureaucracy to administer colonies), opposition to increased taxes to
support overseas expansion, and suspicion of Republican motives, all contributed to
produce widespread opposition to the nation’s expansionist policies.
While most in the region supported McKinley’s declaration of war against Spain in
1898 as a means to prove the South’s loyalty to the Union and liberate Cuba from harsh
Spanish rule, the experience of war did little to allay southern suspicions and fears.
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McKinley’s handling of the war, the paucity of opportunities for southern soldiers and
firms, and the degeneration of the war to liberate Cuba into one to conquer the
Philippines, proved disappointing to the South. Consequently, traditional attitudes were
reasserted and blended with the New South desire for trade to produce a southern foreign
policy consensus that rejected the use of force in favor of neocolonialism.
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INTRODUCTION

To the confident promoters of a New South built upon industrialization and
economic diversification, the expansionist foreign policy pursued by the national
government in Washington during the 1890’s presented an opportunity for the material
advancement of their region. Overseas expansion and the acquisition of foreign markets,
New South advocates predicted, would produce incalculable benefits. The new capital
attracted by foreign commerce would alleviate the crushing poverty faced by millions of
rural southerners and fuel the growth of southern cities and businesses. The foreign trade
that would follow the acquisition of new territories overseas would produce special
benefits for the South’s port cities. And, with the completion of an isthmian canal, cities
such as New Orleans, Galveston, Mobile, and Pensacola, would become the new
commercial centers of the nation. Armed with this glowing vision for the future of the
South in an age of American colonialism, the New South prophets eagerly sought to
convince their southern brethren to support a more aggressive and expansive foreign
policy. Yet after a decade of public agitation, not only had the prophets failed to win
many converts to territorial expansion, but the content and context of their own message
had been significantly altered by the forces of southern culture and the region’s collective
memory. Beginning with territorial designs in Hawaii, through the war with Spain and the
Philippine insurrection, the southern public displayed remarkable underlying continuity in
their foreign policy beliefs. Southern white racism, resentment over the expansion of
federal power, and the fear of a large, permanent military establishment, prevented most
southerners from fully embracing the vision of the New South prophets. Instead, by 1904,

1
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as the nation prepared to begin construction of an isthmian canal, a southern foreign policy
consensus had emerged that reflected both the fears of southern traditionalists and the
modernizing influences of the New South advocates. This consensus rejected the use of
force and the physical acquisition of overseas possessions in favor of a foreign policy
approach that relied on trade to force open markets. The southern consensus, then,
evolving for the better part of a decade, appeared consistent with the new national policy
that reflected national frustration with the federal government’s handling of possessions
acquired from Spain at the end of the Spanish-American War. Given their unique
historical perspective, many southerners arrived at this neo-colonial solution before their
northern counterparts, and, in retrospect, their warnings regarding the pitfalls of
imperialism appear somewhat prophetic.
Historians have examined virtually every facet of American foreign policy during
this period in an attempt to understand the motives of American policymakers. Why
would America’s leaders abandon the nation’s historic policy of isolation and become
entangled in foreign affairs and foreign wars? In one of the most important of these
discussions on American foreign policy, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. William A.
Williams asserted that economic considerations determined the course of American policy.
More specifically, American business interests pressured the government to use its power
to open new markets for American goods and to protect them once acquired. Whether by
diplomacy or by the use of force, the tools of American foreign policy were wielded in
behalf of the nation’s largest economic interests. Williams’ paradigm found even more
forceful expression in the works of his students and followers, such as Walter LaFeber and

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

3
John Dobson. For the better part of a half-century, the economic roots of American
foreign policy have dominated the field of American diplomacy.1
Not all historians of the period, however, agree that economics determined the
course of American policy. A growing number of scholars, including Julius W. Pratt,
Michael Hunt, and Robert Dallek, have argued that American expansion was as much a
product of social and cultural factors as it was a desire for overseas markets. According
to these historians, feelings of Anglo-American superiority, the American sense of mission
and noblesse oblige, and intense nationalism contributed to overwhelming support for a
more expansionist policy in the 1890’s. Gerald Linderman, in one of the most effective
studies of this genre, The Mirror of War, concluded that America’s flirtation with
imperialism reflected popularly held attitudes and beliefs and the need to assert American
power. American foreign policy, he concluded, resulted from a complex mix of economic,
social and political factors. That America’s aggressive, expansionist policy was widely
supported by the public, Linderman argued, largely reflected the degree to which popular
literature—from magazines and newspapers to school textbooks—had convinced the
population of Anglo-Saxon superiority, the inferiority of foreign peopie, and ihe
humanitarian mission of the United States to improve the lives of others. Significant in
emphasizing the importance of public pressure in shaping American foreign policy,
Linderman’s “mirrors” both reflected and shaped the way Americans viewed the world.2
Despite the extensive literature dealing with American foreign policy in the 1890’s,
the role of the South has received scant attention. Since the South still lacked political
and economic power relative to other sections, and few southerners were among the
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foreign policy elite, the value of a study of southern foreign policy attitudes is not readily
apparent. Consequently, existing foreign policy surveys often dismiss the South, or make
generalizations about the region based on certain economic and social characteristics. Yet
a systematic study of the South’s response to American expansion is critical for those
scholars interested in the impact of culture and historical experience in the formation of
foreign policy beliefs. Clearly, as this study suggests, southerners weighed a variety of
social, cultural, and economic factors in shaping their world view; in the absence of any
direct knowledge of foreign affairs, it is not surprising that many in the region relied on
more familiar themes of culture and history for understanding.
The purpose of my study is two-fold. First, I hope to more fully explain the
sources of the South’s foreign policy perspective during the period. Like many other
historians, I have attempted to uncover the economic as well as the socio-cultural origins
of the region’s attitudes. More important, I hope to provide the reader with a greater
awareness of how the South’s unique history shaped the foreign policy beliefs of its
people. In a provocative essay in his classic study, The Burden of Southern History. C.
Vann Woodward described the South as the only region that experienced war, defeat,
humiliation, and subjugation and, therefore, southerners could be expected to have a better
understanding of the ramifications of American imperialism on both the United States and
native people living in overseas colonies. Others have questioned the lingering effect of
the southern experience in shaping a distinctly regional world view. Gaines Foster, in
Ghosts of the Confederacy, asserted that southerners no longer carried the burden of the
Civil War and enthusiastically supported the Spanish-American War to provide further
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testimony of their commitment to the nation. But my conclusions do much to confirm
Woodward’s suspicions; the South, did, indeed, show greater reluctance to fully embrace
the imperial policy advocated by the jingoes. And, their opposition to colonies, and the
dire predictions made by southerners on the impact of imperial wars of conquest, came
long before similar calls from the North gained national attention. In short, the South’s
world view, shaped by a multiplicity of factors, including its own unique history that
included experiences with slavery, war, and defeat, made it a far better predictor of the
problems associated with American imperialism than is generally acknowledged.3
Second, I hope to provide a comprehensive and systematic examination of
southern foreign policy attitudes and, thus, fill a gap in the existing literature. Robert
May, in The Southern Dream of Caribbean Empire, and Alfred Hero, in The Southerner
and World Affairs, have provided excellent overviews of the South’s foreign policy views
for the periods before the Civil War and after World War I, respectively. Yet no studies
have been made of the region’s beliefs during the crucial decade between 1894 and 1904
when America embarked on its policy of global expansion. Numerous biographies of
southerners interested in foreign affairs, including Joseph Fry’s recent study of Senator
John T. Morgan, provide the views of a few exceptional individuals and may leave the
false impression that most southerners supported an aggressive, expansionist foreign
policy. Similarly, Tennant McWilliams, in The New South Faces the World, examined the
beliefs of a handful of southern leaders interested in foreign affairs in the century after the
Civil War and proclaimed the importance of the New South ethic in southern foreign
policy thinking in the 1890’s. Both of these historians have provided valuable insight into
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the minds of the New South prophets who advocated an expansionist foreign policy, but
they fail to address the level of support for such policies across the region. Other
historians, notably Willard Gatewood, Christopher Lasch, and Robert Beisner, have
correctly pointed out the importance of racism in the formation of foreign policy attitudes.
While perhaps the most important issue to many white southerners, racist attitudes toward
non-white people fails to fully explain the depth and complexity of the region’s foreign
policy beliefs. Studying this period in detail and acknowledging the importance of a wide
range of factors, I believe, can provide important insight into regional attitudes toward
imperialism and provide a better understanding of the extent to which the South’s historic
experience with slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction still shaped southerners’ world
view.4
My study, then, seeks to define, categorize, and analyze the sources of the South’s
foreign policy attitudes from 1894 to 1904. This is not a study of public opinion in the
contemporary sense. In the absence of hard, quantitative data, such a study is impossible.
Since modem public opinion polling did not begin until the 1930’s, the historian of past
public attitudes is left to rely on more impressionistic evidence and forced to employ less
precise terms as “many,” “some,” and “most.” Furthermore, the scarcity of relevant
primary material dealing with the foreign policy attitudes of women and AfricanAmericans in the South makes the task of drawing meaningful conclusions about these
groups even more difficult. Nonetheless, by examining the regional press, private
manuscript collections, congressional voting behavior, periodicals from the period,
memorials and resolutions, and other primary materials, I believe that one can reconstruct
the boundaries of public discourse and draw valid conclusions about popular sentiment.
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Certainly, my approach is not unique; Louis Galambos employed a similar technique in his
study of the image of big business in the public mind. And political scientists Jon Hurwitz
and Mark Peffley, in an examination of the functional nature of heuristics in the process of
forming foreign policy attitudes, concluded that most people organize abstract ideas, such
as foreign policy issues, within a schema of pre-existing knowledge. For the southerners
under review in this study, those cognitive frameworks include the familiar experiences of
slavery, war, defeat, and humiliation at the hands of a perceived foreign power. By
examining the South’s world view, this study provides a better understanding of the way
southerners viewed themselves, their nation, and, to some small degree, their future.5
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CHAPTER 1
A FOREIGN POLICY OF HOPE:
THE SOUTH AND ECONOMIC UPLIFT

If you wish to interest the people of the South to-day,
talk to them of the resources and development of
their section. Once they enjoyed more the eloquent
words of the political orator, but now the plain
business presentation of questions connected with
material growth finds the most attentive
listeners.
--H oke Smith, 18941

. . . what we want is more industries, more varied
production, more ways of earning a living, more
small farmers, more capital. Our great need is to
utilize our w ealth.. . With Morgan leading on
the Nicaraguan canal and Walsh all on fire with
earnestness and enthusiasm for the material
development of the South, we are going
to get some great benefits out of the United States
Senate.
—Birmingham Age-Herald. 18942

8
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Between the end of the Civil War and the 1890's, southerners expressed very little
interest in the foreign affairs of the nation. In the absence of any serious international
crises, and with only a handful of businessmen and politicians emphasizing greater
diplomatic activity, foreign affairs failed to stir the imagination of the southern masses
during the Gilded Age. But they were not unique in their disinterest; most Americans
cared little about events abroad. Even the instruments of American diplomacy during this
period remained crude, unsystematic, and unfocused, reflecting the general lack of interest
in international relations in the nation as a whole.3
With overwhelming domestic concerns in the 1870's and 1880's, southerners may
have exhibited even less enthusiasm for foreign involvement than most Americans. After
the Civil War, most southerners faced the more mundane concerns associated with
everyday life. Millions of families eked out meager livings on the land. The second
coming of the cotton kingdom in the 1870's proved to be an added curse to those
committed to producing a staple crop that's average price plummeted far faster than the
cost of most of the commodities they consumed. As a result, more and more southerners
proved unable to meet their financial obligations to creditors; many lost even the marginal
independence of owning their own land and fell into sharecropping and farm tenancy.
The towns of the South offered little refuge for those seeking to escape the desperate
poverty of the rural South. During the period, thousands trekked to the region's squalid
towns looking for the few available jobs in commerce or industry. But rarely did they find
new opportunities. Most town dwellers also suffered from chronic unemployment and
low wages. Thus, though circumstances differed from locale to locale, the common
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experience for millions of southerners became indebtedness, crushing poverty, poor living
standards, and a growing sense of despair.
Regional political developments, too, deflected southern attention from foreign
affairs. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the politics of the South focused
on the white majority's efforts to achieve social control over the freedmen. With millions
of free blacks in their midst, white southerners after Reconstruction resorted to a host of
devices, legal and extralegal, to place African-Americans back into a position of inferiority
and servitude. The ruling whites in the South, commonly called Bourbons, consistently
raised the spectre of black domination and resorted to violence and fraud to beat back
political challenges from groups bent on altering the existing order in the South. Given
the region's preoccupation with these immediate problems it is not surprising that most
southerners remained largely uninterested in foreign affairs during the 1870's and 1880's.4
Although mass disinterest in foreign affairs characterized the period, a handful of
southerners worked during the Gilded Age to foster interest in foreign affairs and, thereby,
prepared the way for international activism in the 1890's. Since shortly after the end of the
Civil War, proponents of a "New South" articulated programs for the social regeneration
of the region, reconciliation with the North, and economic uplift through a variety of
schemes— most often, by developing the South's natural resources and attracting
industrial development with the aid of northern capital. In addition, these New South
prophets focused new attention on the benefits of southern urbanization as potential mass
markets for burgeoning regional industries. In the 1870's and 1880's, these proponents of
change in the South-most of them young, progressive editors, businessmen, and
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educators—concentrated on rebuilding and reshaping the Southern economy to compete
and prosper within the domestic sphere. Nonetheless, their activities created a new public
awareness of the importance of markets that ultimately led to greater public interest in
America's foreign policy.5
One part of the New South boosterism of the 1880's and 1890's, the cotton mill
campaign, emphasized the importance of foreign affairs to the economic health of the
South. Spokesmen for the program recognized that the South lost millions of dollars
annually by selling only raw cotton to middlemen and textile agents in Liverpool and New
York. As a result, they stressed the need for southerners to manufacture raw cotton near
the source and to market their finished products, thus, eliminating onerous middle traders.
Historian Patrick Hearden, in Independence and Empire, noted that support for the cotton
mill campaign in the South cut across occupational lines; farmers and entrepreneurs alike
stood to gain by eliminating European and Yankee factors. The explosion of cotton mills
across the South suggested a significant commitment to the plan. In fact, the South
experienced a 700% increase in mills in the 1890's, which placed it ahead of New England
in the number of spindies in use. Not surprisingly, the success of the cotton mill campaign
and the enormous increase in textile production that followed caused southerners to look
more favorably upon programs designed to provide greater entry of their goods, especially
manufactured cotton goods, into foreign markets.6
In the aftermath of the economic collapse of 1893, many southerners longed for
solutions to the region's economic malaise and thought they might find one in the vision of
the New South prophets. Many southern political figures embraced the message of
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economic rejuvenation and accentuated the need for the South to search for foreign
markets. More comfortable with the South's place in the Union, more assertive in the halls
of Congress, more confident of the South and its resources—the prophets genuinely
believed that their region's lot could be made better if the federal government would
pursue a foreign policy designed to provide economic opportunities for the South.
Important regional spokesmen—Hannis Taylor, Hilary Herbert, John Gordon, and John
Morgan, to name but a few—offered southerners a future of economic uplift built upon the
expansion of international trade. All of these men championed a common southern
approach to foreign affairs in the 1890's. To be sure, many small farmers in the South
turned to agrarian radicalism for hope and inspiration; many others probably remained
focused exclusively on the problems of making a living on their own plot of earth. But for
millions of other southerners in towns and on farms crippled by economic depression and
hard times the hope that serious domestic ills could be remedied by pursuing an active
foreign policy aimed exclusively at gaining access to international markets was particularly
compelling.7
*

*

*

The depression of 1893 struck farmers and agricultural workers in the South far
harder than people in other parts of the country. Prices for the region's chief staple crop,
cotton, edged downward beginning in 1890, and then plunged precipitously during the
depression. Prices for the region’s other leading staples suffered as well. (See Table I)
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TABLE I

Year
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894

Prices of Selected Southern Commodities, 1890-1894
(average price per pound, in dollars)
Commodity
raw cotton
tobacco
sugar__
.062
.111
.080
.086
.047
.082
.077
.044
.089
.083
.048
.079
.070
.041
.066

(Table derived from Historical Statistics of the United States, pp. 207-209, 518)
While southern agricultural prices lost nearly a third of their value during the period, the
overall cost of living dropped only slightly. Therefore, the impact of the panic on the
southern economy was widespread and dramatic; it caused people across the region to
search for economic palliatives in many different areas.
Like their contemporaries in the rest of the nation, many people in the South
recognized the importance of foreign trade to the domestic economy. Not only did
foreign markets supply America with raw materials and luxuries unavailable in the home
market, they provided an outlet for surplus American goods that otherwise would remain
in the domestic market to further deflate prices during a period of chronic deflation. This
relationship between markets and deflation of agricultural prices received considerable
attention among southern farmers—who witnessed calamitous declines in the prices of the
region's chief crops after 1893.8
During this crisis, southerners expected sympathy and aid from the rest of the
nation, as well as material relief and action from the federal government, controlled by
Democrats for the first time since 1860. Indeed, many southerners occupied important
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positions in Washington during the Cleveland Administration. Hilary Herbert, of
Alabama, and Hoke Smith, of Georgia, served in the president's cabinet. Isham Harris, of
Tennessee, became President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and Charles Crisp, of Georgia,
became Speaker of the House. The return of southerners to positions of leadership in
Washington raised the hopes of those in the South who desired to see government take
concrete steps to improve their condition. Senator John Morgan, in a speech before a
gathering of farmers near Opelika, Alabama, suggested that it had been too long, "since
we got under the government what we deserved." Morgan concluded by urging his
people to forcefully articulate their concerns and make their interests clear to their elected
representatives.9
In 1894, consideration of the tariff question did, indeed, provoke considerable
comment among southerners. By the 1890's, many southerners perceived a correlation
between customs and overall regional economic vitality. In other words, high tariffs
protected Northern industry, increased the prices southerners paid for many manufactured
goods, and discouraged the opening of overseas markets for southern exports. Because of
the grave condition of the southern economy after 1893, and the South's reliance on
exporting agricultural goods for desperately needed capital, most southerners hoped that
Democratic electoral victories would lead to significant tariff reductions.
When the battle over tariff reform reached Congress in 1894, a protectionist
minority emerged from the South in opposition to free trade. The most vociferous
opponents of the Wilson Tariff bill and its provisions to place sugar on the free list came,
not surprisingly, from the sugar producing regions of Louisiana. In a letter to
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Congressman Marion Butler, J. H. Stauffen, Jr., of New Orleans, chairman of the Sugar
Industry of Louisiana, relayed his organization's members disbelief that Congress would
"willingly, or knowingly, consent to strike down and destroy an industry of such
magnitude and of such growing importance to the entire country." Furthermore, he
expressed his fear that such changes in the tariff schedule would bring "ruin and disaster,
to both our City and State." Hundreds of sugar planters and manufacturers, assembled in
mass meetings, passed similar resolutions expressing their disapproval of the Wilson bill as
disastrous for their industry. In fact, anger at Congress over the tariff left many in South
Louisiana despondent over the actions of the Democratic party. An Iberville Parish
planter suggested that "sugar being put on the free list has depressed our people, and
everything is confusion." Indeed, popular animosity ran so deep in seme parts of
Louisiana that many involved in the sugar industry "bolted" the Democratic party in favor
of the G.O.P. and protection in 1894.10
Louisiana congressmen who voted to protect sugar during the tariff debate
received sharp criticism from across the South. Consequently, southern protectionists
found themselves on the defensive; they had to justify their actions as consistent with
Democratic principles and as a pragmatic expression of economic survival. The chief
journal of Louisiana sugar production condemned the leaders of the Democratic party for
supporting free sugar and the Republican principle of protectionism. A Baton Rouge
newspaper praised its congressman for voting against a tariff measure that "would
unquestionably do violence to the industry." The "Wilson bill, in so far as sugar was
concerned was undemocratic, and . . . our representatives were right in opposing it."11
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Despite the efforts of South Louisiana protectionists, most opponents of the
Wilson bill were not ready to abandon the principle of free trade and open markets. On
the contrary, their opposition stemmed from a perception that the seriously flawed Wilson
bill would do great injury to their vital economic interests. A. K. Miller, president of the
New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, expressed the dual commitment of businessmen in
that area to the protection of the region's chief industry and to the important concept of
free trade. Speaking before the Chamber, Miller proclaimed,
A great commercial city like New Orleans is interested in having trade as
free as possible, and as little trammelled by tariff taxes and regulations; and
the mercantile classes would naturally favor any legislation having these
objects in view. They expected and desired an intelligent tariff measure;
one that would provide the government with sufficient means to pay its
debts, and that would stimulate foreign trade, but would do this without
injury to our home manufactures . . . . The Wilson bill has not fulfilled
these conditions.12
Unlike the sugar protectionists of South Louisiana, the vast majority of
southerners remained steadfast in their commitment to the principle of free trade. The
protectionist duties of the McKinley Tariff of 1890 had been soundly denounced across
th f i rp c rin n frv r n l a p i n o n n ^ i i f ’m ir H ^ n c Art r n n c i i m p r c nnH f n r n o o r n i / n t i n o f l ip V tn cin p cc
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depression and industrial stagnation of 1893-4. Not surprisingly, the debates over tariff
reform sharpened intense partisan and sectional animosities; southerners were quick to
place the blame on northern capitalists and the Republican party. One Arkansas paper
indicted the G.O.P. for the "political crime . . . of preventing tariff reform." A leading
Texas daily also condemned Republicans and trusts for violating the "rules of special
privileges to none and equal protection of the laws." Furthermore, some editors placed
the current tariff debate in a broader historical perspective; they blamed the Republicans
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for decades of hardship and economic subordination. With Democrats in power for the
first time since the Civil War, these southerners hoped, their native region would become
"the favored section of this great country." From across the South, cries for tariff reform
reflected the popular mood against protection.13
The Wilson bill, passed by Congress in August of 1894 as the Wilson-Gorman
Tariff, placed some important items such as lumber, wool and copper on the duty free list.
In addition, it lowered average duties approximately ten percent to 39.9%. Even though
Wilson-Gorman was not all they wanted, most southerners accepted it as a major
improvement over the McKinley Tariff and a substantial retreat from protection. This
modest political and economic victory served to create a hopeful mood that more open
markets could solve a host of the region's ills. A Texas congressman, Roger Q. Mills,
"voiced the sentiments of the great body of democrats" who urged the passage of a reform
bill to alleviate economic distress. After tariff reform was accomplished, Mills maintained,
then "night will disappear, darkness and distress will leave the land, prosperity will come
to our borders,. . . and the country will once more resume its career of prosperity."14
The South's perspective during the tariff debate of 1894 was hardly unique. Since
the founding of the republic, the South generally favored lower tariffs and tended toward
free trade. As the nation's supplier of raw materials and staple agricultural products, and
a net importer of manufactured goods, the South had little to gain from tariffs designed to
protect nascent industries. By the mid-nineteenth century, many southerners felt
victimized by protective tariffs that increased the cost they paid for manufactured goods in
order to benefit northern industry. Like their antebellum counterparts, southerners after
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the Civil War continued to view protective tariffs as a malignancy of American democracy
that had fostered the creation of the great trusts—corporations that pillaged the consumer,
fixed prices and victimized working people everywhere. Buoyed by Democratic victories
in 1892, the South looked hopefully to substantial reductions in the tariff in the 1890's.
Not surprisingly, southerners were virtually unanimous in support of tariff reform during
the heated debates over the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894.
*

*

*

During the 1890's, southerners who hoped to attain economic uplift through a
more activist foreign policy focused attention on an historic aim of American diplomacy—
the construction o f an isthmian canal. American interest in such a project antedated the
Civil War. Discussions of a canal to link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans had begun in
earnest during the late 1840's and 1850's. Proponents saw it as a way to speed
transportation between the east coast of the United States and the territories acquired after
the Mexican War. The discovery of gold in California in 1848 and the ensuing migration
of thousands of Americans to California created a new sense of urgency to build a canal.
Americans traveling from New York to San Francisco over the Rocky Mountains faced
innumerable difficulties; consequently, many sought alternate routes by sea. Some made
the expensive, 13,000 mile trip around Cape Horn; others sailed to the Atlantic Coast of
Panama or Nicaragua and traveled the short distance overland to the Pacific Coast where
they continued their voyage by sea. Because of its proximity to American ports, more
healthful conditions, and shorter overland passage, Nicaragua, by the early 1850's, became
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the preferred means of traversing the isthmus and, therefore, emerged as the preferred
route for an American-built canal.
Despite the growing demand for an American canal in Nicaragua in the 1850's,
several factors worked to forestall its construction. America had obtained rights in the
region that employed the mouth of the San Juan River as the Atlantic end of a canal.
However, in 1848, Great Britain extended its authority all along the Mosquito Coastincluding the area known as San Juan del Norte. Anglo-American tensions rose as Great
Britain acquired territory in western Nicaragua that had been coveted by the United
States. Americans became deeply suspicious of British motives in the area and feared that
England might build its own canal. Furthermore, some Americans clamored for war
against Great Britain because it had violated the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. In
1850, amidst growing diplomatic tension, the United States and Great Britain agreed in
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty not to obtain or exercise exclusive control of an isthmian canal.
Although some Americans chafed at its provisions, the treaty diffused the immediate crisis
and prevented England from ever developing a canal in the region.
After the Anglo-American imbroglio subsided, American capitalists seized the
opportunity to develop alternate routes across the isthmus. Cornelius Vanderbilt, the
shipping magnate, developed the Pacific Mail Steamship Company to bring a steady flow
o f Americans to the Nicaragua's eastern coast by 1853. Combined with his Accessory
Transit Railroad Company, Vanderbilt made it possible to traverse the isthmus quickly and
with only minimal discomfort. Indeed, during the boom times of the early 1850's, nearly
2,000 people a month traveled across the Vanderbilt line. Given the success of
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Vanderbilt, and the restrictions imposed by Clayton-Bulwer, the debate over a Nicaraguan
canal lost much of its urgency by I860.15
But during that decade, the South, more than any other region, maintained an
especially keen interest in developments in Nicaragua. Southerners' concerns, however,
reflected largely sectional, partisan considerations and had little to do with a nationalist
desire to construct an American-owned isthmian canal. The acquisition of territories after
the Mexican War had not given the South opportunities to expand the institution of
slavery westward and, in so doing, destroyed the southern balance of power with free
states in the Senate. The resulting fear of permanent political inferiority led many
southerners to cast their eyes toward Latin America, where new, economically viable slave
states might be carved out of the semi-tropical environment.
No individual symbolized the expansive mood of the antebellum South as well as
William Walker of Tennessee did. With a handful of men, Walker emerged victorious
from a civil skirmish in Nicaragua and proclaimed himself president of the Central
American republic in 1855. As president, Walker sought American recognition and aid.
In order to shore up his support, he reinstituted slavery and won almost universal praise
from the South. When Walker returned to the United States after his ouster in 1857, he
received a warm and enthusiastic welcome from southerners who drew inspiration from
the success of the filibustering activity in Nicaragua.16
Where antebellum southern interest in Central America, especially Nicaragua,
focused on a sectional desire to bring additional territory under the political and economic
influence of the slaveholding South, regional interest in Nicaragua in the 1890's reflected
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the nationalist goal of building an isthmian canal under American control for commercial
and strategic reasons. More importantly, southerners hoped that a transisthmian canal
would open up new markets for southern goods in Latin America and Asia. In the
absence of slavery and with a growing interest in developing international commerce as a
means of attaining economic uplift, many southerners again turned to Nicaragua in the
1890's as an attractive location for such a canal.
The sense of urgency that surrounded the debate over an isthmian canal in 1894-95
reflected the fear that failure to develop a project immediately would provide Great Britain
with an opportunity to exploit its position in Latin America and acquire access for its own
transisthmian route. Although the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 remained in effect,
Americans still bristled at its provisions. Furthermore, the landing of Royal Marines at
Corinto, Nicaragua, in 1894, and British demands for an indemnity from the Nicaraguan
government in 1895, provoked anxiety over British intentions in the region. Indeed, many
Americans jumped to the conclusion that Britain's actions represented nothing less than an
attempt to recolonize portions of the Mosquito Coast in violation of the Monroe Doctrine.
Similarly, many Americans were outraged at Britain's recalcitrance in refusing American or
international arbitration over a boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela.
Despite the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, southerners genuinely feared
that Great Britain would seize any opportunity to construct their own canal. To be sure,
many Americans balked at the huge projected cost of the project (estimated at around
$100 million), but most southerners believed that it would be money well spent. Indeed,
southerners became alarmed that the refusal of the federal government to provide money
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for beginning feasibility studies and preliminary construction costs would only encourage
Britain to pursue its own canal project. An article in a Little Rock newspaper declared,
"The United States is asked to lend its credit to the extent of $100,000,000 for the
completion of this project or permit Great Britain to build and control this great highway
for the improvement of commerce." Aware of public anxiety regarding the future of a
canal, Senator John Morgan, speaking at a political rally in Birmingham, challenged the
government to begin work on the canal at once, for "if this government does not soon
undertake it Great Britain will. . . . " Fear of foreign, especially British, control over an
isthmian canal was as intense in the South as in any other region. Consequently, most
southern supporters shied away from private schemes involving American and foreign
capital in favor of publicly funded plans under the direct ownership of the United States
government. In 1894-95, business groups from Nashville to New Orleans to Ocala,
Florida, submitted petitions to congress "praying for the construction of the Nicaragua
Canal by the United States Government."17
In addition to fearing British intrigue in the Isthmus, many southerners shared a
suspicion that northern capital had conspired to prevent the speedy construction of a
canal. Railroads, more than any other sector, bore the brunt of the South's vilification.
Southern farmers had long complained about discriminatory rates levied for transporting
their goods; in the 1890's, many accused the railroads of using their political power to
block the Nicaragua canal for equally selfish reasons. The Southern Pacific Line, as the
leading carrier of transisthmian freight, received the harshest indictments. Some in the
South suggested that the "Pacific railroads—the Southern Pacific especially—have again
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got control of the transportation route to the east by way of the isthmus of Panama and
the Panama railroad" and, with their monopoly had enacted "extortionate" rates. Southern
anti-monopoly sentiment led them to support a canal as a means to "facilitate the exchange
of commodities, between the two sections of the country . . . giving to each the products
of the other, with much less taken out for freight than is now charged." While much of the
southern criticism of the canal's opponents focused on prevailing perceptions of trusts and
monopolies, some reached the conclusion that nothing less than a sectional battle for
economic supremacy was at stake. A rural Alabama editor suggested that the Nicaragua
Canal would transfer "the seat of business and industry" to the South, and "the North and
East would suffer. For that reason the canal is opposed by men from those sections .. .."
Further, he urged southerners who supported the economic uplift of their region to insist
upon the quick completion of the canal despite opposition from other regions.18
The idea that the canal would make the South the great commercial center of the
nation captivated the entire region. Southerners looked at the Pacific coast as a potential
market for many of its agricultural products, especially tobacco and fruit. Some
southerners even believed that the canal would provide the South with the ability to break
the dominance that eastern manufacturers held over the West. Eastern commercial
hegemony hindered the development of longitudinal trade patterns, they reasoned;
consequently, most of the products of the interior were shipped by rail to the East Coast
for local consumption or transshipment overseas. Southerners hoped that the cost and
distance advantages associated with an isthmian canal would redirect the trade of the
western United States from eastern to southern ports. As a result, numerous pundits
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predicted future greatness for the port cities of the region. A leading southern business
journal anticipated that upon completion of an isthmian canal, Galveston, New Orleans,
Savannah, Charleston, Port Royal and Newport News would assume increasing
■

importance as great export centers.

|Q

The report of a federal commission in 1895 declared the Nicaraguan route feasible
and bolstered regional confidence that the domestic products of the nation would be
exported from the South. The Austin Daily Statesman predicted that no state would
benefit from the construction of a canal as much as Texas, and that work should begin
immediately to establish safe harbors along the Texas coast. The state's ports, in the
future, would be great "entrepots for the trade that will flow through this channel as well
from Texas as from other States of the West and Northwest." Mobile and New Orleans
also expected to capitalize on the western trade that would follow the opening of the
canal. A rural Alabama newspaper editor, for example, believed that with the canal,
"Mobile will expand so fast, that they won't be able to 'see how we grow' unless they
neglect everything else." On the floor of the House, Samuel Pasco, a Democratic
representative from Monticello, Florida, claimed that the people of his state expected great
things from the canal given Florida's southernmost location in the Union. Such a location,
Pasco concluded, "promises us a large share in the commercial advantages which will
come from the successful completion and operation of this great work."20
Not only did the South expect to benefit from an increase in the domestic trade
with the Pacific states, but many in the region also envisioned vast, new markets opening
for southern goods in the Far East. They pointed to how the opening of the Suez Canal in
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1869 gave Great Britain a significant advantage in trade with the countries of Asia and
predicted a Nicaraguan canal would provide similar benefits to the United States. Because
of increased American missionary activity in China in the 1880's and early 1890’s, some
southerners suggested that closer Sino-American relations were possible. In the minds of
many, 400 million Chinese presented a potential market too vast to be ignored, especially
during the depression years after 1893. Clearly, this interest in the Far East was rooted in
the possibilities of the future, not the realities of the present. The attention given to Far
Eastern trade far surpassed the region's significance as a trading partner with the United
States. At no time during the years between 1894 and 1904 did the value of commerce
with China, Japan and Hong Kong exceed 5.5% of total American trade. In fact, trade
with China and Japan was dwarfed by trade with Great Britain and significantly
overshadowed by trade with Cuba and Mexico. Nonetheless, the prospect of securing and
exploiting Far Eastern trade received enormous attention around the turn of the century as
a means of providing for substantial economic growth into the next century.21 (See
Table 2)
In the 1890's, the prospect of increased trade with China excited many of the
South's beleaguered cotton growers who struggled economically and confronted special
problems. High cotton prices immediately after the Civil War led many fanners to abandon
other crops in favor of cotton. The fever to plant the staple crop produced enormous crop
yields; by the early 1870's, the South was annually producing more cotton than at any time
since before the Civil War. Increased production, however, led to steadily declining prices
during the remainder of the century. Prices plummeted from a postwar high of around 43
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TABLE 2
Value of U.S. Imports and Exports to Selected Countries,
1894 to 1904 (in millions)
Year

Total Value of
All U.S. ImportsExports

Value to
Destination

1894
1896
1898
1900
1902
1904

1547
1663
1847
2244
2285
2452

Cuba
96
48
25
57
62
104

Mexico
42
36
40
64
80
90

China
23
29
30
42
46
42

Janan
51
46
53
54
47
44

Avg.

2006

65

59

35

49

(Table derived from Historical Statistics of the United States, pp. 903-7 and Dennett, p.
581.)
cents a pound in 1866-67 to less than 10 cents a pound in the 1870's. Nonetheless, for the
next three decades southerners continued to produce more and more cotton. With over a
million farms in the South devoted primarily to the production of cotton, the steady
decline in prices in the Gilded Age was calamitous. Consequently, when the depression of
1893 drove cotton prices to a record low of 5 cents per pound, many in the region saw
overseas markets as a potential source of relief.22
The importance of cotton in the South's economy predicated the region's keen
interest in potential new markets m China and the Far East. In the 1890's, both China and
Japan imported the vast majority of their cotton goods through Great Britain.
Furthermore, amidst the disintegration of the Ming dynasty in China, it appeared as
though European powers were jockeying for position to carve out ever greater spheres of
influence in Asia. By 1898, France, Russia, Germany, Japan and Great Britain had
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forcibly obtained exclusive rights to develop certain regions and mineral deposits from the
Chinese Empire. Many southerners feared that failure to build a canal and establish an
oceanic highway to Asia would allow European powers to establish permanent control
over Asian, especially Chinese, markets and lock out future American economic
penetration.23
In early 1895, an article in the Arkansas Gazette expressed the common concern
that European nations would capitalize on China's weakness in the wake of its defeat in
the Sino-Japanese War. The paper noted, however, that American economic exclusion
from China could be averted. If the United States completed the Nicaraguan canal at some
early date, "it would place this country in a position to command the commerce of the
world . .. and make us all the busiest people on the face of the globe . . . . The South has
nothing to lose and everything to gain by the construction of this canal." Numerous other
articles in southern newspapers and journals suggested that the Far East represented a
great market for the South's leading staple crop. Similarly, New South spokesmen
heralded the possibilities of increased trade with the Orient. Former Minister to Siam,
John Barrett, exhorted the New Orleans Board of Trade to prepare for a new age of
commercial greatness that would accompany the opening of markets in the Far East for
southern cotton. Not only did China and Japan constitute a ready market for southern
textiles, Barrett contended, but anticipated growth in the Asian textile industry would
provide enormous opportunities for the South to sell raw cotton.24
Clearly, by 1895, a consensus of opinion existed in the South favoring the
construction of a Nicaraguan canal under the direct control of the federal government.
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Southern support for a canal project cut across occupational lines and was rooted in a
common hope that an isthmian waterway would provide economic opportunities—
agricultural, industrial and commercial—for the entire region. Farmers expected the canal
to eliminate onerous freight charges on their products and open up vast new markets in
the Pacific United States and in the Far East. A rural north Georgia paper saw the canal
as "the greatest enterprise now before the business world . . . [that would] open a new
country for American products, particularly cotton, lumber, and naval stores. . . . "
Another regional editorial proclaimed that with the canal, Japan would "buy all their
cotton from the American planters." Given the economic malaise of the region, and near
record low prices for the section's chief staple crop, cotton, agricultural interests looked at
the canal project as a sure means to improve the lot of southern farmers.25
Commercial and industrial interests in the region's towns, cities and ports also
showed great concern in the proposed canal. An isthmian canal promised to provide a
huge economic stimulus for the region's nascent manufacturers, especially textiles and
iron, by opening up new markets. Indeed, southern business organizations provided the
most vocal support for a canal throughout the early 1890's. In a petition to Congress in
February of 1894, the Nashville Board of Trade and Chamber of Commerce declared that
"our people regard the Nicaragua Canal as the only available project holding out to our
producers and merchants the project of permanent relief, in the desideratum of cheap
freights to the great markets of the world." "This beneficent work," the petition
continued, "will inaugurate a new era of prosperity in the Gulf States of our Republic, and
throughout the great valley of the Mississippi." Several months later the Chamber of
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Commerce and Industry of Louisiana unanimously supported a petition urging Congress
to build and control the Nicaraguan Canal. The Louisianians maintained that when the
canal was completed, it would "attract the World's Commerce to such an extent as to give
results compared with which the already enormous profits of the Suez Canal enterprise
will sink into insignificance."26
Business ieaders across the South expected the canal to provide immediate
economic relief for the region and to enhance permanently the commercial prospects of
southern ports. Consequently, when the federal government sent a team of experts to
survey the situation in Nicaragua in May of 1895, a national publication accurately noted
that news of the action "has been noted with a special satisfaction by the press of the
southern seaport towns . . . . Commercial bodies in the southern ports are looking
forward with high hopes to an era of great prosperity which they believe will follow upon
the opening of the Nicaraguan Canal."27
Given the region's support for a canal, it was appropriate that a southerner,
Senator John T. Morgan, of Alabama, emerged in the 1890's as the leading spokesman for
the Nicaragua Canal. Morgan, an ex-Confederate officer and Bourbon, took a southern
approach to foreign policy that was both intensely nationalist and conciiiatoiy, yet fiercely
regional in its origin. While noting both the economic and strategic importance of an
isthmian canal for the entire nation, Morgan emphasized his concern for the uplift of his
native region. He hoped that an active internationalist foreign policy would lead to the
acquisition of overseas territory and markets made even more accessible to the South by
way of an American-owned isthmian canal. With overseas markets opened to southern
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goods, Morgan predicted, his native region would enjoy unprecedented prosperity and the
ports along the Gulf coast would become the preeminent entrepots for American
commerce. In the end, Morgan's vision of the world represented both a deep desire to see
his country achieve world prominence and a passion--as a southerner—to see his native
region realize its economic potential and thus liberate itself from its economic dependence
on the North.28
Morgan's extreme internationalism, especially his support for the acquisition of
overseas territory, was not shared by the majority of southerners. Indeed, most
southerners' foreign policy attitudes rejected colonies outright. Nonetheless, Morgan won
universal praise across the region as the leading spokesmen for an isthmian canal. To be
sure, few southerners were as obstinate as Morgan in clinging to the Nicaraguan route, but
most recognized the advantages ir. distance and cost for the South in such a proposal.
Despite Morgan's position as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the
prospects of a canal in Nicaragua remained but a hopeful dream to most southerners in
1895.
*

*

*

In several aspects, the Atlanta Cotton States and International Exposition reflected
southern popular attitudes regarding the role of international markets to the economic
health of the South. Although small and quaint compared with the massive, white
columned buildings at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago, the mere presence of
numerous, solidly built structures at Atlanta's Exposition served as a testament to the
progress the South had made since the Civil War and as an advertisement that the region
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was ready to compete in the international market. In addition, exhibits from across the
South portrayed the region as teeming with vast, untapped natural and human resources.
Some exhibits featured mineral resources found in abundance in Alabama and Tennessee;
others featured citrus and other produce from Florida; still others emphasized the progress
southern workers had made through technical education. A leading journal of southern
industry proclaimed that the exhibits "tell a wonderful story to the peoples of the world"
of how southerners by their own industry had "worked a revolution in the land."29
On the surface, the exposition served as a source of pride and optimism for the
South. More important, the exposition sought to impress guests from outside the region
of the South's great potential for investment or trade. Over a year before the fair's
opening, many southern business leaders, not just those in Atlanta, spoke of the economic
opportunities that the exposition might create. In May 1894, a large and enthusiastic
gathering of members of the Little Rock Board of Trade endorsed the exposition,
especially its attempt to obtain a greater share of the trade "of all the lands south of us
which belongs to the United States by geographical neighborhood . ..." New Orleanians,
too, supported the exposition's mission to "not only make the North and Europe better
acquainted with Southern resources, but open Latin American trade to us." In order to
make their case to the nations of Latin America, the fair's promoters sent to the region a
personal representative, Colonel Isaac W. Avery, to indicate the South's desire for closer
trade relations and to solicit official participation at the exposition from their governments.
Although Avery secured only four exhibits from Latin America, he did convince Mexico,
Venezuela, Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica to send delegations.30
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Governor William Y. Atkinson of Georgia, in The North American Review.
discussed the importance of the exposition—for the South, the nation, and for the future of
international trade. To be sure, Governor Atkinson's interest in the fair's mission to attract
Latin American business stemmed from a growing southern desire to see regional industry,
especially manufactured cotton goods, challenge the dominance of Britain on the South
American continent. Atkinson recognized that South America furnished "close at hand a
vast market for the very grade of cotton goods that the South is now manufacturing in
greatest abundance."31
Popular southern support for government efforts to make foreign markets more
accessible also found expression at the exposition. On November 30, 1895, Nicaragua
Canal Day, the scheduled festivities included speeches supporting the canal and a call for
those present to sign petitions urging Congress to act. The Vice-President of the
Exposition, William A. Hemphill, presided over the day's events and spoke of the canal's
importance to the South and the nation. Hemphill emphasized the economic benefits that
the canal would provide by making markets more accessible. In addition, Hemphill read a
message from Senator Morgan in which he vigorously urged the nation to build the
Nicaraguan Canal at the earliest possible date. After the morning's speeches, the attendees
passed resolutions urging Congress to give the matter early and earnest consideration.32
Support for the canal and a desire for low tariffs reflected majority opinion among
southerners in the early 1890's. Many southerners biameu the economic malaise of the
period on protectionist tariffs and the inability of the domestic market to consume
southern goods, especially cotton. Falling agricultural prices and concomitant economic
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deprivation in the South caused many in the region to search for solutions to the region's
poor economic health. Many leaders in the New South had long urged the region to end
its international isolation; in a period of chronic economic decline, these messages found a
receptive audience. Low tariffs and an isthmian canal would end the South's economic
isolation, open up new markets for southern goods, and pave the way for the prosperous
future the New South prophets had long proclaimed. This vision of the potentialities of
foreign policy activism inspired hope among southemers—hope that American
internationalism would provide the South with material rewards.
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CHAPTER 2
DOLLARS AND CULTURE:
THE SOUTH, VENEZUELA AND HAWAII

President Cleveland’s special message
to congress is a strong and patriotic
exposition of a doctrine, the enforcement
of which has been held by every American
statesman from the time o f its original
assertion to be essential to the natonal
welfare. It has been made painfully
evident by recent aggressions of Great
Britain in Central America that our
government was confronted with the
alternatives o f a virtual waiver of the
Monroe doctrine or of its positive re
assertion and enforcement at any hazard
and at any cost.

The future of Hawaii, under a government
that can provide for and control its assured
development, such as the United States,
Great Britain, or Germany, is full of interest
to all the maritime nations, and is of the
greatest importance to the commercial
world.

—Ft. Worth Gazette. 18951

John T. Morgan, 18983

Happiness and freedom within only to be
attained by peace without. Such peace was
to be maintained only by the notorious
possession of power to resist aggression;
power could, in the absence of standing
armies and great fleets, lie only in an
immense territory, compact, contiguous;
filled by a population homogenous, free;
proud of their freedom and jealous to
maintain it, and equally jealous to maintain
their country’s independence and unity—for
these are the expression and the shield to
the outer world o f their freedom.

It seems that war with England is
threatening. May it be averted. A war
with England-our own blood and tongue,
even if a necessity, is little short of
a crime against civilization. England
and the United States-mother and
daughter, are the last two peoples
who ought to go to war.
-David T. Boyd, 1895« 2

-John S. Williams, 18984

34
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Two foreign policy crises in the mid-1890's revealed that southerners' view of the
world reflected a level of complexity that transcended economic determinism. The New
South prophets' campaign to build widespread southern support for a more expansionist
foreign policy ran into difficulty when their rhetoric challenged some of the deeply-held
socio-cultural values of the great majority of southerners. In developing positions in the
public debate over American policy regarding the Venezuelan boundary dispute and the
annexation of Hawaii, most southerners relied on social and cultural factors, some unique
to the South. Consequently, while the prophets emphasized economics and markets, most
southerners continued to examine foreign policy from the perspective provided by a
common southern cultural experience. The result was that issues such as national and
regional honor, racism, partisan politics and group identity played a far greater role than
economic opportunity in determining the southern response to both of these foreign policy
events.5
*

*

*

A long-standing boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana
constituted the most serious breach in Anglo-American relations in the mid-1890's. The
Venezuela boundary dispute began shortly after Great Britain acquired the provinces of
Berbice, Demarara, and Essequibo, from the Dutch in 1814. Renaming the provinces
British Guiana, the territorial cession lacked a definite western boundary with Venezuela.
As a result, questions arose over ownership of approximately 50,000 square miles in the
sparsely settled Orinico River Valley. In 1835, Great Britain appointed Sir Robert
Schomburgk, a geographer, to determine a legitimate boundary between British Guiana
and Venezuela. Citing earlier records of Dutch exploration and settlement, Schomburgk
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determined that the Dutch cession included most of the disputed territory, including the
strategic Point Barima that controlled traffic through the Orinico River. Angered at
Britain's claims in 1841, Venezuela rejected the Schomburgk Line in 1841 and requested
further negotiations on a boundary settlement. After several fruitless efforts to resolve the
matter, diplomats from both countries agreed not to allow their nationals to settle in the
disputed territory.
Until the 1870's, the boundary dispute received little attention outside of London
and Caracas. However, in the mid-1870's, the discovery of large deposits of gold in the
disputed territory caused both nations to push for a permanent boundary settlement. To
be sure, both coveted the region's newly found mineral wealth. Venezuela requested that
the entire dispute be resolved through arbitration; Britain refused to place any territory
east of the Schomburgk Line up for mediation. As the weaker party, Venezuela invoked
the Monroe Doctrine in an attempt to elicit American intervention. In 1887, Secretary of
State Thomas Bayard offered to assist in arbitrating the dispute, but Britain refused.
Despite the offer of American good offices and the bravado of a few politicians, most
Americans paid little attention to the dispute since it did not seem to affect any national
interests.6
In 1894, the American public began to pay more attention to the dispute over
territory in Venezuela as a result of the propaganda efforts by the Venezuelan
government. The government in Caracas hired a Georgian who had once served as the
United States Minister to Venezuela to serve as a legal adviser and special agent to the
Ministry of State, especially on matters pertaining to the boundary dispute with Great
Britain. In this role, William C. Scruggs noted that the issue had heretofore attracted little
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attention among Americans because they worried more about domestic problems
stemming from the depression. With this overwhelming public disinterest in the imbroglio,
Scruggs doubted that any public figures in Washington would champion the cause of a
resolution to a foreign boundary dispute. Scruggs, therefore, believed that his first task

would be to engage in a public education campaign "to create an interest in the
Venezuelan question."7
The task of making a foreign boundary dispute meaningful to the lives of ordinary
Americans would be difficult—especially during the depression. Scruggs, therefore, tried

to exploit what he believed to be a deeply-held, persistent commitment among Americans
to the Monroe Doctrine. By providing the American public with only the Venezuelan side
of the dispute, Scruggs hoped to generate overwhelming public sympathy for Venezuela.
In 1894, in a pamphlet entitled "The Venezuelan Question," he presented the case to the
American public in very simple terms:

Briefly stated it [the question] is about this; whether, under pretexts
afforded by a controversy which she obstinately refuses to settle in any just
and reasonable basis England shall be permitted to dismember an American
republic, and to indefinitely extend her colonial system on this continent in
violation of public law and in disregard of the principles of the Monroe
Doctrine.8
In October of 1894, Scruggs published "British Aggressions in Venezuela, or The
Monroe Doctrine on Trial," his most important piece of propaganda. At his own expense,
Scruggs distributed copies of this work to newspaper editors, members of Congress,
governors, and other important political leaders. The pamphlet presented the history of
the boundary dispute and asserted that Venezuela's claims antedated Britain's by several
years; in addition, Scruggs rejected many of Britain's claims as groundless. Britain's
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demands, therefore, represented an illegitimate attempt to seize Venezuelan territory.
Finally, Scruggs concluded that the refusal of England to accept Venezuela's offers of
outside arbitration, dating back to 1844, suggested England's territorial designs in the
hemisphere were not restricted solely to the Orinico River Valley.
Most damning of all in the court of American opinion, however, were Scruggs'
charges that Britain's actions violated the prohibition against "recolonization" contained in
the Monroe Doctrine. Regardless of its validity in international law, its principles, Scruggs
claimed, constituted "an unwritten law of a fundamental character which had already
become as sacred to the American people as the Constitution itself." Since its formulation
by Monroe, the doctrine had "been confirmed by every subsequent President of the United
States." Given the gravity of Britain's transgressions, Scruggs concluded that America's
failure to intervene "would be an explicit and final abandonment of those principles [of the
declaration of 1823]; and that would involve a sacrifice of national honor and prestige
such as no first-class power is likely ever to make, even for the sake of peace." Scruggs
emphasized the near universal American approval of the doctrine; many, he maintained,
held it to be inviolable. The former foreign minister from Georgia rightly perceived the
immense popularity of the doctrine; his appeals, more than anything else, elevated public
awareness of the boundary dispute and increased support for direct intervention.9
In January of 1895, Scruggs' pamphlet, already in its fourth printing, began to have
an impact on the government's Venezuela policy. Leonidas F. Livingston, a congressman
from Scruggs' district in Georgia, introduced a resolution urging Great Britain and
Venezuela to refer the boundary dispute to friendly arbitration. In support of the
resolution, Livingston repeated many of the charges leveled against Great Britain by
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Scruggs in "The Monroe Doctrine on Trial." Livingston challenged the validity of
Britain's claims and expressed his concern at Britain's refusal to accept arbitration. Like
Scruggs, Livingston suggested that England was exploiting a small, weak Latin American
republic for its own selfish ends; he also argued that as the weaker party in the dispute,
Venezuela had a right to expect American intervention under the Monroe Doctrine.
During an impassioned plea before the House in February of 1895, in what could have
passed as an excerpt from Scruggs' own work, Livingston concluded:
To abandon that doctrine and repudiate the whole traditions of our
Government touching its policy toward the South American Republics now
would be not only an act of bad faith, but would involve us in international
disputes and complications the end and consequences of which no man can
foresee. It would be not only such a surrender of national prestige as
would make us the jest of the civilized world, but it would be such an act
of pusillanimity as the people of the United States would never ratify.. . .
There is but one honorable course before us. Come what may, we have no
choice but to resolutely maintain our self-respect and prestige as a nation.10
On February 22, 1895, Livingston's resolution was approved by the unanimous vote of
both houses.
Despite Scruggs's propaganda campaign and Congress's resolution, the
Venezuelan question failed to capture the imagination of the southern masses early in
1895. Nonetheless, Anglo-American relations remained strained; especially during April
and May when Great Britain directly intervened in Nicaragua. This episode, the so-called
Corinto Affair, stemmed from the arrest and deportation of a British consular official by
the Nicaraguan government. Britain accused Nicaragua of acting illegally in the matter
and of unduly insulting the honor of both the consular official and Great Britain. After
Managua ignored Britain's demands for a public apology and an indemnity, Great Britain
dispatched four hundred Royal Marines to the port city of Corinto to collect
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compensation. During this crisis, Managua appealed to the United States to intervene to
expel the British under the Monroe Doctrine. Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Walter
Q. Gresham, refused to act. The Cleveland Administration maintained that the British
occupation of Corinto was temporary and, therefore, did not constitute a direct violation
of the Monroe Doctrine's prohibition against future colonization by a European power. In
the end, the intervention of the United States in the matter was a moot question; by May 2
the British marines had left Corinto.11
By the late spring of 1895, President Cleveland faced mounting criticism over such
inaction. A general campaign of jingoism, waged largely by the Republican press, had
created a reservoir of hostility toward Great Britain. Viewed in this light, the policies
pursued by Secretary of State Gresham regarding alleged British aggressions in Nicaragua
and Venezuela appeared inconsistent with public opinion. Some national business leaders
believed that the administration's refusal to stand firmly against Great Britain would make
it more difficult for American capital to penetrate Latin American markets; other critics
condemned Cleveland's refusal to uphold the honor and integrity of the Monroe Doctrine.
Regardless of their origins, these attacks against Cleveland caused serious concern in the
White House and paved the way for a shift in policy after Gresham's sudden death in
May.12
The real crisis in Anglo-American relations arising from the Venezuelan question
occurred under Gresham's successor at the State Department, Richard Olney. Olney
quickly abandoned Gresham's conciliatory posture and responded to administration critics
by sending a stem message to the British prime minister. Olney’s letter of July 20, 1895,
outlined the history of the boundary dispute and of Britain's repeated refusals to accept

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

arbitration of all the territory in question. More important, Olney vigorously asserted that
by its actions in Venezuela, Great Britain had violated the Monroe Doctrine. America
was, therefore, justified in interfering in the matter since Britain’s prior refusal of American
offers of arbitration constituted a disregard for American law and honor. Finally, Olney
requested that British Prime Minister Salisbury respond to this offer of arbitration in a
timely fashion, so that President Cleveland could announce it to Congress in his next
annual message.13
In the fall of 1895, southerners expressed their opinions on the Venezuelan
question amidst leaks to the press regarding the serious nature and forceful tone of Olney's
letter. Most southerners supported Olney's broad interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine
that reaffirmed the provisions prohibiting European colonization. Indeed, the South
shared Olney's view that the Doctrine represented a canon in American public law.
Southerners differed, however, over how strongly to press the matter. Joseph Wheeler, a
congressman from Alabama and ex-Confederate general, represented the jingoist minority
who suggested military action against England should Salisbury refuse arbitration.
Writing in the North American Review. Wheeler proposed that the United States use the
Monroe Doctrine to demand arbitration from Great Britain in the matter as a pretext to
challenge and reverse Britain's commercial hegemony in the Western hemisphere. In
regards to the Monroe Doctrine, Wheeler believed "that the United States should extend
its policy and look to the establishment of depots and naval stations around which
American colonies would locate, sufficiently strong to encourage and protect our trade
and commerce."14
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Unlike Wheeler, the majority of southerners did not view the Venezuelan question
as serious enough to warrant armed intervention; nor did most southerners expect any
great commercial benefit to follow from strong American demands. Most business
interests consistently opposed American action in the dispute that threatened peaceful
relations between the United States and Great Britain. Many southern businessmen
involved in the cotton trade were mindful of the fact that Britain was the largest foreign
consumer of southern cotton. Given the small volume of trade, especially in southern
cotton, with Venezuela, anti-British jingoes made little headway in influencing southern
opinion in the summer and fall of 1895. (See Tables 3,4 and 5)
Along with the regional concern over markets for cotton exports, many
southerners concluded that there were too many common bonds between Great Britain
and the United States to risk a war over a foreign boundary dispute. Arguments against
war based upon Anglo-Saxon kinship were particularly compelling in the South where
much of the population was of English stock. More than any other section of the country,
the South remained relatively untouched by the flood of immigrants from southern and
eastern Europe that came to America after the Civil War. By 1900, when nearly half of
America's non-southern population was either foreign-born or bom of immigrant parents,
only a tenth of the South's residents were classified in that category.15
Undoubtedly, the close economic and cultural relationship between the South and
Great Britain effected southerners' perception of the boundary dispute. While much of the
nation was gripped in anti-British hysteria, many in the South maintained their traditional
affection for British culture, customs and institutions. One southern observer noted that
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TABLE 3
Value of U.S. Imports and Exports to Great Britain
and Venezuela, 1895 (in millions of dollars)
Great Britain

Venezuela

Exports

Imports

Total

Exports

Imports

Total

387.125

159.083

546.209

3.740

10.073

13.814

TABLE 4
Quantities of Domestic Raw Cotton Exported to South America
and the United Kingdom, 1893-1895 (in pounds)
Country to
Which Exported
U.K.

Year
1893
1,181,587,898

1894
1,485,451,425

1895
1,776,890,909

70,643

130,145

140,714

South America

TABLES
Commercial Cotton Crops and Exports
to Great Britain, 1894-1895

Year
1894
1895

Exports to
Total Commercial
G.B.
Cotton Crop
tin thousands of bales')
7,532
9,837

2,861
3,449

Exports to G.B.
As % of Total

38
35

(Tables derived from Statistical Abstract of the United States—1895. pp. 84-110, 286287.)
while jingoes in Congress talked of war with Great Britain, southern representatives
emphasized the "many common ties, hopes and purposes" we shared with that nation.
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Furthermore, the South rejected the notion that a territorial dispute in a Latin American
republic was sufficient cause to go to war with England. Most in the region shared the
view "that two great nations, largely of the same blood, and speaking the same language,
are not going to fall to cutting each other's throats . . . ,"16
On the eve of Cleveland's message to Congress in December of 1895, a majority of
southerners expressed both a strong rhetorical commitment to the Monroe Doctrine and a
desire to see the Venezuelan matter resolved without bloodshed. Most in the South
understood the boundaiy dispute as a legitimate test of the Doctrine, but hoped that
American policy could be adequately upheld through successful arbitration. An Arkansas
editor succinctly expressed this view when he noted, "We favor the Monroe Doctrine, but
we don't believe in jingoism." Other southerners expressed the view that the boundary
dispute would not serve as a suitable pretext for war; indeed, such a pretext would "not
meet with the approval of the people."17
Cleveland's efforts to maintain a conservative position in the boundary dispute
became increasingly difficult as political pressure mounted to take decisive action. The
administration faced growing resentment in some parts of the nation for its apparent
unwillingness to force Great Britain's hand in the matter. Lord Salisbury's failure to
respond in a timely fashion to Olney's letter angered Cleveland and forced him to alter his
message to Congress of December 17, 1895. Cleveland's address reflected the growing
partisan conflict surrounding the debate over the Venezuelan affair as well as his desire to
exonerate the administration and his party from charges of weakness in its dealings with
Britain.
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Cleveland's address emphasized the relevance of the Monroe Doctrine to the
dispute and of British challenges to the hallowed American doctrine. In his account of the
long history of the boundary dispute, and of Britain's repeated refusals of American
arbitration, the president argued that Britain's abuse of power in Venezuela clearly
violated the principles of Monroe. He also declared that the United States must enforce
respect for the principles of the doctrine not only for Venezuela's sake, but for the purpose
of maintaining "our peace and safety as a nation and . . . the integrity of our free
institutions . . . . " More important, Cleveland portrayed the episode as a challenge to
national honor and warned of the consequences for failing to act. According to the
president, "There is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which
follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national
self-respect and honor. . . . " In concluding, Cleveland firmly established his commitment
to defend the principles of the Monroe Doctrine by calling for Congress to create a
boundary commission with full authority to impose a boundary settlement should Great
Britain and Venezuela fail to resolve the matter.18
Cleveland's message to Congress caused many southerners to reconsider the
Venezuelan question. The president's assertive position and his attempt to give the
impression of unity and strength within the Democratic Party produced a marked shift of
public attitudes in the South. In the weeks after his December 17 speech, Cleveland
successfully rallied southern support for his new, more militant approach. Where
previously only a minority had supported American intervention, a majority of southerners
now embraced the president's call to defend the Monroe Doctrine, even if it meant war
with Great Britain.
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The South appeared more willing to accept war with Great Britain after Cleveland
placed the honor of the United States at stake in the controversy with Great Britain. By
firmly declaring that Britain's actions violated a fundamental principle of American law,
Cleveland portrayed Salisbury's repudiations of American offers of arbitration as a sign of
disrespect and dishonor. Failure to force British compliance, Cleveland suggested, would
make the United States appear weak to the other nations of the world. In Savannah, a
newspaper editor noted the grave nature of the crisis and concluded "that the time has
come for this country either to insist upon a proper recognition of the Monroe doctrine or
to abandon that doctrine altogether." His community, the Georgia editor continued, stood
squarely behind the president and "nothing. . . will alter the determination of the American
people to uphold the Monroe doctrine . . . . " Others in the region asserted the nation's
honor-bound commitment to take forceful action to prevent Britain from disregarding
American rights in the hemisphere. For the United States to allow Britain to impose
unilaterally a boundary line in Venezuela "would be bad faith to Venezuela and cowardly
on the part of this government to such an extent that we would lose respect and standing
among the nations of the earth. . . . " Even the staunchly pro-commerce Mobile Daily
Register declared that in this matter honor must take precedence over "trade, commerce,
and profits in dealing with Great Britain."19
Similar expressions of support for the president came from across the South. In
Public Opinion, a survey of editorials in selected southern Democratic newspapers
indicated that approximately seventy percent of them supported the Administration's
tougher stand. Another informal survey by the Birmingham State Herald found that most
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governors approved of the president's position on enforcing the Monroe Doctrine and,
that most of the residents of their respective states supported "his patriotic efforts in behalf
of the honor and dignity of the United States."20
In Congress, Cleveland's message received universal acclaim. Partisans from both
sides of the aisle scrambled to show their support for the president and the revivified
Monroe Doctrine. On December 18, 1895, amidst considerable applause, Charles Crisp of
Georgia declared, "If the American people have a fixed opinion upon any question, it is
the opinion that no European country shall be permitted to acquire territory on the
American continent by force." After a few questions regarding procedural matters, the
House voted unanimously to create an American boundary commission "to investigate and
report upon the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana
. . . " and appropriated $ 100,000 for its operation. A few months later in the Senate,
Newton Blanchard of Louisiana delivered a ringing endorsement of the president's action
and castigated Lord Salisbury for Britain's continued obstinance. The popularity of the
doctrine, Blanchard proclaimed,
is not confined to any section or class of our people. It pervades all alike;
it leaps over party lines and rises above party feeling . . . . Go ask the
people of the . . . rapidly recuperating South, and they will tell you that the
time has come for a broadening of the scope of the Monroe doctrine of
1823, and for a much more enlarged application of it.21
Senator Blanchard's rhetoric captured the rising jingoist fervor that gripped the
nation; however, his assessment of the geographical breadth and emotional depth of public
support failed to recognize the persistent opposition to intervention of key conservative
groups in the South. These critics of Cleveland's policy represented a cross-section of the
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southern middle class. As a group, they disliked the intense partisan tone of the debate
over Venezuela and feared that Cleveland and Congress might risk war with England to
obtain political advantage. Jabez Lamar Monroe Curiy, former minister to Spain during
the first Cleveland Administration, ridiculed the notion of fighting a war with England
over the boundary of a "contemptible little republic." Curry also observed that, "There
seems to be a rivalry between the two parties in Congress as to which shall be the readier
and more blatant in jingoism." Similarly, Henry Hammond of South Carolina, scion of the
late wealthy planter James Henry Hammond, chided politicians for their jingoist rhetoric
and actions and declared that he "would as soon go to war with Kit and Alf [his brothers]
as with England."22
Other anti-jingoist spokesmen represented the commercial class of the South.
Their arguments, too, criticized the partisan nature of the debate and the seemingly
irrational actions of Congress. In addition, some southerners feared that a war with
England would be economically devastating for the South because it would drive southern
cotton prices downward. A leading conservative Texas daily asked its readers if "any man
with sober sense considered one of the semi-annual rackets of Venezuela sufficient cause
for a disturbance of the commercial relations between the United States and friendly
European customers?" Another southern editor hoped that the "war-scare" would subside
due to the antipathy to war with England shown by the commercial interests of the
country. He, like many other southerners, continued to urge arbitration despite the pleas
of jingoes in Washington.23
Especially important in reducing war hysteria in the South was Parliament's
decision of January 11,1896, to open negotiations regarding the boundary dispute. The
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British Parliament made it clear that arbitration of the matter would be acceptable if
certain guidelines were followed by a boundary commission. Parliament's action largely
diffused the crisis in Anglo-American relations, though some jingoes continued to bluster
over the slow pace of the talks and the need for the United States to impose a boundary
line between the two parties.
Many southerners cheered Parliament's decision and saw it as an opportunity io
build closer Anglo-American ties in the future. In the weeks following Parliament's
acceptance of negotiations, some southerners expressed a desire to establish a formal
mechanism for Anglo-American arbitration to resolve future controversies. In the Senate,
John W. Daniel of Virginia proclaimed,
Arbitration is the modem and the rightful method of settling differences
between nations. It is the substitute for war. It appeals to humanity. It is
necessary to civilization. It is Christianity.
In North Carolina, the yearly meeting of the Society of Friends lamented the fact that war
passions against Great Britain had become so inflamed as to threaten amicable relations
between the two countries. A resolution from the North Carolina Quakers to Congress
reiterated their commitment to pacifism and their satisfaction that many Americans joined
them in opposing war. The group expressed their thanks "that the spirit of peace began to
assert itself, first by the religious organizations and benevolent associations, then by
commercial organizations, and now by the people, until the prevailing sentiment seems to
be in opposition to War." The North Carolinians, too, urged Congress to consider
establishing a system of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain.24
On February 22,1896, a mass meeting in Chattanooga, Tennessee, expressed
similar support for Anglo-American arbitration. The Chattanoogans resolved that "all
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Christian nations should abandon war as a means of settling international disputes." More
specifically, the group suggested that "on account of their peculiar relations, of language,
civilization and blood . .., " the United States and England should create a mechanism
whereby all disputes could be resolved peaceably. Likewise, the faculty of a Virginia
college expressed their regret that the United States and Great Britain had faced the
prospect of war because no court of arbitration existed between the two nations during the
negotiations regarding Venezuela.25
The final resolution of the Venezuela boundary dispute proved to be anticlimactic.
In February of 1897, Great Britain and Venezuela signed a treaty of arbitration that placed
the matter before a tribunal of five men. As a result, the American boundary commission
disbanded and turned over its findings to the new body. Two and a half years later, in
October 1899, the arbitration tribunal unanimously awarded Great Britain ninety percent
of the disputed territory; however, Venezuela received the strategically important port at
Barima that gave it control of the mouth of the Orinico River.26
Although Venezuela's extreme claims were rejected, most southerners seemed
generally satisfied with the decision. Indeed, after the first few months of 1896, the entire
question of the boundary dispute disappeared from the headlines and years later evoked
little public commentary on the actions of the tribunal. Southerners, like other Americans,
confronted more pressing issues, both domestic and foreign, in the interim. During the
crisis, most southerners had hoped that the Monroe Doctrine could be honorably
maintained without resorting to a war with England—with whom the South shared
common ties. The decision by Great Britain to accept arbitration satisfied those who
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wanted British recognition and respect. In addition, there was no strong southern
opposition to the size of the British award; on the contrary, southerners probably preferred
to see the matter settled to the satisfaction of Great Britain so as to preclude any future
territorial disputes in the region that might involve American intervention. The relative
absence of southern commentary on the Venezuelan question after the spring of 1896
suggests that the South's goals in the matter would be realized through arbitration.
The South's reaction to the Venezuela boundary dispute suggested that several key
factors shaped public attitudes. Like many other Americans, southerners revered the
Monroe Doctrine; failure to uphold its principles represented a loss of honor.
Nevertheless, the South's desire to maintain good commercial relations with Great Britain
and feelings of Anglo-Saxon kinship contributed to strong pro-British sentiment in the
South during this entire debate. The volume of trade between the South and Great Britain
had always been large; and clearly, the prospect of increased trade with Venezuela seemed
dim. Most important, Great Britain had always served as a model for southern culture and
institutions. Few southerners, therefore, seriously contemplated waging war against Great
Britain on behalf of a Latin American republic whose people and institutions were
completely foreign.
The rallying of southern public opinion around Cleveland in the weeks after his
message to Congress was an aberration which did not reflect the most deeply held foreign
policy attitudes of southerners. Rather, the apparent shift in opinion that occurred in late
December 1895 and early 1896 was more an uncritical show of support for the
beleaguered president and the Democratic Party. To be sure, as tensions mounted during
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the winter of 1895-1896, both parties sought to move out ahead of public opinion on the
question of the boundary dispute. Many southerners temporarily expressed support for
the president’s policy, but it was for purely partisan reasons. Given the importance of
maintaining Democratic unity in the South, it is not surprising that southern opinion briefly
coalesced around Cleveland’s policy despite its intrinsic unpopularity.
*

*

*

More than the debate regarding the Venezuelan boundary dispute, the question of
Hawaiian annexation raised southern concerns over the proper course of American foreign
policy. American interest in the islands as a promising site for a naval station and as a
stopover in the Asian trade dated to the early nineteenth century. In 1875, in an attempt
to prevent any other nation from taking advantage of Hawaii’s prime location, the United
States signed a reciprocal trade agreement with the islands that allowed their goods into
the United States free o f duty. The result of reciprocity was a boom in the local economy
driven by a marked increase in sugar production. Hawaiian planters, many of them
Americans, imported cheap labor from Asia to meet the resulting need for more laborers.
In addition, the trade agreement virtually insured that the islands would become an
economic dependent of the United States. Despite some native Hawaiians’ resentment of
the dramatic changes that had taken place in their kingdom, reciprocity was renewed seven
years later.
In 1890, a new American tariff policy depressed the Hawaiian economy and led to
political unrest. The McKinley Tariff removed Hawaii’s competitive advantage by
eliminating duties on all imported raw sugar. American sugar producers received a two-
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cent-per-pound bounty as compensation for their loss of tariff protection. For Hawaiians,
the elimination of their exclusive tariff exemption and the payment of a bounty to
American producers proved calamitous. Sugar production declined dramatically, incomes
fell, and unemployment soared. The islands' ruler, Queen Liliuokalani, rallied support
among nativists who blamed the island's misfortune on the onerous influence of
Americans. Consequently, in 1893, she attempted to impose a new constitution that would
seriously limit the political power of foreigners.
Queen Liliuokalani's actions raised fears among Americans and their European
allies in Hawaii that the monarchy could not or would not protect their substantial
investments on the islands. By 1893 there were over sixty-two sugar plantations in
Hawaii capitalized at over $31 million; Americans alone had invested over $13 million. A
group of Americans in Honolulu, therefore, organized a Committee of Safety to oust the
monarchy, establish a provisional government, and pursue American annexation.
On January 16, 1893, the Committee launched its "revolution." Claiming that
Americans needed protection from the queen's forces, the Committee appealed to the
American Minister John L. Stevens to provide aid. Under Steven's authority, one hundred
and fifty men from the U.S.S. Boston landed and quickly surrounded the queen's palace.
The next day, the Committee announced the end of the monarchy and established a
provisional government. A few weeks later, Stevens declared Hawaii an American
protectorate and raised the American flag over Honolulu. The provisional government,
aided by Stevens, then drafted a proposal for the annexation of Hawaii to the United
States and forwarded it to Washington for consideration.27
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Within a week of assuming office, President Grover Cleveland withdrew this
hastily drawn treaty. Along with his Secretary of State, Walter Q. Gresham, Cleveland
suspected that Stevens had abused his position in Hawaii to bring about the overthrow of
its rightful leader. In addition, the president was apprehensive of the former Republican
Administration's duplicity in the episode. On March 10,1893, Cleveland appointed James
Blount, of Georgia, to lead an investigation into the Hawaiian affair. After three months
of conducting personal interviews and reading individual testimonies, Blount delivered a
serious indictment of former minister Stevens and the other Americans on the islands.
Blount asserted that American businessmen in Hawaii, aided by Stevens and the United
States military, overthrew the native government for their own self-aggrandizement. He
also accused the provisional government of misrepresenting the will of the people on the
islands when it claimed widespread popular support for annexation. In actuality, Blount
argued, fully eighty percent of native Hawaiians opposed annexation. In the end, Blount's
arguments not only established a Republican conspiracy in the coup of 1893 but also
discouraged those who would seek annexation on the basis of native popular support in
the future.28
Blount's investigation into Hawaiian affairs slowed the efforts of pro-annexation
forces in Washington. During the fall of 1893, President Cleveland failed to act decisively
on the matter. The president’s indecision stemmed largely from his inability to find a
morally and politically acceptable policy. Cleveland felt outraged by the conduct of
Stevens and the members of the provisional government; yet removing them from power
would be difficult. Even more vexing was the problem of restoring Queen Liliuokalani,
who had made no promises to guarantee the lives and property of those involved in the
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coup, without alienating American public opinion. In the end, Cleveland failed to execute
either measure and placed the entire problem in the hands of Congress.29
By portraying the episode as a morality play, with himself and his party as just and
honorable, Cleveland made the subject of Hawaiian annexation an intensely partisan one.
Republicans were forced to defend the actions of the previous administration, its advisors
and their party against charges of malfeasance; Democrats felt pressure to support their
president. The debate in Congress from December 1893 to February 1894 established the
tenor of the broader public discussion of the Hawaiian question that took place in towns
and cities across the South.
In 1893-94, southern public opinion appeared split on the question of Hawaiian
annexation. A minority of southerners appeared to be in favor of or ambivalent toward
the annexation of Hawaii. Surprisingly, the sugar cane producers of Louisiana, who had a
vested economic interest in the matter, failed to express any strong opposition to
annexation in late 1893 or early 1894. The chiefjournal of the industry, the Louisiana
Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, never even addressed the subject. Nor did the sugar
cane growers' associations petition Congress in opposition to annexation. Although
Louisiana's two senators, Edward White and Donelson Caffery, opposed annexation, the
remainder of the state's congressional delegation did not.30
In all likelihood, the silence of southern sugar interests originated from an
ambivalence on the question of Hawaiian annexation. Perhaps they failed to appreciate
the determination of annexationists to bring Hawaii into the Union or overestimated the
power of the national Democratic party to block such an effort. More likely, southern
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sugar growers were preoccupied with issues that would provide for the long term
competitiveness of domestic cane. The two- cent-per-pound bounty virtually guaranteed a
profit for domestic growers, but the continual payment of their unpopular subsidy was not
assured. In addition, southern sugar producers faced immense pressures to modernize
their own industry or be driven out of business by much larger producers, especially in
Cuba. Consequently, the question of Hawaiian annexation seemed relatively unimportant
to most southern sugar producers in 1893-1894.31
During this period, southern opponents of annexation voiced a number of
ideological concerns about incorporating the Hawaiian islands into the American union.
Some southerners echoed Cleveland's claims that it was immoral to recognize the
provisional government and annex the territory in the absence of popular support among
native Hawaiians. Such an action would be unethical and tantamount to "stealing" the
islands from the natives. Often, however, critics of annexation averred that forcing
American rule upon the Hawaiian people represented a repudiation of the highest ideals
expressed in the Constitution. On December 6, 1893, Senator Roger Q. Mills of Texas
challenged the legitimacy of the annexationists' arguments:
We are told that the Provisional Government is a republican govemment~a
government boosted and upheld by American bayonets and living under the
shadow of muzzles of American cannon. If our Government will get out of
the way and let the people exercise the same rights that we claim, and
which our fathers claimed were inalienable in the Declaration of
Independence, the right to institute whatever government they pleased,
they will institute a government which will be in accordance with their
will. . . . 32
Two months later, Representative Hernando DeSoto Money, a Mississippian sympathetic
to annexation, declared that even he could not endorse the current situation in Hawaii
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because of Stevens' malfeasance. Money accused Stevens of abusing his authority and
unduly intervening when no threat to American lives or property existed on the islands.33
Charges by southern Democrats against the G.O.P. resonated in Congress and
among the southern population. Many southern anti-annexationists compared Republican
intrigue in the Hawaiian revolution to the actions of Radicals in the South after the Civil
War. To some southerners, Stevens' attempt to use force to create a pro-American
annexationist government that represented only a minority of the islands' population was
no different than the imposition of Radical Republican rule on the South thirty years
before. In addition, southern Democrats quickly charged the Republicans with hypocrisy
for supporting white rule over Kanakes (non-white Hawaiians) in the islands while
attacking Bourbon rule in the South. Representative Josiah Patterson, of Memphis, raised
both of these issues in a disparaging attack in Congress:
Can this country ever forget that the same Republican party, that now so
piteously pleads for white supremacy and Christian civilization in the
Hawaiian Islands, only a few short years ago deliberately turned South
Carolina, one of the Southern States of America, one of the original
thirteen states. . . over to the dominion of a race inferior to, and less
progressive than, are the Hawaiians?
In concluding his diatribe, Patterson scoffed that the Republicans now had the gall to
appeal to the public for support of the annexation scheme in the name of "Christianity and
civilization, and a white man's government."34
Another southerner, William Oates of Alabama, followed Patterson in the
Congressional debate and declared his support for Cleveland's decision to oppose
annexation. He, too, condemned the Republicans for their hypocrisy in supporting
annexation and the provisional government. Oates reminded Republicans that "they set up
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negro carpetbag governments over the white people of the Southern States . . . but now
they sought to disfranchise non-whites in Hawaii. According to Oates, the party's recent
actions were wholly inconsistent and represented a complete reversal on the "negro
question." When debate ended in May of 1894, the Senate joined the House in rejecting
the immediate annexation of the Pacific archipelago; thus, temporarily removing the
Hawaiian question from public scrutiny.35
On January 7, 1895, a Royalist uprising in Hawaii caused Congress and the
American public to re-examine the annexation question. The coup, supported mainly by
natives and half-castes loyal to Queen Liliuokalani, consisted of only a few brief skirmishes
and was quickly crushed by the provisional government. Nonetheless, annexationists in
Congress argued that this civil disorder could have been prevented had the United States
maintained a military presence on the islands. In addition, since the provisional
government defeated the Royalists without American help, they had proven their
legitimacy and were entitled to seek annexation. Although neither of these arguments led
to votes on annexation, they did spark a new debate on the merits of such an action.36
As in 1893-1894, southern congressmen ardently opposed Hawaiian annexation
based on race, republican principles and the memory of Reconstruction. They contended
that the annexation of the islands would be but the first step toward American imperialism
and concomitant problems such as race mixture, the extension of executive power and
militarism. Consequently, most critics of annexation warned that the United States must
not begin down the "slippery slope" of imperialism; instead, the nation should remain true
to traditional sources of foreign policy~the appeal by Washington to avoid entangling
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alliances and the example of Jefferson to support expansion only on contiguous territory.
During the debate in 1895, many southerners also assailed the sugar trust as the real
power behind the 1893 revolution. These anti-annexationists suspected that the trust's
desire to obtain cheaper, raw sugar from the islands caused them to provide material
support to the provisional government in Honolulu and Republican annexationists in
Washington. Certainly, the Hawaiian episode appeared as a warning of the potential for
governmental abuse and corruption should the United States embark on a colonial policy.
In a blistering attack against the annexationists, Senator Donelson Caffery of
Louisiana averred, "Under the present condition of affairs in that island, inhabited as it is
with the population that it has, under the drastic authority by which it is necessary to
govern that population, I am not willing to incorporate that heterogeneous mixture of all
the nations. . . into the American Union." Caffery further declared his support for
Cleveland's Hawaiian policy and chided Republicans for trying to force annexation down
the nation's throat. Finally, the Senator affirmed his commitment to upholding the rights
of American citizens everywhere on the globe, but he refused to "have the Navy or the
military arm of this country used to oppress any people . . . ,"37
Less than a week later, the fiery senator from Texas, Roger Q. Mills, leveled
additional charges against the annexationists. Like Caffeiy, his attacks fell squarely on
Republicans in Congress and on the late Harrison Administration. He, too, stressed that
Republicans supported an anti-republican regime in Hawaii against the popular will of the
islands' inhabitants. Mills' sarcastically asked his colleagues on the other side of the
chamber if they had forgotten that this was a Democratic government that believed in
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individual rights and the Declaration of Independence and, in the right of the people to
overthrow governments if they failed to protect their lives, liberty and property. More
importantly, Mills also injected a greater element of sectionalism in his obloquy. He found
it unusual that the greatest support for the provisional government and for annexation
came from the extreme East. Indeed, the Texas senator suggested, Republican support for
annexation came from its affiliation with the powerful sugar trust. It was the powerful
sugar trust of New York City, Mills argued, that overthrew the Hawaiian Monarchy and
provided assistance to the provisional government. In concluding, Mills proclaimed that
the current controversy over Hawaii stemmed from the Republican Party's nefarious
relationship with the trusts.38
In the southern press, editorial opinion generally supported the efforts of the
region's representatives in Congress to block annexation schemes. It savaged Republicans
for the unsavory conduct of Minister Stevens and the Harrison Administration during the
revolution of 1893. A New Orleans editor noted how the recent Royalist uprising proved
that the provisional government lacked universal support. Indeed, the coup showed that
reports suggesting "that the Hawaiians are supporting the Dole government were without
foundation except perhaps in the imagination of a few annexationists." The Chattanooga
Times, too, expressed its sympathy with the Hawaiian rebels who, "reduced to a condition
of serfdom, and denied all voice in the government" were fighting for their rights. An
Arkansas editor summarized the question of annexation simply when he declared, "unless
the republics are mockeries the majority will rule. . . ,"39
Although not a major reason for opposition to annexation in 1895, the issue of
race was raised by some southerners to justify their anti-annexationist sentiment. These
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southerners deemed native Hawaiians as racially inferior and "not fit to be formed into a
republic .. .

The result would be interminable domestic turmoil that would require

periodic American intervention to restore order. In addition, others suggested that it
would be impossible to incorporate Kanakes into the American union because they were
inherently unassimilable. Where other foreigners might be welcomed into the United
States "because in a short time they fall in love with our institutions of so much personal
freedom . . . Hawaii was "inhabited by a people totally unlike our people . . who
could never be absorbed. Nonetheless, even opposition to annexation based upon racial
prejudice often returned to the theme of republicanism. To that end, as an Austin editor
argued, to embark upon an imperial policy, with the acquisition of colonies inhabited by
non-white peoples, would "depart from the organic form and traditions of a republican
government. . . .
During much of 1896 and 1897, the question of Hawaiian annexation received
little attention in Congress or in the American public. In Congress, partisan bickering on
the question produced deadlock; consequently, there were no new annexation resolutions
in the offing. Annexationists bided their time until a more sympathetic president occupied
the White House. More important, the Marti Revolution in Cuba entered into a bloodier
phase and threatened to entangle the United States. At home, domestic politics, especially
the money question, engulfed the unpopular Cleveland. In November 1896, the
Republican William McKinley won a sweeping electoral victory and entered office with
Republican majorities in Congress For annexationists, the election of a Republican
president promised new hope that another annexation effort might produce results.
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The debate over Hawaiian annexation resumed in January of 1898 amidst
increasing fears that a war with Spain over Cuba would be unavoidable. Unlike earlier
debates, those in 1898 more fully engaged the American public and southern members of
Congress. Southern annexationists, led by Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama,
represented a minority in the region. Morgan viewed the annexation question in the
context of his own vision of expanded commercial opportunities for the South. The
senator declared that on his visit to the islands in 1897, he gained a greater appreciation
for the native Hawaiian people and culture. Ironically, the Bourbon from Alabama
concluded that native Hawaiians were as American as any other foreigners who had
become United States citizens and equally capable of self-government. More important,
Morgan argued, Hawaii occupied a strategic position in the Pacific that would serve as an
important stopover for American merchantmen on the way to Asia and for American naval
vessels protecting American commerce and the Pacific entrance to a Nicaraguan canal:
Annex Hawaii, and we will rapidly build up at Honolulu, in sight of Pearl
Harbor, a commercial mart, like Hong Kong, protected by a fortress, easy
of construction, far stronger than Gibraltar, that will stand sentinel over the
surrounding ocean for thousands of miles.
In his final analysis, Morgan feared that American failure to annex the islands promptly
would allow a foreign power, most likely Great Britain or Japan, to use its influence on
the island to overthrow the pro-American government of Sanford Dole and replace it with
a monarchy hostile to the United States.41
As in previous debates, Morgan spoke for the minority of southerners who favored
the acquisition of Hawaii as a means to achieve commercial expansion in the Pacific. Only
a few supporters for an economically revitalized New South ever embraced the colonial
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policies of Morgan, but those who did usually shared Morgan's concerns regarding the
commercial and strategic value of the islands. James Field, a Virginia lawyer and planter,
expressed his distress at the rejection of the annexation treaty in January. Field criticized
this action as "a backward movement. . . and a surrender of our Pacific and Oriental
commerce." Failure to annex Hawaii, he maintained, opened the door for another power
to seize it; in that event, "We should abandon all ideas of the Nicaraguan Canal. . . . "
Another prominent southerner, Walter Clark, a liberal judge from North Carolina, shared
Field's concern over Hawaii's strategic importance for the development of our commerce
and fears of a foreign takeover. In a letter to Senator Marion Butler, Clark stated that, "A
few years hence our commerce in the Pacific will be 50 fold what it is now—or more, if
China awakes to new life as Japan has done, and then Hawaii will be indispensable to us.42
Despite the pleas of Morgan and other annexationists, a majority of southerners in
1898 still opposed the incorporation of Hawaii into the American union. Southern sugar
producers, who had remained relatively silent during earlier debates, feared that
annexationists lacked only a few votes in the Senate to achieve success, so they mounted a
spirited campaign to undermine support for annexation. Southern sugar interests
complained that they had only survived in the 1890's with bounties and tariff protection
from foreign producers. Favorable governmental policies in the early 1890's had stabilized
the industry and provided investment capital to centralize production to insure long-term
profitability. The annexation of Hawaii, however, would bring a flood of cheap, raw sugar
duty free into the United States and permanently cripple domestic cane producers.
Because of their higher labor costs, southern sugar producers claimed they could not
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compete with Hawaiian raw sugar, produced by "semi-slave labor." It was unfair to
subject "our own free labor, American-grown.. . sugars," to unfair competition. Some
sugar producers even suggested that because of the disparity in labor costs, all the
"farmers of this country oppose annexation." Finally, the leading journal of domestic
sugar producers challenged the assertions of annexationists that Hawaii was incapable of
producing more sugar than it currently produced and, thus, posed no significant threat to
the domestic cane growers. On the contrary, the Louisiana Planter and Sugar
Manufacturer asserted; Hawaiian sugar production would "double or triple in the next five
years . . . Such an increase, the journal concluded, would do irreparable harm to
domestic cane growers.43
Outside of the sugar growing regions of the South, most people based their
objections to annexation on their paradoxical commitments to white supremacy and to
republican ideology. A Florida editor warned against the United States following the lead
of European empires by acquiring "distant lands and strange people . . . . " Such a policy
would "contribute to our ultimate undoing." Others feared that a colonial policy would
unnecessarily entangle us with foreign nations, enlarge executive authority and lead to an
expensive military buildup. To many, imperialism meant:
entering upon a policy wholly at variance with the teachings of the
founders of the republic~a policy that is out of harmony with the spirit of
our institutions . . . . in annexing Hawaii without the consent of the
Hawaiians a fundamental principal of the republic would be ignored—the
principal that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed.44
During the debate in the House and Senate on the Hawaiian question, which ran
from March to July in 1898, southern congressmen generally reflected the popular
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attitudes of their native region. Congressman John Sharp Williams of Mississippi warned
his colleagues of the dangers of imperialism. He pleaded with other House members to
remain faithful to traditional expansion only to contiguous territory. Williams predicted
that the march of colonialism could not stop at Hawaii, but would go on and on acquiring
additional "stepping stones" across the globe at great expense to the treasury. This "fool's
procession" of imperialism "would be to the democracy of America identical in kind . ..
what the dead weight of the Indian Empire will some day prove to be to Great Britain."
Amidst loud applause, Williams concluded:
when a self-seeking oligarchy, or a mistaken patriotism, or a criminal
covetousness . . . leads our country and that flag [Stars and Stripes] out in
the endless race for conquest and domination, it has lost its honor and
should be furled in disgrace.45
Other southern congressmen issued their own dire predictions regarding the
longevity of republican institutions should the country acquire Hawaii. Thomas Ball of
Texas suggested that any member mindful of "the teachings of our fathers" and of "the
traditions of the past" must oppose the current measure. To annex Hawaii would violate
the highest ideals of the Constitution and be the first step in making the military arm of the
government superior to the civil arm. At that point, Ball exclaimed, "farewell, my
country; thy honor and thy glory have departed forever; thy strength proved thy
weakness."46
Still other southern representatives used racial prejudice as a rationale for opposing
Hawaiian annexation. Indeed, after almost seventy years of exposure to American
missionaries, planters and businessmen, fewer than three percent of the islands' residents
were American. Asian immigrant laborers and native Hawaiians composed the vast
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majority of the population. (See Table 6) Some southerners feared that such a
heterogeneous, non-white population could never be assimilated into the body politic.
TABLE 6
Population, by nationality, of Hawaii, 1896
Nationality______________________________________ Number of Persons
Native Hawaiians
31,000
Japanese
24,400
Portuguese
15,100
Chinese
21,600
Hawaiian mixed blood
8,400
Americans
3,000
British
2,200
German
1,400
Norwegian and French
479
All other nationalities____________________________________ 1.055
Total
109,020
(Table from 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Reports, no. 681, p. 43.)
Representative Adolph Meyer of Louisiana asserted that America could not have a
colonial system, "with inferior and mongrel races and mongrel governments . . . , " without
sacrificing our own freedom and liberty. Furthermore, Meyer added, it was patently unfair
to place American free labor in competition with "hordes of Asiatics, Japanese, Chinese,
and others ... " who worked in a condition of quasi-slavery."47
When debate ended in the House and Senate on the Hawaiian question in June and
July of 1898, respectively, southern congressmen voted overwhelmingly to defeat a joint
annexation resolution. In the House, only fifteen of seventy-six southern representatives
who voted favored the measure. In no instance did more than half of a state's
representatives favor the measure. Only Alabama, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
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Virginia provided more than a single affirmative vote. Southern senators also provided
the bulk of opposition votes. In the Upper House, of the twenty-one negative votes cast
against annexation, over half (eleven votes) came from the South. Five additional
southern senators would have voted no had they not been paired with other members.
Clearly, the political representatives of the South made a strong indictment against
colonialism and its perceived ramifications with their votes on the question of Hawaiian
annexation.48
*

*

*

The minority of southerners who supported the annexation of Hawaii emphasized
the important commercial and strategic position of the islands. Like many of their
northern counterparts, southern annexationists pleaded that the United States needed a
coaling station at Honolulu as a "stepping stone" to the much coveted markets of Asia.
Furthermore, they viewed the acquisition of Hawaii as a vital component of projecting
American military and economic power into the Pacific Basin. Finally, some southern
annexationists, especially John T. Morgan, believed that the United States must seize
control of Hawaii to protect a future American-built Nicaraguan canal. To allow Hawaii to
fall into foreign hands would jeopardize the feasibility and the defense of the entire canal
project.
In the end, the economic rationale for the annexation of Hawaii failed to persuade
many southerners of the wisdom of such a measure. Most southerners feared the cultural
and ideological implications of Hawaiian annexation. Certainly, many white southerners
objected to the inclusion of native Hawaiians (Kanakes) and Asians into the American
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body politic. Not only did many in the South harbor racial prejudice against non-whites in
Hawaii, but they doubted their ability to administer affairs on the islands. In addition,
southern whites feared that their own labor, especially in sugar production, would be
degraded and devalued as a result of the inclusion of Hawaiian forced labor into the
American union.
More important, the debate over the annexation of Hawaii touched the historical
memoiy of southerners and raised ideological fears that the acquisition of Hawaii would
lead to the ultimate destruction of the Republic. In the Hawaiian affair, many southerners
quickly drew parallels between Minister Stevens' activity in Honolulu and the actions of
Radicals in the South after the Civil War. In both instances, a "foreign power" intervened
on behalf of a minority to establish a "carpetbag regime" to rule over an unwilling
majority. By implication, southerners feared that Republicans and other jingoes would
stop at nothing to obtain foreign territory and foreign peoples in absolute disregard for the
Constitutional principles of self-rule and the Jeffersonian tradition of territorial expansion.
The end result of colonialism, according to many southerners, would be the end of
republican institutions, the erosion of states' rights and civil liberties, onerous taxes to
support a bloated military, and the creation of an imperial government.
John T. Morgan's vision of a reinvigorated New South buoyed by increased
international trade, an isthmian canal and the annexation of far-flung territories in the
Pacific directly challenged the ideological and cultural norms of his native region.
According to Joseph Fry, the chief biographer of Morgan, the Senator’s rationale for
annexation was "a southern rationale." Nonetheless, a majority of southerners rejected his
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opinion. Morgan, in his capacity as a spokesman for a New South, defined the world in
economic and strategic terms; he pursued policies that he thought would increase
international trade opportunities for the South and, hence, provide economic uplift. A
majority of southerners, however, found it difficult to support policies that ran counter to
the region's sense of history and tradition or that challenged well-established cultural
norms. In the case of Hawaii, southerners clearly repudiated the promise of economic
uplift at the expense of sacrificing deeply-held principles.49
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CHAPTER 3
THE SOUTH AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
1895-1896

All over the Union the cry is going up for the
recognition of the rights of the Cuban patriots.
The will of the people is manifesting itself in a
way not to be resisted.
—Ft. Worth Gazette. 18951

We shall know in a few days what action, if any,
in the matter of the Cuban insurrection, the
President of the United States will recommend to
Congress to take; but it is almost past hope that
he will recommend the taking of any action at all.
Mr. Cleveland appears to be convinced that the
insurgents have done nothing to call for recognition
or assistance. In which conviction he is at
variance with a vast majority of his countrymen.
—New Orleans Times-Democrat 18962

70
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American intervention in Cuba in 1898 and the Spanish-American War had far
reaching effects on shaping southerners' foreign policy attitudes. Far more than the
debates over the acquisition of Hawaii or the construction of an isthmian canal, the
aftermath of the war caused most southerners to reevaluate America's role in world affairs.
In the late 1890's, southern interest in Cuba was hardly new; many in the South had
coveted the island of Cuba as a logical point for the expansion of southern slave power in
the 1840's and 1850's. The island's tropical climate, fertile soil and slave labor made it the
world's leading producer of sugar by mid-century and the wealthiest of Spain's remaining
colonial possessions. Socially and economically, the South and Cuba appeared to have
much in common. Indeed, during these two decades, southerners viewed the acquisition
of Cuba as the most important goal of American foreign policy.
Southerners had hoped that James K. Polk and the leadership of the Democratic
Party could initiate and approve a plan for the annexation of the island as part of a broader
program of national expansion. Polk campaigned on the theme of American expansion
westward and southerners believed that he would be receptive to the idea of further
expansion into the Caribbean. In 1848, pressured by leading expansionists within the
Democratic Party, Polk urged his Secretary of State to offer up to $100 million for the
purchase of Cuba, but Spain quickly rejected the offer. Efforts to acquire Cuba resumed
during the Franklin Pierce administration. A northern Democrat, Pierce made the
annexation of Cuba one of his major foreign policy objectives, believing such a move
would appease southerners upset over the addition of free territory in the Mexican Cession
and, thus, remove much of the vitriol from the debate over shivery. In addition, Pierce
realized that many southerners feared that Spain, under British pressure, might abolish
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slavery on the island of Cuba, thereby placing additional "free" territory on the periphery
of the slave South. The idea of a "free Cuba" did in fact alarm many southerners because
it could serve as a place of refuge for runaway slaves and as a potential source of slave
revolt in the American South. In other words, the "Africanization" of the island, they
feared, would be a potential source of trouble for maintaining their own social control
over African slaves in the South.
Supported by leading expansionists in his own party, Pierce requested that his
Secretary of State, William Marcy, draw up a plan for the peaceful acquisition of Cuba. In
turn, Marcy appealed to America's most important foreign ministers in Europe—Pierre
Soule, John Mason, and James Buchanan—to participate in the discussion over the cession
of Cuba to the United States. Rather than conclude an agreement with Spain for the
United States to acquire Cuba, the three ministers threatened Spain with the infamous
Ostend Manifesto that warned Spain that the United States would be justified in seizing
Cuba to protect its own national interests should Spain refuse to sell the island. The
inflammatory rhetoric of the manifesto was seen as a dangerous expression of American
jingoism; it also suggested that the southern slave power held undue influence over
determining the goals and methods of American foreign policy. Public criticism of Pierce's
failed Cuban policy destroyed any possibility that the island might be annexed during his
administration.
By the mid-1850's, southern interest in Cuba had indeed acquired a purely
sectional character. The South no longer looked upon the annexation of Cuba in the
context of a broader, more expansive foreign policy begun by Polk and the Mexican War.
Instead, many in the South, alarmed at congressional refusal to allow for the expansion of
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slavery in the western territories, claimed that expansion into Cuba was vital to the
economic health of the region and for the maintenance of its social institutions. Ironically,
efforts to acquire Cuba, seen by Polk and Pierce as a means to alleviate sectional discord,
provided an additional source of sectional animus as the possibilities of Cuban annexation
faded in the late 1850's.
After the Civil War, the destruction of the South's social and economic institutions
left it with little reason to be interested in Cuban affairs. Gone were fears of free labor in
Cuba or of the possibilities that Cuba could promote unrest in the South; gone too was the
possibility that the South could expand the institution of slavery to Cuba to exploit
economic conditions on the island. As a result, southerners took no significant part in
shaping American policy toward Cuba during the numerous rebellions on the island from
1865 to 1890. Although many Americans objected to a European colony so close to
American shores and sympathized with rebels fighting for their freedom against a colonial
power, preoccupation with domestic affairs in the late 1860's and 1870's prevented the
United States from intervening in Cuba. Indeed, the nation maintained strict neutrality
even in the wake of repeated appeals by native Cuban rebels, thus, assuring the defeat of
various insurgent movements to Spain3
*

*

*

In late February of 1895, news that another rebellion had been launched in Cuba
began to appear in the southern press. Many southerners, familiar with other failed
attempts to overthrow Spanish rule, gave this rebellion, led by Jose Marti, little chance for
success. They quickly dismissed the latest outbreak of violence as nothing more than
another attempt by a small band of disaffected Cubans, poorly ied and equipped, to
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challenge the power of Spain's colonial rule. A leading New Orleans newspaper declared
that given the immense violence and bloodshed that accompanied past rebellions, future
revolts "should not be encouraged . . . as the only result is increased burdens on the people
of Cuba.”4
Although the initial accounts of the Marti Revolution received little attention
across the South, a report of a Spanish warship firing upon an American vessel off the
coast of Cuba prompted many southerners to call for a reexamination of America's
relationship with Spain and its colonial administration of Cuba. On March 8, 1895, a
Spanish ship allegedly fired shots at an American mail steamer, the Alliance, as it passed
through the Windward Passage. Although the steamer was not visibly damaged when it
arrived in New York, the ship's captain, James Crossman, told the press that it had been
fired upon despite proudly and prominently flying the "stars and stripes." Largely on the
basis of Crossman's charges, Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham demanded an
immediate apology and reparations from Spain. Gresham also warned Spain that it could
not use the rebellion in Cuba as justification for suspending maritime rights in international
waters. Even though diplomats worked quietly to diffuse this crisis, the episode lingered
in the minds of many southerners and raised concerns regarding the defense of American
honor.5
Southerners, generally, favored the strong assertion of America's claims and
demanded a formal Spanish apology for the Alliance incident, although few suggested
using the affair as a pretext for war. In addition, some in the region used this occasion to
assert their own loyalty to the American flag and their determination to uphold American
maritime rights. One Arkansas editor noted that the overwhelming mood of the South
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regarding the affair could be seen in "the quick demand made by the press of the south for
an apology from Spain for the conduct of her man-of-war. . . Undoubtedly, most
southerners favored the forceful diplomatic assertion of America's claims and a peaceful
resolution of the matter.6
On the other hand, a minority of southerners adopted less moderate views during
the public debate over the Alliance affair. This small group of jingoes questioned whether
a Spanish apology alone would satisfy American honor and, instead, suggested that
reparations or a large indemnity should be demanded from the government in Madrid. A
few extremists even argued that the nation should intervene in Cuba in order to end
Spain's reason for maintaining a naval presence in the Caribbean. The price for Spain's
perceived insult against the United States, such jingoes concluded, "should be the
liberation of Cuba."7
In April of 1895, Secretary of State Gresham received a formal, public apology
from the Spanish government, thus diffusing the immediate crisis in Spanish-American
relations. Southerners appeared satisfied with the resolution of the Alliance incident; calls
for punitive actions against Spain dwindled to insignificance. Indeed, the virtual absence
of criticism in the South over the Cleveland Administration's handling of the episode
suggested widespread approval for the peaceful resolution of the affair. Nonetheless, at a
time when news of the rebellion itself was scarce, the Alliance episode focused attention
on the possible complications for the United States that accompanied the rebellion in
Cuba. In the end, southern reaction to the Alliance affair revealed the region's lingering
concern over its perceived loyalty within the Union. Southerners addressed the issue with
patriotic rhetoric and stated their desire to uphold national honor. Few in the South,
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however, suggested that the Alliance affair provided a justification for engaging in a war
against Spain to prove the South's loyalty.
As press accounts of the Alliance incident dwindled in April and May of 1895,
news reports indicated that the Cuban rebellion was growing in strength and scope. Rebel
operations moved beyond the eastern highlands in Oriente Province to the rich, sugar
growing regions of central Cuba. Military confrontations in this region exacted a heavy
toll on sugar and tobacco plantations and other ancillary industries, such as railroads and
processing facilities. Prior to the rebellion, the volume of American trade with Cuba
exceeded that of all other Latin American countries. In fact, the United States purchased
almost ninety percent of all Cuban exports. As the rebellion spread westward, this trade
was adversely effected; thus, some Americans with vested economic interests in Cuban
affairs began to press Cleveland to intervene to stop the loss of lives and property on the
island. Edwin Atkins, a Boston native and one of the largest sugar producers in Cuba,
made repeated appeals to the president to use his influence to end the rebellion and
preserve Spanish authority as the best means of protecting American investments on the
island.8
While Atkins, his American Sugar Refining Corporation (known as the Sugar
Trust), and important elements on Wall Street supported the continuation of Spanish rule
on the island, many southerners expressed strong sympathy for the Cuban rebels. In
addition, southerners welcomed reports of Spain's inability to terminate quickly the
revolution led by Jose Marti. A rural Alabama editor observed that"... nearly every
American sympathises (sic) with the oppressed islanders in their endeavor to throw off the
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oppressive yoke of Spain. The efforts to secure liberty always arouses the intense
sympathy of Americans."9
On June 12, 1895, Cleveland reaffirmed America's historic policy of neutrality
toward the warring parties in Cuba. The president feared that abandoning neutrality
would open the way for private American citizens to aid the rebels. Cleveland foresaw a
flood of American supplies and arms being shipped to the insurrectos, as well as countless
filibustering expeditions aimed at bolstering the rebel armies in the field. The
consequences, therefore, of discontinuing American neutrality would likely lead to direct
armed conflict with Spain and, possibly, its European allies. Given these alternatives,
Cleveland hoped his Cuban policy would prevent a costly war with Spain and provide an
opportunity for American diplomacy to end the rebellion in Cuba peacably.10
As a matter of official policy, most southerners understood the rationale behind
Cleveland's declaration of neutrality. On a more emotional level, however, some
southerners showed a visceral affection for the Cuban rebels and expressed anxiety that
the United States could not do more to aid the cause of Cuban freedom. Undoubtedly,
press reports of native Cuban rebels fighting for their own independence against a
European power played upon the South's own collective understanding of the American
Revolution and the Civil War and evoked considerable southern support. Some in the
region glorified the exploits of Jose Marti and other rebel leaders who waged a war for
freedom just as their own "Revolutionary Fathers" did in 1776. Still others compared the
Cuban rebels with the heroes of the former Confederacy—Robert E. Lee, Stonewall
Jackson, and Jefferson Davis. From across the region, southerners praised the insurrectos
as "struggling patriots" fighting against "oppression and tyranny." They arrived at the
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conclusion to support belligerent rights for the Cuban rebels based upon the South's
experience to gain similar recognition for the Confederate States of America during the
Civil War. One observer noted that the South had "an established government, a fixed
capitol, a large and victorious army . . . all the elements necessary for a strong and
independent republic." Therefore, it was "right and proper for foreign powers to declare
neutrality" during the American Civil War. Given the current rebellion in Cuba, it was
clear that war existed between the rebels and the mother country. The rebels had even
achieved victories in the field and had established a provisional government.
Consequently, one southerner noted, "It is manifestly the duty of congress, as soon as it
meets in December, to pass a joint resolution declaring neutrality and thus giving the
Cubans belligerent rights."11
Although neither side in the rebellion observed the rules of civilized warfare, news
reports in the popular press emphasized, and often exaggerated the level of Spanish
barbarism. Reports of the wholesale slaughter of Cuban civilians and the summary
execution of rebel prisoners proliferated in the popular press. Many of these stories
emanated from either the "yellow press" in New York City or from pro-rebel Cuban juntas
in Florida. As a result, the rebels gained increasing sympathy during the course of the
rebellion.12
In the South, the most ardent supporters of "Cuba Libre" criticized Cleveland's
conservative stance and favored the recognition of Cuban belligerency regardless of the
consequences. They feared that the insurgents would be crushed unless Americans were
allowed to offer their direct assistance. The United States, they added, had a moral
obligation to support the efforts of "patriots" fighting for their freedom against a despotic
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European power. Many favored the recognition of the insurgents because it would be
"just and right." In light of the horrible stories of atrocities against the insurgents, it was
not surprising that "sympathy for the Cuban patriots" rapidly increased.13
As the rebellion progressed, several groups across the South assembled to voice
their opinions on the Cuban crisis. At an October meeting of the Houston chapter of the
Typographical Union, for example, members unanimously approved a resolution
expressing their concerns and desires regarding the rebellion in Cuba. The resolution
captured many of the popularly held attitudes in the South concerning the conflict and its
relevance to the United States. It condemned Spain for its "harsh and arrogant" rule that
subjected the island's residents to a system of peonage. Such a brutal administration could
not be permitted to exist because "the enlightened system of liberty .. . must prevail in the
New World." The resolution also expressed profound sympathy "to the struggling
patriots of Cuba who are seeking . . . to throw off the Spanish yoke and enjoy their Godgiven right of self-government." Finally, it called upon the Cleveland administration to
grant the rebels belligerent rights in the name of "justice, humanity and liberty."14
Popular support for the recognition of the Cuban rebels continued to mount in the
South during the fall of 1895, and calls for congressional intervention came from across
the region. To many southerners, "the first duty of Congress at the approaching
December session should be to recognize the belligerency of Cuba. The people. . .
demand it." Congressional recognition, many believed, would put an end to Spanish
atrocities against rebels and civilians and "force Spain to treat them with some degree of
humanity." In addition, recognition would allow Cuban "relatives and friends in this
country to go there and aid them with men and arms."15
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Organized groups of Cuban sympathizers also contributed to this growing popular
support for "Cuba Libre" in the South. During the first months of the revolution, few
mass meetings on behalf of Cuban freedom occurred. By the fall of 1895, however,
various "Cuban clubs" sponsored meetings to raise money for the insurgents and create
broader popular sympathy. In New Orleans, a local Cuban club held a large "camp
meeting" in November to excite sympathy for Cuban freedom and to urge the federal
government to extend belligerent rights to "the patriots of the island." The event included
entertainment and a series of distinguished speakers, including Louisiana Supreme Court
Justice Samuel D. McEnery. One by one, each speaker delivered impassioned pleas for
"Cuba Libre" and urged the attendees to make generous contributions to the cause. At the
close of the meeting, a resolution was read and unanimously approved imploring Congress
to recognize the belligerent rights of the Cubans.16
Other groups and organizations in the region also assembled in support of
belligerent rights for the Cuban rebels. In late October, the city councils of West Tampa
and Jacksonville, Florida, passed resolutions urging Congress to recognize the insurrectos.
Copies of their resolution were forwarded to their United States Senator, Samuel Pasco,
who was called upon to take a leading role in securing such an accord during the
upcoming session of Congress. In Roanoke, Virginia, a large crowd braved bad weather
and assembled on behalf of "Cuba Libre." Several speakers, including the mayor and local
clergymen, noted that Spain was wantonly disregarding the inalienable rights of man as
articulated in the Declaration of Independence. "If any people since history began ever
had a right to throw off the foreign yoke by force of arms," Reverend R. W. Patton
explained to the meeting, "the people of that island are surely justifiable in the great and
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unequal struggle they are making to drive Spanish tyranny from their land." The mass
meeting concluded with a unanimous call to Congress to recognize the belligerent rights of
the rebels.17
The only areas where significant opposition to the granting of belligerent rights
developed was in certain port cities along the coast. In these communities, often regional
centers of business, commerce and finance, some people—often from among the
commercial class—expressed concern over the growing support for the Cuban revolution.
These opponents of congressional recognition understood the "popular sympathy with the
Cuban patriots in their struggle for independence," and proclaimed their own hope that the
rebels would prove successful. Nevertheless, they maintained, such expressions of
popular sympathy would "not justify the Government in transgressing the plain mandates
of international law and treaty obligations." The United States, they concluded, must
maintain strict neutrality during the rebellion in Cuba.18
Most southern opponents of granting belligerent rights probably felt less concern
for the minutia of international law than they did for the perceived implications of
congressional recognition. To some, sympathizing with the rebels was one thing, "but the
extending to them the protection of the United States Government is another matter
altogether." Commercial interests in southern port cities, already injured by the economic
depression that began in 1893, undoubtedly feared that a Spanish imbroglio over Cuba
might cripple southern seaborne trade. Indeed, some believed that Spain would view
congressional recognition as a casus belli and establish a naval blockade of southern ports.
In any event, coastal cities figured to be adversely effected by any Spanish naval
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operations in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Consequently, some along the
coast urged Congress not to "take so serious a step as that [recognition]
. . . unless they are anxious for a war with Spain."19
By December of 1895, several important factors had emerged in shaping southern
public attitudes regarding the Cuban question. The Cuban rebels clearly enjoyed almost
universal sympathy in the region. Accounts of Spanish atrocities proliferated in the
southern press and created an overwhelmingly negative view of Spain's administration of
the island. A few southerners even condemned Cleveland's policy of neutrality and
advocated a more active, interventionist policy for the United States in Cuba. But calls
arose across the South, from Texas to Florida to Virginia, for the recognition of
belligerent rights, even if it threatened amicable Spanish-American relations. Other
southerners, especially those associated with the region's leading business and commercial
interests, expressed concerns over the rising tide of public support for a more active
American role in the Cuban rebellion. Most of these opponents of recognizing the
belligerent rights of the Cuban rebels lived in the coastal cities of the South, and, generally
objected to recognition for strategic and economic reasons. They feared recognition could
lead to a war with Spain in which their cities would be far more vulnerable to attack than
any point in the interior. Also, leading business and commercial interests in the South's
primary port cities undoubtedly feared that a war with Spain would paralyze oceanic
commerce and slow international trade, thus, compounding the nation's economic
problems arising from the depression of 1893.
*

*

*
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In December of 1895, the Cuban rebels launched a major offensive into westcentral Cuba. After quickly marching through Matanzas province and destroying
numerous sugar plantations and refineries, the insurrectos approached the outskirts of
Havana. There were several reasons for the invasion of the west in December. First, the
insurrectos wanted to strike Spain closer to the center of colonial authority in Havana.
Such a show of force would demonstrate to other Cubans the viability of the rebellion and
might encourage them to join the rebel forces. Second, the invasion sought to devastate
Cuba's ability to produce sugar and, thus, impair Spain's ability to pay for the war effort.
Finally, leaders of the revolution apparently saw a western invasion as a means to
influence the upcoming debate in the United States Congress over the recognition of
belligerent rights. Several rebel leaders, including Antonio Maceo and Estrada Palma,
believed that if the insurrectos could demonstrate effective control over Cuba's sugar
producers then Congress would be more likely to accord belligerent rights. If Congress
recognized the rebels, it would substantially aid their attempt to obtain desperately needed
ammunition and supplies for a final assault upon Havana and Pinar del Rio.20
Amidst the rebels' invasion of western Cuba and growing public sympathy in the
United States for the insurrectos, Congress grappled with the question of recognition.
From January to April, much of Congress's attention focused on Cuban affairs.
Congressmen in both parties recognized the immense popularity of "Cuba Libre" and
sought to move out ahead of public opinion on the subject of recognition. Consequently,
some in Congress attempted to wrest control over recognition from the president and
employ it as an issue to further injure the already unpopular Cleveland.21
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The prospect of congressional recognition heightened the fears and concerns of
those in the coastal South. Some residents of its port cities followed the debates with
keen interest, fearful that recognition would lead to a war with Spain. Many of the leading
business and commercial interests in southern port cities accepted the inevitability of a
conflict with Spain and embarked on a program to ensure that their communities would be
adequately defended in the event of war. As part of this "preparedness campaign,"
numerous business groups from the coastal South petitioned Congress to enhance their
defense capabilities. In Savannah, Georgia, for example, the Cotton Exchange, the Board
of Trade and the City Council petitioned Congress, "for the improvement of the coast
defenses .. .." Other resolutions came from the Chamber of Commerce, the Cotton
Exchange, the Young Men's Business League and the City Council of Charleston, South
Carolina, "favoring passage of a bill to provide fortifications and other seacoast defenses."
Business groups from Virginia to New Orleans passed similar resolutions calling upon
Congress to build up the coastal defenses of the South before passing any measure that
could precipitate a war with Spain.22
Residents of coastal communities were not unanimous in their opposition to
greater congressional involvement in Cuban affairs. On the contrary, outside the business
communities of these coastal cities, considerable public support existed favoring the
recognition of the insurrectos. In a mass meeting on January 11, 1896, in Lake Charles,
Louisiana, local residents packed the courthouse in support of "Cuba Libre." Several
judges delivered speeches condemning Spain's brut al administration of the island and
sharply criticized the United States government for its failure to act. A local minister
expressed his alarm at the policy of neutrality and "called on America to aid Cuba in the
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name of liberty." At the end of the meeting, the Lake Charles gathering answered those
conservatives who claimed that the rebels had not met the preconditions for recognition as
outlined in international law. On the contrary, "the Cuban patriots now fighting for their
independence have proven that they are able to engage in and conduct civilized warfare,
maintaining order in those provinces where they have their forces." As a rebel
government, exercising effective control over the territory in their possession, it was the
duty of Congress "to secure for the Cuban people recognition of belligerent rights."23
Impressive levels of public support also emerged in the South's leading commercial
center, New Orleans. At a mass meeting on January 20, over four hundred people braved
bad weather to attend a meeting on behalf of the Cuban rebels. The planned event,
including a benefit concert, raised a considerable sum of money to help widows and
orphans of Cubans killed in the rebellion. A month later, two local Cuban clubs, the
"Liga Cubana American de Sonoras de New Orleans" and the "Circulo Cubano
Americano" organized a celebration marking the first anniversaiy of the revolution. Over
fifty guests attended the formal ceremony, including Louisiana Supreme Court Justice
Samuel D. McEnery. McEnery delivered an impassioned speech on behalf of the
struggling Cubans and expressed his belief that the sympathies of most people were with
the rebels.24
Public debate in Florida's coastal cities also suggested growing support for the
Cuban rebels. Large numbers of Cuban immigrants lived and worked in these cities and
actively supported the Cuban cause. More importantly, business and commercial interests
in Florida's port cities expected to profit handsomely in the event of a war with Spain.
Given Florida's proximity to Cuba, it was assumed that the state would be the major point
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of deployment for the armed forces. With this in mind, the Jacksonville Board of Trade
broke ranks with most other business organizations in southern coastal cities and
supported the congressional recognition of the Cuban rebels. A similar attitude seemed to
prevail on Florida's opposite coast. On February 22, 1896, a mass meeting in Tampa
sponsored by local Cuban clubs attracted over three thousand persons. An observer of the
meeting noted that in addition to hundreds of local Cubans, the gathering had "behind it
the active sympathy and good-will of the greater portion of the English-speaking people of
the city." Finally, the resident of Tampa suggested that the vast majority of Americans
supported the Cuban cause and that it was only a matter of time before adequate pressure
would be brought to bear upon our government to make them respect the public will.25
The opposition of most southern commercial interests along the coast to the
recognition of Cuban belligerency contrasted sharply with the views of other southerners.
In much of the southern interior, sympathy for the rebels and support for the recognition
of the insurrectos was widespread and diverse. From rural regions of North Carolina to
commercial centers in the interior to immigrant communities in central Texas, support for
the Cuban cause remained extremely strong. Support for the rebels also transcended most
class lines; farmers seemed just as likely to support the rebellion as those in the professions
or skilled trades. From across the South came a chorus of voices in January and February
of 1896 urging "Congress to accord belligerent rights to the people of Cuba. . . in their
struggle for freedom."26
On January 28, 1896, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee introduced Cuban
belligerency resolutions for consideration by the Senate. The majority resolution was
concurrent; therefore, it had to be approved by both houses and did not require executive
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action. It stated that a condition of war existed on the island and that full belligerent rights
should be accorded the rebels. In addition, the committee reported out a more
conservative minority resolution that made no demands on the president to recognize the
rebels' belligerent rights. It only urged the president to offer his good offices to Spain for
the purpose of recognizing the independence of Cuba.27
Debate on the resolutions began on February 20, 1896. Senator John T. Morgan,
Democrat from Alabama, spoke for the majority. He reiterated the public's humanitarian
concern over the widespread suffering of civilians on the island. Morgan also expressed
outrage at the Spanish army’s treatment of captured prisoners of war. The senator
believed that recognition was justifiable given the situation in Cuba.
If we are ever called in question for making a humane declaration in favor
of these victims, we shall be . . . supported by an array of facts that will call
forth the sympathies of all Christendom. As the action we propose is based
on justice and our regard for human rights, our sympathy for the oppressed
needs not to be justified . . . by a recital of all their wrongs and sufferings.
Morgan concluded by urging his colleagues to vote for the resolution even though Spain
would likely view such a measure as a casus belli28
Wilkinson Call, a senator from Jacksonville, Florida, joined Morgan in supporting
the passage of the majority resolution. He reviewed the last thirty years of Spain's
tyrannical rule over Cuba and concluded that Spain could neither crush the current
rebellion nor maintain effective control over the island in the future. As a result, the
United States must secure Cuban independence in order to prevent constant turmoil in the
Caribbean island. The senator also quoted extensively from documents, provided him by
the Cuban junta, that served as proof that a legally constituted rebel government existed
on the island. Call hoped these records would allay the concerns of opponents of
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recognition who claimed that the rebels did not merit recognition under international law.
As for critics who demeaned the racial composition of the rebels, Call countered, "This
revolt was brought about by the intelligent and educated Spaniards who live in Cuba,
natives of Cuba, and I undertake to affirm that no country, no period of time, presents a
record of more distinguished ability, more heroism, more patriotism, more self-sacrifice
and courage than that which is presented by the effort of the people to establish their
independence."29
Finally, Senator Call drew upon America's own experience with foreign powers
granting belligerent rights to the Confederacy during the Civil War as a precedent to guide
American actions toward Cuba and Spain. Call noted that Spain accorded belligerent
rights to the Confederate States of America thirty five years ago. He also claimed that
Great Britain had recognized the belligerency of the "Southern Confederacy in its
inception." Even the United States had recognized the independence of Spain's liberated
colonies earlier in the century. By precedent and by example, Call implored, the nation
was obligated to recognize the rebels and stop the "cruel and brutal outrages committed
upon the people of Cuba."30
Only a few southern Senators spoke in opposition to recognition. The most vocal
critic of the resolutions was Donelson Caffery, a sugar planter from St. Mary Parish,
Louisiana. Caffery raised numerous concerns about the recognition of the rebels. The
senator averred that Congress lacked the proper authority to intervene in Cuba; only the
executive could recognize the rebels. Caffery also asserted that Spain, as one of the
civilized nations of the world, deserved the respect and protection accorded under
international law. Caffery agreed with the Spanish government that the revolution in Cuba
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was a purely internal matter. Finally, Caffery declared that the Cuban rebels had not yet
erected a viable government on the island, and hence, the most crucial precondition for
recognition had not yet been met.31
Caffery's actions in the Senate appeared wholly inconsistent with popularly held
attitudes in his home state. Although business and commercial interests in New Orleans
opposed recognition, sympathy and widespread support for recognition was pervasive in
that city and the state as a whole. Even most sugar planters, who had a vested economic
interest in the continuation of the rebellion and the destruction of Cuba's capacity to
produce sugar, failed to actively oppose recognition in 1896. Senator Caffery probably
based his position not on any real concern for international law, but on his own perception
that American recognition would hasten the success of the insurrection and provide for a
more timely recovery of the Cuban sugar industry. Caffery, unlike many of his other
colleagues in the sugar industry, believed that a restoration of the Cuban sugar industry
would lead to economic ruin for domestic producers, like himself.32
Despite the objections of Caffery and others, a concurrent resolution recognizing
the belligerent rights of the Cuban rebels and urging the president to offer his good offices
to Spain for the purpose of achieving Cuban independence passed the Senate by a lopsided
margin on February 28. Of sixty-nine votes cast in the Senate, only twelve members voted
against the resolution. Among southern senators, only William Bate of Tennessee and
James George of Mississippi joined Caffery to oppose the resolution. The remaining
thirteen southern senators, including both members from Arkansas, Florida, Texas, and
Virginia, followed their party's leadership in the Senate and voted for the measure.33
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Most southerners seemed satisfied that the Senate, by passing the resolution, had
acted in accord with public opinion on the question. The New Orleans Times-Democrat
heralded that chamber's move as atonement for its past apparent lukewarmness in behalf of
the Cubans." Another editor observed that the Senate's vote "meets with the approval of
the vast majority of the . .. people." Given the history of the Cuban rebellion, some found
it impossible "to see why any citizen of this republic of any religion, party, or faction"
could oppose the belligerency resolution.34
Southerners feared that Cleveland's desire to avoid war with Spain would prevent
him from signing the belligerency resolution. By 1896, many in the South believed that
opponents of recognition, such as Cleveland, used the threat of war with Spain as a
diversionary tactic to protect business and commercial interests. Most dismissed the
possibility of war because "a country which cannot manage a war with Cuba will hardly
care to engage in a war with the United States." Calls for Cleveland to ignore big business
and act in accord with public sentiment came from across the South. An Alabama
physician, Thomas Parke, commented:
'Business' interests are beginning in the East to discountenance and
discourage any recognition of the insurgents in Cuba, but then Business'
interests never encourages anything that will interfere with the ordinary
course of business. For one I heartily hope he [Cleveland] will act and act
promptly.35
The Senate's passage of a resolution recognizing the belligerent rights of the Cuban
rebels caused some southerners to reexamine their attitudes toward the revolution in Cuba
and retreat from support of greater American involvement. Most southerners concluded
that the passage of the belligerency resolution moved the United States closer toward war
with Spain and that such a war, if prosecuted successfully, could have far-reaching
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implications for the South. In addition to business interests along the coast who continued
to voice their displeasure with any proposal that might lead to war with Spain and the
possible destruction of southern port cities and commerce, public debate in the interior
reflected a slight diminution of popular support for recognition. In the interior, opponents
of recognition cared little about the implications of the belligerency resolution on coastal
commerce or the possibility of naval assaults on seaport cities. Instead, the views of anti
recognition forces stemmed from anxiety over racial issues and the cost of a war.
Some southerners in early 1896 expressed apprehension about the United States
becoming involved in Cuba on behalf of non-white persons. While few sympathized with
Spain, opponents of recognition feared that American help for the rebels would be wasted
because their racial composition made them morally and socially incapable of governing
themselves. One observer noted that "The main body of the Cuban people is a compound
of Spanish and negro, the composite mass being worse than either of the ingredients."
Furthermore, some argued that despite the pro-rebel rhetoric of the "yellow press" and the
Cuban juntas that glorified the liberty-loving insurrectos, the racial composition of the
insurrectos~"hordes of ferocious and depraved mongrels"—predisposed them to be
animated by their own libidinal impulses to "live by rapine and pillage and . . . the desire to
plunder . . . ,"36
Some southerners also opposed recognition because they feared the high cost of a
possible war with Spain, especially at a time when America's resources were seriously
taxed by the depression. Even if a war with Spain was relatively short and inexpensive,
they believed, the cost of providing pensions and veterans' benefits would bankrupt the
country. Union pension rolls after the Civil War served as a constant reminder of the
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protracted costs of war and of the possibilities for abuse in the veterans' bureau.
Southerners were particularly sensitive to this issue because they resented paying taxes to
support Union veterans and their families. Based on our experience with Union veterans'
pensions, one southerner concluded, "in 1930 we would be paying pensions to more
soldiers than were engaged in the war!" Given the high cost of a war with Spain, and the
pressing needs of Americans at home, some in the South suggested that it would be best
"If Congress would leave Cuban affairs alone for a while and give some attention to those
of this country . . . ,"37
Despite growing public reservations about an active policy toward Cuba, the
House of Representatives debated its own belligerency resolution early in 1896. There,
unlike in the Senate, southern opponents of recognition figured prominently. Henry St.
George Tucker, of Virginia, was the lone member on the House Committee of Foreign
Affairs to oppose reporting out a resolution recognizing belligerent rights. During debate
in the House, Tucker pleaded for Congress to respect the doctrine of foreign non
intervention as preached by the Founding Fathers. He noted that idle talk and sympathy
are usually cheap, but, in this case, they could lead to a costly war with Spain. In addition,
he castigated those who supported the resolution for hiding behind their expressions of
sympathy to conceal their real intent to conquer Cuba. Finally, Tucker stated that he, and
the South, opposed any measure that might bring war:
. . . our people are not for war. I see in these resolutions the occasion for
it. The Southern people have had enough of war. They know what it is.
For four years they endured and suffered as no other people ever did.38
In a similar appeal, Henry Turner of Georgia, pleaded for Congress not to provoke
a war with Spain. Turner believed that a war would bring terrible consequences to the
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nation. War would likely curtail American commerce and paralyze seaborne trade. He
also feared that war would further depress cotton prices. The South as "the section of the
country already desolated by war would be still further impoverished .. .." Since his
native region had yet fully recovered from the horrors of one war, he vowed his
opposition to any measure that risked another war.39
Turner continued his speech by appealing to the racist views of many white
Americans. He suggested that in the future, when Americans reflected upon America's
experience after the Civil War, they would conclude that the problems of Reconstruction
stemmed from empowering racially inferior people in the South. African-Americans, he
averred, belonged to a race that was incapable of self-government. Extending his
arguments to the situation in Cuba, Turner remarked that a high percentage of people on
the island were of African descent; therefore, they lacked the requisite characteristics "for
liberty and good government and free institutions." Appealing to the basest fears of many
Americans, Turner alleged that the current rebellion was largely a race war and that the
United States should not interfere. Amidst considerable applause in the House, Turner
concluded, "I, for one,. . . have had enough of reconstruction."40
On April 6, 1896, the House voted on the concurrent resolutions. The measures
passed by a huge margin; two hundred and forty seven members voted for the measure
with only twenty seven members opposed. Eighty representatives did not vote. Although
the vast majority of southern congressmen voted for the measure, one-third of all the
negative votes came from the South. With this vote, the Congress of the United States
went on record as supporting the recognition of Cuban belligerency and the active
involvement of the president to effect the independence of Cuba.41
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The rebel invasion of western Cuba in 1895-1896 not only spurred Congressional
action, it also brought a more forceful response from Spain. Few in Spain could believe
how quickly the insurrectos had reached the outskirts of Havana. The Marti Revolution
could no longer be summarily dismissed as merely another attempt by a small, indigenous,
separatist group to weaken Spanish rule. This revolution had assumed national
proportions and had as its intent the destruction of Spanish rule over the island.
Recognizing a significant challenge to Spanish sovereignty, Madrid immediately
reorganized and enlarged their forces on the island. By early 1896, Spain had almost
200,000 men in the field. Madrid also replaced the Spanish Governor General of Cuba,
Martinez Campos, with a veteran commander, General Valeriano Weyler.
General Weyler arrived in Cuba in February of 1896 and implemented a new
strategy designed to crush the rebellion. Weyler believed that the rebels received
sustenance from sympathetic non-combatants across the island. With the Cuban peasantry
free to move from town to town, they could offer supplies, aid and intelligence to the
insurrectos. Weylefs approach, therefore, was to "answer war with war." He dramatically
escalated the level of violence and brutality on the island. The general ordered the
wholesale destruction of homes, crops, and livestock; peasants in certain zones were
forced to relocate into densely packed, filthy, garrisoned towns, appropriately called
"reconcentration camps." In these squalid, disease-ridden camps, "reconcentrados" died
by the tens of thousands.42
The attitudes of African-Americans in the South to deteriorating conditions on the
island and the United States government's response to the Cuban question is extremely
difficult to discern. The dearth of southern black newspaper accounts for this period and
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of extant manuscript evidence on this subject provides few opportunities to render firm
conclusions. In addition, it is likely that many African-Americans feared acting on any
sympathies they may have held because of the possibility of white retaliation. The
historian Willard Gatewood, Jr., using primarily northern black newspapers as his source,
suggested that African-Americans generally sympathized with the Cuban rebels. AfricanAmericans, given their history of slavery and servitude, identified with the struggle of
another oppressed people, native Cubans, in their fight for independence against Spain.
Mrs. Bishop C.C. Pettey, a black woman from New Bern, North Carolina, indicated her
horror at the stories of Spanish atrocities and her impatience with American policy. In an
article in The Star of Zion. Mrs. Pettey concluded, "If the United States had recognized
the belligerency of the insurgents... peace would have doubtless reigned on the island to
day." She added that God would soon punish Spain for its malevolence and then Cubans
could "rejoice in the triumph of their political freedom."43
Despite the horrible images of war that appeared in the press, the opposition of
some white southerners to recognition or other forms of intervention remained steadfast.
After the passage of the concurrent resolution by the House, a New Orleans editor warned
the president not to sign the measure because the "result might be war with Spain. . .
[and]. . . war would not result in any great gain for the U.S. and would cost much money
and considerable number of lives." The resolutions also excited the passions of some in
Mobile who feared that the action of Congress was "equivalent to a declaration of war."44
The passage of the belligerency resolution undoubtedly heightened the anxiety of
those in southern port cities over the possibility of war with Spain. Spain's action and
rhetoric further compounded the fears of a naval attack. An article in the Spanish press by
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Lieutenant Gutierrez Lobcal, the naval attache of Spain at Washington, ridiculed
America's seacoast defenses and its inability to repel a large naval assault against its port
cities. Based upon their knowledge of southern seacoast defenses, few in the coastal South
could refute Lobcal's assertions. Lobcal's article caused some southerners to question the
wisdom of Congress unnecessarily provoking Spain. One southerner remarked:
It is difficult to understand how Senator Morgan and others can
conscientiously urge a course in respect to Cuba that would almost,
certainly, result in war knowing that all of the coast cities . . . are more or
less exposed co hostile navies . . . . What is to hinder a fleet from
destroying Savannah, Mobile or Galveston?45
Amidst growing public debate over Cuban recognition, President Cleveland
refused to act on the concurrent resolution recognizing insurgent belligerency and urging
him to use his good offices to bring about peace on the basis of an independent Cuba.
Instead, Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Richard Olney, continued strictly enforcing
neutrality laws while working toward a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of the Cuban crisis.
In April of 1896, Olney sent a diplomatic message to the Spanish minister, Enrique Dupuy
De Lome, detailing the administration's position regarding the rebellion. In his message,
Olney expressed his disappointment that Spain had not lived up to its promises to quickly
crush the rebellion, since outside of the towns, the rebels held the upper hand. The
magnitude and length of the rebellion, Olney continued, had seriously injured the
productive capabilities of the island Since the beginning of the revolution in 1895, the
productive value of Cuban goods had declined seventy-five percent. Nonetheless, Olney
reassured Spain that the administration was loathe to intervene on behalf of the rebels
because of concerns that they were incapable of self-government and would embroil the
island in a race war. Consequently, Olney urged Spain to enact meaningful reforms on the
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island and ask the American president to serve as mediator. Two months later, Spain
responded with an unqualified rejection of Olney's demands.46
After Spain refused his offer, Cleveland sought information and advice from his
newly-appointed consul-general in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee. The administration had
appointed Lee, a Confederate general, nephew of Robert E. Lee, and former governor of
Virginia, because of his military expertise. Cleveland expected Lee to evaluate fairly and
accurately the military situation on the ground and offer insightful analysis. Lee concluded
that the wan was at an impasse and that Spain could never completely subdue the rebels.
The consul-general also maintained that the insurrectos would not accept any Spanish
reforms short of absolute independence. To end the conflict, therefore, Lee believed that
the United States should offer to buy the island from Spain.47
Lee's reports from Cuba alarmed the president. Cleveland hoped that conditions on
the island would provide opportunities for future diplomatic initiatives. The military
stalemate and the obstinance of both parties left the administration with veiy little room
for maneuver. As for Lee's proposal to buy the island, Cleveland gave the measure little
serious consideration. Since the United States did not want the island, it would be foolish
to buy it and turn it over to native Cubans, who he suspected were incapable of self-rule.
Thus, the summer of 1896 was marked by an impasse among public opinion, Congress and
Cleveland.48
Many southerners added Cleveland's obduracy on the Cuban question to a long list
of grievances they held against the president. Although the Democratic South had held
firm against Populism in 1892, Cleveland's support in the region had declined markedly
since the depression. Cotton prices had dropped, Populism was revived and the
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president's fiscal policies threatened to split the Solid South. Cleveland also suffered in
the South from allegations that he had engaged in nefarious dealings with the House of
Morgan and other Wall Street financiers to secure a contract for a bond sale of $100
million to shore up the nation's gold reserves. Indeed, reports of meetings between the
Treasury and Wail Street bankers received almost universal condemnation in the southern
press in 1895. Most important, however, Cleveland's unflinching support for the gold
standard alienated southerners who rallied around a radical reform of the nation's currency
system with the remonetization of silver. Indeed, by the time of the Democratic
nominating convention in Chicago in July of 1896, all of the southern state Democratic
organs had indicated their support for free silver. As the convention progressed, it became
apparent that Cleveland had not only lost the support of the once Solid South, but of the
national Democratic party as well. The delegates nominated the free silver champion from
Nebraska, William J. Bryan.49
After the Democratic Convention of 1896, many southerners framed the lameduck president's Cuban policy in the context of his perceived failings in the area of
financial reform. During the political battles over the money question in 1895-1896, many
southerners concluded that Cleveland's sound money policy was the result of his
obsequiousness to America's wealthiest capitalists. So, too, many southerners suspected
that Cleveland's Cuban policy, which seemed to defy public opinion, derived from a similar
cabal. A Populist editor reminded his readers of the horrible atrocities taking place in
Cuba, of the congressional resolutions supporting belligerency rights for the rebels, and
the historic parallels between the Cuban struggle for liberty and our own. Cleveland's
indifference in the matter was simply unfathomable and led one southerner to exclaim,
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"Hang such a president. . . why didn't he recognize as belligerents the brave Cubans."
Other more moderate spokesmen expressed dismay at Cleveland's commitment to
neutrality that prevented "the true feeling of the American people . . . from manifesting
itself."50
During Cleveland's last months in office, southern supporters of a more aggressive
policy toward Cuba continued their attacks against the White House. Many of them
realized that,
nothing need be expected of Mr. Cleveland, who . . . has shown a brutal
indifference to public opinion . . . . when the last word in the history of his
administration shall have been written, no darker chapter will be found
there than those which tell the story of the Cuban struggle and of
Cleveland . . . ,51
Due to widespread dissatisfaction with Cleveland, many southerners eagerly anticipated a
change in the White House. Although they preferred a Bryan victory, they felt assured that
even the Republican candidate would be more responsive to prevailing popular sentiment
on the Cuban question than Cleveland had been.
The Cuban question received scant attention in the final months before the election
of 1896. During the party nominating conventions, the respective party platforms
presented a different vision for the future course of American foreign policy, including a
response to the Cuban Revolution. The Democrats largely endorsed Cleveland's policy of
neutrality, but they did express sympathy to the people of Cuba. Republicans, on the
other hand, endorsed a more aggressive foreign policy, including a call for the United
States government to "actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give
independence to the Island." Nonetheless, neither national party emphasized these
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differences during the presidential campaign. Instead, domestic issues such as currency
reform and the tariff dominated the parties', and the public's, attention.52
Although the election in November produced a resounding victory for McKinley
and the Republican party, Cleveland made one last attempt to resolve the rebellion in
Cuba. In his final message to Congress on December 7, 1896, he clearly articulated his
Cuban policy to the public. After almost two years of war, the president observed, Spain
appeared no closer to crushing the rebellion than at the time of his last annual message a
year ago. Spain still exercised virtual control of the large cities and their environs; the
countryside had "either given over to anarchy or is subject to the military occupation" by
the rebels. Nonetheless, Cleveland repeated his opposition to recognizing the putative
insurgent government because it had "given up all attempts to exercise its functions" as
required by international law. Cleveland then issued a stem warning to Spain. He
asserted that America's patience with Spain's inability to restore peaceful authority over
the entire island was reaching a critical stage. More and more Americans desired active
United States intervention to protect their investments on the island; still others railed
against the cost of policing our coastlines to prevent unlawful filibustering expeditions
from reaching Cuba. In addition, Cleveland warned that if Spain's authority became
completely ineffective, and the war became one of wanton and useless destruction of lives
and property, then the United States would be forced to intervene on humanitarian
grounds.53
Cleveland's warning to Spain represented no significant change in the
administration's position. Despite the message's firmer tone towards Spain, the president
still refused to recognize the belligerent rights of the Cuban insurrectos. He also
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challenged jingoes in Congress by declaring that recognition was impossible since the
rebels had no government to recognize. Not surprisingly, the Spanish Foreign Minister in
Washington, Enrique Dupuy de Lome, perceived the message as favorable to Spain;
clearly, he concluded, Cleveland planned no further action on the Cuban question during
his final months in office.54
*

*

*

By the time of McKinley's election in November of 1896, southern public attitudes
regarding the situation in Cuba were well-established. The continued opposition of
commercial interests in southern port cities to a more aggressive policy toward Spain
remained almost universal. Certainly, the passage of congressional resolutions recognizing
the belligerency rights of the rebels added a new sense of urgency to their opposition. In
general, business and other financial interests in southern coastal cities feared that
recognition would provoke Spain into declaring war against the United States. In the
event of a war with Spain, their cities could be expected to bear the brunt of attacks by the
Spanish navy. Certainly, the inadequacy of the South's coastal defenses heightened their
feelings of vulnerability to a Spanish naval attack. Finally, business groups in many
southern port cities believed that a war between the United States and Spain would
virtually paralyze seaborne commerce in the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic. Such
a diminution of trade would have a profoundly negative impact on local economies and
jeopardize the prospects for an economic recovery from the depression.
Only in Florida's coastal cities did business interests appear unconcerned over the
prospect o f war. In fact, several business groups in Florida supported the congressional
recognition of the rebels. The proximity of Florida to Cuba made it likely that the state
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would serve as the nation's primary staging area in the event of a war with Spain. The
flood of men, material and federal dollars that would be sent to the state could translate
into large profits for many of Florida's businesses. In addition, the large number of Cuban
immigrants and the activities of the Cuban juntas in the state's coastal cities supported the
position taken by leading commercial interests in the state.
In the rest of the South, support for recognition and for a more active policy was
widespread. Most southerners felt sympathy and compassion for the rebels. Spanish
atrocity stories shocked many in the region and led them to demand an American policy
that would relieve much of the human suffering on the island. The South, too, felt a
special bond with the Cuban rebels. Native Cubans, like an earlier generation of
southerners, sought to throw off the yoke of a tyrannical power. A common experience in
seeking self-determination led many to support the insurrectos in their quest for liberty. In
short, humanitarianism and historical memory combined to produce extensive southern
support for "Cuba Libre."
The passage of a concurrent resolution by both houses of Congress early in 1896
caused some in the South to reflect more carefully on the ramifications of direct
intervention in the Cuban crisis. While congressional debates and the resolution did little
to alter prevailing attitudes in the region, actions in Washington created more anxiety
among those who feared a war and its consequences. Some southerners raised concerns
that American intervention on behalf of non-white Cubans would be improvident; southern
racist assumptions held that the Cuban rebels were incapable of self-rule. Still others in
the South suggested that involvement in Cuba against Spain would be an extremely costly
affair. Given the depressed state of the American economy, it seemed foolish for the
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nation to provoke a foreign war that would further drain America's resources. Although
only a mere rumble in 1896, southern critics of a more aggressive policy outside of the
South's port cities began to raise important questions that would gain far greater
acceptance as the crisis in Cuba intensified.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SOUTH AND THE DRIFT TOWARD WAR,
1897-1898

An incident that happened at the opera house in this
city last Saturday night demonstrates the intense
feeling that pervades the public mind relative to
Cuba. A comic actor...was giving the Bowery style
of ordering the wants of customers in a restaurant.
A girl wanted a dessert and finally asked for "a
floating island." The head caterer immediately
shouted "One Free Cuba." The mention of the name
caused a wild burst o f continuous applause. There is
no mistaking the temper of the people in sympathy
with the struggling patriots.
— Shreveport Times. 2 March 18971

What defense is there for., .the port of Mobile in
case o f war with any first-class naval power? Fort
Morgan is undergoing great improvement, but the
great guns that are to be the weapons o f defence are
as yet on the cars in this city. The old guns at the
fort, if still in position, could not be relied upon to do
any damage to a modem war vessel. If attacked,
Fort Morgan would have to surrender, for it is
wholly defenceless. Pensacola is in the same fix,
only worse, for that city can be bombarded from the
sea. New Orleans is not any better off. Galveston is
likewise helpless....
—Mobile Daily Register. 29 Jan. 18982
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Prior to McKinley's inauguration, southerners appeared seriously divided over the
proper course of action regarding the Cuban question. Southern interventionists,
especially in the rural interior, viewed the situation in Cuba based largely upon their own
historical memory and their understanding of domestic politics. These southerners often
compared the rebels in Cuba fighting for independence against Spain with their own
heroes—the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution and the leaders of the
Confederacy. Therefore, they claimed that the United States should aid the rebels in their
quest for self-determination against the Spanish monarchy. In addition, southern
interventionists tended to evaluate the government's policy toward Cuba in the context of
their attitudes toward their own society and national politics. Many of them suspected
that just as large capitalists and financiers conspired to defeat a popular outcry for "free
silver," so, too, they plotted to prevent American intervention in behalf of the oppressed
people of Cuba. The notion of a conspiracy among Republicans, wealthy capitalists, and
"gold-bug" Democrats had great explanatory power to the people of the rural interior, in
both domestic and foreign affairs.
In many coastal cities of the South, in contrast, most residents seemed
apprehensive about becoming entangled in Cuban affairs. Although many people in the
coastal plains sympathized with the Cuban rebels, they feared direct American intervention
would lead to a war with Spain. And if it did, they predicted, the coastal South would
suffer both physically and economically Spanish naval ships would likely bombard
southern ports and blockade access to seaborne commerce in the Gulf of Mexico and the
South Atlantic. Such attacks would be devastating to the South.
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During McKinley's first year in office, changing circumstances in Washington,
Madrid and Cuba led many southerners, especially interventionists, to reevaluate their
position on the Cuban question. The election of 1896 produced Republican majorities in
both houses of Congress and presaged a rising tide of jingoist rhetoric from Washington.
Partisan wrangling in Congress led both parties to take a more aggressive stance on the
Cuban question out of fear that they would be assailed by a public they perceived as
favoring stronger action. Reports of failed negotiations between Washington and Madrid
and of continued atrocities in Cuba produced a distinctly anxious public mood that made
the prospect for war more real. During these months, southerners looked more carefully
at the possible consequences of war with Spain. Some southern Democrats then sought to
place their party squarely ahead of public opinion on the subject of Cuba. Other
southerners voiced concerns about a foreign war and its implications for the future of the
American republic. On the eve of war, the South remained divided; only when official
reports linked Spain to the humanitarian disaster in Cuba and the destruction of the U.S.S.
Maine did a southern consensus for war emerge.
*

*

*

Despite widespread southern opposition to Cleveland's policy, few in the South
expected any real changes after the inauguration of William McKinley. Many viewed the
Republican president-elect as even more closely aligned to big business than his
predecessor. During the presidential campaign, the G.O.P., under the able leadership of
Marcus Hanna, raised vast sums of money for their candidate and many southern
Democrats assumed that these large campaign contributors would profoundly influence
McKinley's policy toward Cuba.3
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The fears of southern interventionists that leading business interests would
pressure the president to avoid direct involvement in the island's affairs stemmed from the
important position Cuban trade occupied under Spanish rule. American investors on the
island and those engaged in Cuban-American commerce had been seriously injured since
the beginning of the rebellion. From 1894 to 1897, total imports and exports between the
two nations declined one-third; Cuban sugar and tobacco imports into the United States
plummeted nearly eighty percent. As a result of declining Cuban production, the powerful
American Sugar Trust had to pay three to four dollars more per ton for sugar imported
from other sources. In addition the spread of the rebellion caused American property
owners on the island to fear that their holdings would be destroyed or seized should the
rebels prove victorious. American investors in Cuba, with holdings estimated at about $50
million, were sure to place the same demands on McKinley that they had placed on
Cleveland—a quick end to the war and the maintenance of Spanish sovereignty.4
McKinley's inaugural address of March 4, 1897, did little to ease the doubts of
those who sought a change in America's policy toward Cuba. McKinley cited George
Washington's policy of non-interference with foreign nations and pledged that his
administration would not meddle in the domestic affairs of other nations. McKinley issued
no expression of sympathy for the rebels nor pointed to any contingency that would
require direct American intervention. He concluded his cursory comments on Cuba with
the statement, "War should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed;
peace is preferable to wa r . . . ."5
McKinley's inaugural message, therefore, offered little insight into what changes, if
any, his administration would make in Cuban policy. Obviously, though, he had rejected
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the appeals from the public and members of his own party who supported immediate
intervention. McKinley, like his predecessor, preferred a more moderate course of action.
The new president sought to give Spain every possible opportunity to enact reforms that
would bring an end to the revolution in Cuba and restore Spanish authority. During the
spring of 1897, in sum, McKinley continued Cleveland's policy of neutrality while
gathering additional information about conditions on the island.6
In the spring of 1897, public sentiment in favor of American intervention increased
with the publication of various reports of Spain's mistreatment of American citizens on the
island of Cuba. Thousands of Cubans became naturalized citizens of the United States in
the hope that Spain would not injure their lives or property. Spanish officials rarely
recognized the legitimacy of their American citizenship and captured many of them as
insurgents or seized their property. Claims made by these recently naturalized United
States citizens, combined with those filed by American nationals, mounted steadily in
1897. Finally, and most importantly, consular dispatches from Havana corroborated many
of the press reports and confirmed that at least eight hundred American citizens had been
placed in Weylefs reconcentration camps. In the South, some viewed these revelations as
evidence that Spain ignored the rights of American citizens abroad and failed to respect
the power and dignity of the United States as a nation. Although most southerners
believed that the United States should simply negotiate with Spain to protect its citizens
and preserve its national honor, some extremists suggested that the situation warranted
direct American intervention. One observer condemned McKinley for allowing "American
citizens in Cuba to be butchered" and hoped that he would not delay too long before
intervening. Given the present desperate situation on the island, and the "extreme cruelty"
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practiced by Spain against American citizens, he wrote, "something should be done and
that quickly."7
In an attempt to seize the initiative on the Cuban question from the president,
Congress took up the issue in the spring of 1897. Called into special session to deal with
tariff reform, Congress quickly turned its attention to Cuba. In the Senate, on April 6,
John T. Morgan of Alabama introduced a joint resolution recognizing Cuban belligerency.
Since a state of public war existed between Spain and Cuba, the resolution maintained,
strict American neutrality demanded the recognition of the belligerent rights of both
parties. Speaking in support of his resolution, Morgan reiterated his outrage at Spain's
conduct toward Cuban civilians and American citizens on the island. The latter group,
Morgan exclaimed, had had "their rights, liberties, and lives . . . placed under the power of
a brutal authority.. . ." American recognition of the rebels would lead to better Spanish
treatment for Cuban rebels and American citizens alike. After a month of intermittent
debate, the Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 41 to 14, with 33 abstentions.
Southern senators voted almost unanimously in favor of the measure. Among southerners
who voted, only Donelson Caffery of Louisiana voted no. Undoubtedly, the large
southern vote in favor of Morgan's resolution reflected southern members' loyalty to
Morgan and their desire to use the issue as a political club against the Republican party
and the president.8
In the House, Joe Bailey of Texas, the leader of House Democrats, shared the
belief that his party could use the Morgan Resolution, the issue of recognition, and the
question of appropriations for the relief of Americans suffering in Cuba to turn public
opinion against the McKinley Administration and embarrass the president. Although
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Bailey disliked the notion of war with Spain, and opposed American territorial expansion,
he waged a spirited battle with the White House and Republicans over Cuba. He often
attacked the motives of Republicans, especially the president, and accused them of being
proxies for the moneyed interests of the nation.
On May 20, when the Morgan Resolution reached the House, Speaker Thomas
Reed blocked a vote on the measure. Reed disliked the insurgents and supported
McKinley's policy of non-recognition. In addition, the speaker feared House passage of
the belligerency resolution would embarrass both the Republican party and the president.
On the other hand, Reed supported congressional efforts to appropriate money for the
relief of Americans suffering in Cuba. Consequently, Reed sought unanimous consent of a
resolution authorizing $50,000 for Cuban relief. At this point, Bailey rose to oppose the
relief bill unless the resolution favoring the recognition of Cuban belligerency was attached
to it. In a parliamentary maneuver, Reed blocked consideration of the Morgan Resolution
and sparked a vigorous protest from Bailey and other House Democrats.9
During the raucous debate that followed Reed's ruling, virtually the entire two
hours allowed for debate dealt not with the legality of Reed's ruling, but with other aspects
of the broader Cuban question. In a bitter partisan speech, Bailey suggested that
McKinley ignored the Republican platform favoring the recognition of the insurrectos,
not because conditions have changed . . . but because powerful influences
have been exerted to prevent your proceeding. The stock gamblers have
become alarmed, and they would rather see their country insulted than to
have their operations disturbed . . . preferring, as you always have, the
interests of wealth above the rights of humanity, you are endeavoring to
evade and postpone this [Cuban] question.10
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Two other representatives, John Sharp Williams and Joseph Wheeler, followed
Bailey to the floor of the House and expressed their concerns regarding the Cuban
question. Their speeches emphasized common themes—the obligation of the United States
to intervene on behalf of a people struggling for liberty, humanitarian concerns, and, most
important, the malignant influence of "the money power" over foreign policy. Williams, of
Yazoo City, Mississippi, spoke first. He delivered a scathing partisan attack on
Republicans and the Speaker of the House and suggested that "a plutocratic influence"
dictated their inaction. Williams believed that the United States was duty-bound, because
of its history, its sense of mission, and its "superior" racial composition, to rally to the aid
of the insurgents fighting for freedom in Cuba. To continue to do nothing reflected a "sad
change in the character of the Anglo-Saxon race, which previously rallied to the cause of
liberty." But thus far, he exclaimed, American policy toward Cuba reflected only the
subordination of the nation's democratic goals and moral values to the corrupting influence
of big business.
For a nation. . . to come to the conclusion . . . that the only thing to be
considered in their relations with the other nations of the earth is the money
question, the trade question, the effect on stocks and bonds, and the
disturbance of business, carries degradation so far that I do not believe any
man was ever gifted with power to express the contempt that a real man
ought to feel for it.11
Joseph Wheeler, of Alabama, spoke shortly after the conclusion of Williams'
remarks. He, too, castigated Republicans for their failure to lead on the question of
granting Cuban belligerency and charged that they employed subterfuge to block the
passage of a belligerency resolution. He dismissed Republicans' claims that a state of war
did not exist on the island and, therefore, the entire question of recognition was moot.
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Wheeler, a former Confederate general, reminded his colleagues that Spain had more
soldiers in Cuba than the Confederacy had under arms in 1863. Clearly, a state of war,
"cruel, brutal, murderous war," existed in that "Gem of the Ocean." Wheeler, like
Williams, blamed "the pride of gold" for thwarting the popular will that supported Cuban
belligerency. Wheeler contended that Congress must reject the wishes of powerful
economic interest groups and pass the belligerency resolution. Amidst loud applause, he
concluded, "If we fail to do this, we are recreant to our pledges . . . to civilization, to
humanity." In the end, the House passed only the bill providing $50,000 for humanitarian
relief as House Republicans sustained Reed's rule prohibiting a vote on the belligerency
resolution.12
Despite the support of southern members in Congress, the Morgan Resolution
proved far less popular with the southern public. While a majority of southerners still
sympathized with the insurrectos and "Cuba Libre," many in the South feared the
resolution would push the nation dangerously close to war with Spain. Criticism of
intervention, once largely confined to the coastal South, began to appear in the interior
among southerners who had no clear connection to coastal commerce. In addition,
opponents of the Morgan Resolution raised many different objections to Congress's
actions, some of which had not figured prominently in earlier debates on Cuba.
Some southerners criticized jingoes in Congress for pursuing a course of action
that threatened to involve the United States in the internal affairs of another nation. To
these critics, Spain legally possessed the island of Cuba and was justified under
international law in suppressing the rebellion. "The island of Cuba belongs to Spain just as
much as Arkansas belongs to the nation .. .," an Arkansas editor explained. Another
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critic of the resolution, Rebecca L. Felton, a Georgia physician, minister, and champion of
progressive causes, dismissed the argument that the United States had a higher obligation
to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Felton noted that Spaniards and their immediate
descendants owned virtually all of the property in Cuba, and that the Spanish ruling class
on the island favored the continuation of Spanish rule. Therefore, Felton contended,
American intervention in Cuba could only be regarded as a move to appease the jingoes,
for such a crusade lacked popular support in Cuba. Spain was not a "heartless invader;" it
owned the island. On the other hand, Felton asked, if "the United States [should] send
over its soldiers to aid the Cuban insurgents, would not the United States be regarded as
the invading nation?"13
Some southerners also feared that Cuban intervention and a war with Spain would
undermine several principles that had long shaped America's foreign policy. George
Washington's warning to avoid alliances with foreign nations "and the Founding Fathers'
policy of non-interference in the affairs of other nations bolstered the arguments of noninterventionists. Abandoning America's historic isolation, some southerners feared,
threatened to involve the United States in the conflicts of Europe and its periodic wars.
Others in the South suggested that a war with Spain would mark not only the end of the
volunteer army but the very ideal of the citizen-soldier. Since the founding of the
Republic, most Americans viewed standing armies as anathema; they were unresponsive to
public control and threatened the liberty of ordinary citizens. During the debate over
Cuba, some southerners suspected that the most ardent expansionists "would not hesitate
to create [foreign] disturbances as a means of rendering such enlargement tolerable."
Southern non-interventionists, wary of the motives of expansionists, raised the possibility
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that a greatly enlarged, permanent military establishment could someday be turned against
the citizens of the nation. These concerns appeared particularly alarming to southerners
who still chafed over the military occupation of the South during Reconstruction.14
Most often, though, racial concerns dominated the public discourse of southern
non-interventionists during congressional consideration of the Morgan Resolution. The
unvarnished racism of some in the South bred determined opposition to any policy that
jeopardized peaceful relations with Spain in order to help native Cubans. Regardless of
reports of cruelty and suffering, one southerner stated, the United States should not be
concerned "over a lot of dagos and mongrels in Cuba." Some southerners also deemed
the rebels incapable of administering civil affairs on the island in the event they gained
independence. While virtually all white southerners agreed that Anglo-Saxons had
mastered the art of politics, "the cut-throats, brigands and otherwise detestable insurgents
in Cuba. . . mixtures of Negroes, Indians and low Spanish," were unlikely ever to advance
beyond the state of barbarism.15
The South's reaction to debate over the Morgan Resolution reflected the region's
growing concern over the long-term implications of a foreign war on the United States
and the South. Congressional consideration of the resolution raised southerners' fears that
a war with Spain was probable and, therefore, caused many in the region to reevaluate
their position. Widespread feelings of sympathy for the Cuban rebels and concern over
humanitarian abuses against Cuban natives stemmed from some southerners' visceral
identification with the Cuban revolution based on their own understanding of the
American Revolution, the Civil War and Reconstruction. Public discussion of the Cuban
question, especially among non-interventionists, had addressed the possibility of war as an
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abstract concern; few in the South actually expected it to occur. Support for intervention,
however, diminished as the likelihood of war raised significant issues of importance to the
South about the perils of foreign wars and the possible acquisition of foreign territories.
The rhetoric of southern congressmen during the debate over the Morgan
Resolution betrayed the growing division of opinion in the South concerning the issue of
the recognition of Cuban belligerency. Morgan, author of the resolution, believed his
measure enjoyed widespread popularity in the South. Similarly, other southern
congressmen, such as Bailey, Williams, and Wheeler, played important roles in advocating
passage of the resolution in the House. The irony of their action, however, was that in
supporting the recognition of Cuban belligerency, and raising the specter of war with
Spain, they weakened support for recognition in their native region. Rather than reflecting
majority sentiment on the Cuban question, these politicians sought to lead southerners
toward a consensus for recognition and intervention.
During the late summer months of 1897, American consideration of the Cuban
question took another turn after the assassination of Prime Minister Antonio Canovas del
Castillo. The assassination of Castillo produced a governmental crisis; the Queen Regent
named a new government led by General Marcelo Azcarraga, the former Conservative
Minister of War. Most Spanish politicians realized that Azcarraga's appointment
represented only a temporary solution to Spain's vexing problems because he lacked the
requisite political stature to unify the Conservative Party. Despite the new government's
precarious position, Azcarraga and his Minister of State, the Duke of Tetuan received an
important American diplomatic mission only a few weeks after assuming power.16
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On September 18, 1897, the United States Minister to Spain, Stewart L.
Woodford, conveyed the substance of McKinley's Spanish policy to the government in
Madrid. McKinley, trying to counter the efforts of legislators who would use his inaction
on Cuba to embarrass the administration, issued a sharp rebuke to Spain for its inability to
restore peace on the island in a timely fashion. He pointed out that Spain exercised only
nominal control over much of Cuba, and questioned whether it could ever restore its
relationship with Cuba, even if it did crush the rebellion. Woodford also indicated to the
Spanish government that although the president wanted peace with Spain, he could not sit
idly by while American lives and property were destroyed by the conflict. Finally,
Woodford, speaking on behalf of the president, issued a veiled threat of American
intervention unless Spain showed some meaningful signs of reform by November l.17
McKinley's message further complicated Spain's domestic political situation.
Spanish political leaders realized that Azcarraga and Tetuan were neither likely to rally
popular support against the American demands nor to propose any substantive reforms.
On September 29, 1897, therefore, they agreed to accept a new Liberal government
headed by Praxedes M. Sagasta, an arch-critic of Canovas's Cuban policy. Once in office,
Sagasta indicated his intention to abandon the policy of the Conservatives and implement a
broad program of reform designed to grant Cuba limited autonomy within the "Spanish
Commonwealth." To demonstrate his government's good faith, Sagasta recalled General
Weyler and declared an end to the policy of reconcentration. He also pardoned all
political prisoners and released Americans held in Cuban jails. Finally, Sagasta announced
a plan to grant native Cubans a large degree of self-rule. Spain, however, would retain
sovereignty over the island's military and foreign affairs.18
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After the diplomatic activity of August and September, southern interventionists
received the news of a change in the Spanish government and its promises of reform with
considerable skepticism. Given the military success of Cuban rebels in the field, the notion
of limited autonomy within the Spanish empire appeared as a last desperate attempt by the
Sagasta ministry to retain sovereignty over the island. These southern interventionists
questioned the veracity of the new Liberal government and urged others to embrace direct
intervention as the only means to stop Spain's inhumane policies in Cuba. Previous
Spanish governments had promised reform for Cuba, yet nothing substantial had ever been
implemented. One southern observer mocked Sagasta's pledge to create a freely-elected
legislature in Cuba as a sham since "the veto power would rest in the mother country!"
Most important, however, southern interventionists recognized Spain's complete inability
to restore order on the island. Unwilling to allow the present Cuban war to drag on for
years, they continued to urge the administration to intervene and hasten the inevitable
collapse of Spanish authority over the island.19
Sagasta's promise of reform also failed to satisfy Hannis Taylor, of Alabama, who
had served as Cleveland's minister to Spain during his second term. When the rebellion
began in 1895, Taylor had counseled Cleveland to adopt a moderate course of action
toward Spain. Over time, though, Taylor became increasingly frustrated by Spanish
politics and that nation's unwillingness to settle claims of Americans whose property had
been destroyed by the Cuban war. He also reached the conclusion that Spain was simply
unable to restore peace and order on the island. Alarmed by events in Spain, and by
reports of the slaughter of civilians under Weyler, Taylor returned to the United States in
1897 as an ardent interventionist.20
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In November of 1897, Taylor published an article in the North American Review
that supported American intervention in Cuba. Spain's inability to re-establish sovereignty
over the island, according to Taylor, had led Canovas and Weyler to pursue a policy that
had "degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of
human life and the utter destruction of the very subject matter of the conflict itself."
Taylor also expressed his doubts that Sagasta's accession to power would produce any
real changes. Despite Spain's proposals for reform, Taylor concluded that Spanish
leaders—civil, clerical and military—would never tolerate losing the "Gem of the
Antilles."21
Like many other southern interventionists, Taylor believed that the United States
had a moral obligation to intervene in Cuba. He was appalled at the course of the war
under Weyler and wary that Spain would never alter its policy of rapine, destruction and
carnage. Given these dire circumstances, Taylor asserted, continued inactivity by the
United States government was unconscionable. On several occasions, he proclaimed that
the United States, as a Christian nation, "must. .. discharge its duty to itself and to
humanity. . . " by using its power to end the Cuban war. Otherwise, the United States
would forfeit its place as the moral steward of the new world. He concluded that "In its
final form the question [of direct U.S. intervention] is one of moral dignity."22
On December 6,1897, President McKinley addressed the Cuban war in his annual
message to Congress. Unswayed by Taylor's and similar widespread criticism of his
policy, McKinley reiterated his sympathy with native Cubans' desire for self-government
without officially recognizing the belligerent rights of the rebels. In doing so, he severely
criticized the inhumanity and widespread destruction wrought by the insurgents, but

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

119
stressed the dramatic shift in Spanish policy since the departure of Canovas. Under
Canovas and Weyler, Spain's inhumane policy of reconcentration had "shocked the
universal sentiment of humanity." Sagasta, however, removed Valereano Weyler from
command and proposed substantial reforms to pursue the conflict in a more humane
manner. After praising these reform efforts of the Liberal ministry, McKinley maintained
that Sagasta should be given more time to implement his plans. McKinley was especially
hopeful that Spain's autonomy plan would bring a quick end to the war since it offered
both Spain and the Cuban people a just and honorable settlement. In concluding his
comments on Cuba, the president appealed to Republicans to support his moderate
position and resist the calls of jingoes who advocated an illegal and unwise war with
Spain.23
McKinley's call for patience evoked even greater criticism after the collapse of the
Liberal ministry's reform efforts in January of 1898. The removal of General Valereano
Weyler and the installation of a new Autonomist regime led to a series of riots in Havana
sponsored by the military and business elite. Both of these groups remained loyal to Spain
and threatened to resist the Autonomistas with force. The autonomy plan also met
vigorous resistance from the leaders of the Cuban insurrection. Even before Sagasta
revealed the details of his proposed reforms, the rebel leaders Maximo Gomez, Calixto
Garcia, and Domingo M. Capote, dismissed the concept of limited autonomy as
unacceptable. Anything short of independence could not serve as the basis for
negotiations and peace. Despite widespread opposition in Cuba, among Loyalists and
Cuban rebels, the Liberal government stood firmly behind its plans as the best means to
provide a peaceful resolution to the island's troubles.24
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The apparent popular rejection by Spaniards and Cubans of Sagasta's reforms
coincided with additional reports of a growing humanitarian crisis on the island. For
years, American's had been shocked by accounts of life in the squalid, densely populated,
disease-ridden reconcentration camps. To be sure, many of these reports were little more
than propaganda disseminated by the Cuban junta and the yellow press; nonetheless, most
Americans realized the horrific nature of these camps through the observations of more
responsible spokesmen such as the consul-general, Fitzhugh Lee. Beginning in 1897,
limited relief efforts began under the Cuban Relief Fund, a private organization created to
solicit and distribute funds directly to reconcentrados. With several hundred thousand
persons in reconcentration camps, however, the efforts of the Cuban Relief Fund were
pitifully inadequate to deal with the crisis.
In another concession, Sagasta agreed in December to allow Clara Barton and the
American Red Cross access to the suffering reconcentrados. On Christmas Eve, the
president appealed to the American public for contributions to the Red Cross for the
purpose of providing Cuban relief. To collect and distribute the funds, McKinley created
a Central Cuban Relief Committee. To start the program, he anonymously donated
$5,000. The initial response from the public was extremely disappointing. By early
January, less than $2,500 dollars had been collected, excluding the president's initial gift.
In January, the Central Cuban Relief Committee renewed its appeals for private
contributions. To bolster their fund-raising efforts, the committee dramatized the
conditions in Cuban reconcentration camps, with a special emphasis on the suffering of
women and children. The new campaign yielded more donations and allowed for an
expansion of relief operations. Despite this increased American charity, it became clear
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that private relief was wholly inadequate to deal with a humanitarian crisis of this
magnitude. Fitzhugh Lee, in his analysis of conditions in the camps, estimated that it
would cost approximately $20,000 per day to take care of the reconcentrados. Ultimately,
he concluded, only the restoration of peace could provide for the dispossessed.25
Apparently, many other southerners agreed with Lee's assessment that the situation
in Cuba remained desperate despite Spanish promises of reform. Reports that the Spanish
military still maintained reconcentration camps and summarily tortured or executed those
suspected of being insurgents led to new American calls for direct intervention. In
Mississippi, the state legislature received information from George Donald, a former major
in the Confederate Army and long-time public official from Clarke County, confirming the
tales of horror emanating from the reconcentrado camps. After a visit to Cuba, Donald
reported that during the past year over 90,000 persons, mainly women and children, had
starved to death in Santa Clara province alone. He also charged that in Cuba's principle
cities and towns, he could not "go twenty steps without some poor, starving woman or
child begging him for something to eat." His observations of conditions on the island led
Donald to conclude that Spain's official policy was to exterminate native Cubans by
starvation and other equally barbaric methods. Donald's account of conditions in Cuba
shocked Mississippi's state legislators. "Speaking for the people of Mississippi and in
behalf of humanity, and the Christian civilization of the world," members of both houses
passed a joint resolution favoring intervention by the United States government in the war
between Spain and Cuba and forwarded the resolution to Congress.26
In Congress, Hugh Dinsmore of Arkansas expressed his own impatience with
McKinley's policy of inaction. Prior to 1898, Dinsmore had consistently favored caution
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on the question of American intervention and preferred to see the resources and energies
of the nation channeled toward ending the depression at home. Deteriorating conditions
on the island, he finally concluded, demanded immediate American intervention.
Dinsmore, therefore, announced his support for the recognition of Cuban belligerency and
of direct intervention to end the Cuban war. Amidst loud applause, the Arkansas
representative proclaimed:
I think the time has come for action. We may no longer close our eyes to
the scenes and deafen our ears to the sounds of sickening, harrowing
human misery and death. These scenes, these sounds, are at our very
shores. We have a certain responsibility, and in self-respect, in the name of
civilization, for the sake of humanity, we should take some step toward
ending them.27
Bitter partisan rhetoric characterized Congressional debate on the Cuban question
in January-February of 1898. The ranking minority member on the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Dinsmore, blasted Republicans for blocking efforts to pass a belligerency
resolution in Congress. The Arkansan accused the Republicans of hypocrisy for savaging
Cleveland's failure to recognize Cuban belligerency, yet standing behind McKinley's refusal
to do the same. In a lengthy diatribe, Dinsmore accused the Republicans of demagoguery
by campaigning during the last presidential election as the party for Cuban independence,
but once in power, thwarting the popular will and doing nothing. As a result, Dinsmore
concluded, Republican pronouncements about Cuban independence appeared to the
insurrectos fighting for liberty as "an empty shell," and their continued inaction was
resented by all champions of freedom.28
The successful effort of House Speaker Thomas B. Reed to limit debate on Cuban
belligerency further angered southern interventionists. An Austin editor noted that one of

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

123

Texas' representatives, Joseph Bailey, had called for the recognition of Cuban belligerency
and independence on the floor of the House until Republicans suspended debate. The
editor proclaimed,
Rather than rising to immediate action on this important questionappealing to the sympathy of the American people, republican
representatives in congress postpone it indefinitely, while rapine, and
murder stalk bloody handed over the Antilles . . . on the flimsy pretext of
the technical violation of the rules. . . .
Despite his inability to force the issue of Cuban belligerency and independence, Bailey and
other House Democrats had forced the Republicans to go on record "against the popular
will of the people."29
In the South, a common hatred of both trusts and the Republican Party continued
to produce widespread hostility to the apparent conspiracy between moneyed interests and
the G.O.P. Southern interventionists, like their counterparts in other parts of the nation,
embraced the popular notion that American business interests, especially in the Northeast,
worked through the Republican Party to prevent a humanitarian war to liberate Cuba.
Regarding the continued refusal of Republican leaders to act, one southerner observed,
It is pretty well understood that the power behind such action is centered in
Wall street and that the moneyed and business interests of the country are
made paramount to the question of right. . . .
Although claims of a conspiracy against the public will were often exaggerated, large
contributions from financial interests to the Republican Party and big businesses' public
opposition to war seemed to confirm some of the interventionists' charges.30
In February of 1898, a series of events dramatically altered the diplomatic situation
between the United States and Spain and united southern opinion for war. On February 9,
1898, the New York Journal, under the headline, "The worst Insult to the United States in
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Its History," published a private letter written by Dupuy de Lome to a friend in Cuba. The
letter, intended for Don Jose Canalejas, editor of the Madrid Heraldo. was intercepted by
a Cuban insurgent and turned over to William R. Hearst's Journal. In his communication,
the Spanish minister made some disparaging comments about President McKinley.
Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness with which he [McKinley]
repeats all that the press and public opinion of Spain have said of Weyler, it
shows once more that McKinley is weak and catering to the rabble and,
besides, a low politician who desires to leave a door open to himself and to
stand well with the jingos of his party.31
De Lome's letter closed with comments pertaining to the pursuit of a commercial
treaty of reciprocity between the United States and Spain. Since the beginning of the year,
Madrid had made diplomatic overtures regarding the importance of a reciprocity
agreement as a further element of economic reform designed to restore peace to the
island. Regarding these negotiations, de Lome suggested,
It would be very advantageous to take up, even if only for effect, the
question of commercial relations, and to have a man of some prominence
sent hither in order that I may make use of him here to carry on a
propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the junta and
to try to win over the refugees.32
H. Wayne Morgan, a leading scholar of the McKinley administration, concluded
that the de Lome letter irreparably damaged relations between the United States and
Spain. The contents of the letter suggested that the entire autonomy scheme was merely a
ploy to buy time for Spain as it pursued total military victory on the island. De Lome also
indicated that Spanish diplomacy had been perfidious and insincere. The bad faith
demonstrated by de Lome thus served to define the character of the entire government in
Madrid. Other studies have asserted that de Lome's letter greatly increased Americans'
hostility toward Spain. The content of the Spanish minister's letter appeared in papers
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across the nation within a matter of days. Fueled by constant harangues from the "yellow
press," many believed that further negotiations with the hypocritical Spanish would be
pointless. To some, the revelations of de Lome served to heighten the sense of disgust felt
toward Spain's conduct toward the United States and its handling of the Cuban War. The
letter also led some moderates to abandon their position and call for intervention.33
Unlike in other parts of the country, though, southern attitudes changed little after
the publication of the de Lome letter. To jingoes in the region, the incident merely offered
further proof of Spanish treachery and deceit, and they quickly added it to their litany of
grievances against Spain that justified intervention. Most southerners, though, considered
the letter from the Spanish foreign minister appeared as simply a personal indiscretion.
Some even questioned whether or not the remarks were de Lome's or if they had been
manufactured by Hearst or his subordinates. Certainly, most in the region did not view the
letter as a casus belli. As one editor put it, "That De Lome was indiscreet i n . . .
criticizing the President is true, but that this should bring about a war with Spain is
absurd." The failure of Democratic southerners to rally around the Republican president
after the de Lome letter, as residents of other sections quickly did, indicated the extent to
which partisanship guided southerners' view of McKinley and his policy toward Cuba.34
The failure of liberal reform efforts and a surge of violent opposition to the
autonomy plan in Havana led the administration to consider a more direct response to
events in Cuba. Riots led by Spanish military officers, many of whom formerly supported
Weyler, now disrupted civil administration in Havana and threatened to destroy American
property in the city. The American consul-general, Fitzhugh Lee, reported to the State
Department that mobs loyal to the military attacked the offices of pro-autonomy
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newspapers and roamed the streets, shouting "Death to Autonomy!" and "Viva Weyler!"
Although Spanish authorities eventually brought the crowds under control, Lee feared that
future riots might endanger American citizens and property in Havana so he urged
McKinley to prepare for any contingency that would require the use of force to protect
American interests on the island.
Based largely upon Lee's reports, McKinley decided to send a United States
warship to Havana. The president reassured Spanish authorities that the U.S.S. Maine.
which arrived in Havana on January 25, did not represent a threat to Spain. To further
allay Spanish concerns, Secretary of State William Day told Spanish minister Dupuy de
Lome that McKinley wanted to give Sagasta's autonomy plan a little more time. In
addition, since the two nations were at peace, the United States navy should resume visits
to Havana as a sign of friendship. The pleasant diplomatic exchanges between Madrid and
Washington betrayed the growing sense of frustration felt by the leaders of both nations.
In Madrid, Spanish officials believed that the autonomy plan would work if only the
United States would suppress the activities of the Cuban Junta. On the other hand,
McKinley's patience had nearly reached its end. At the same time McKinley offered
support for autonomy, he authorized both humanitarian relief on the island and the
assembly of United States naval vessels near Key West.35
On February 15, less than a week after the publication of the de Lome letter in the
Journal, an explosion aboard the U S S Maine, anchored in Havana harbor, killed 266
American sailors and officers. Secretary of Navy John Long and McKinley received
consul-general Lee's dispatch regarding the catastrophe shortly after 1:00 A.M. on the
morning of February 16. The massive destruction caused by the explosion led Lee to
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conclude that it would be impossible to determine the origin of the explosion, but he
believed that it had been accidental. Aiso, Lee probably doubted Spanish duplicity in the
affair because he witnessed the heroic efforts of Spanish officials to rescue American
sailors after the explosion. On the other hand, the commander of the ship, Charles
Sigsbee, fearing that the explosion might be blamed on the negligence of his command or
his crew, counseled Long to withhold judgment until additional information could be
obtained.36
In his first public statement regarding the Maine disaster, McKinley asserted that
his administration would not assess blame for the explosion until a full investigation had
been made. The president convened a naval court of inquiry to investigate the facts
pertaining to the explosion and resumed his diplomatic efforts to get Spain to surrender
the island and grant Cuban independence. During this period of profound anxiety, the
public engaged in reckless speculation as to the origins of the’ explosion aboard the
American battleship. In general, opponents of intervention preferred to believe that the
explosion was the result of an accidental overheating of internal coal bunkers.
Interventionists, goaded by sensational reports from the "yellow press," quickly blamed
the explosion on Spanish treachery.
Several historians have concluded that the explosion of the Maine created a
popular consensus for war that politicians could no longer ignore. Despite McKinley's
pleas for moderation, this view holds, the vast majority of Americans blamed Spain for the
tragedy in Havana and demanded intervention in order to exact vengeance. In the
immediate aftermath of the Maine disaster, therefore, political opposition to war crumbled;
McKinley succumbed to overwhelming popular opinion and called for war.37
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Southerners' reaction to the Maine explosion, however, challenged this explanation
of events. In the South, persistent cleavages in public sentiment regarding Cuban
intervention remained even after the disaster in Havana harbor. A southern consensus for
war did not materialize at this point. In a survey of twelve regional newspapers, including
several that had supported intervention in the past, the Birmingham Age-Herald found that
none of them supported an immediate declaration of war. Such a finding confirmed the
observation of a Louisiana editor who declared, "With calm dignity and amid breathless
expectancy the people . . . await future developments."38
In the aftermath of the Maine explosion, a surprisingly large number of
southerners, from commercial centers along the coast to small towns in the interior,
expressed their continued apprehensions about war with Spain. In southern port cities,
many repeated the familiar arguments that war would be devastating to their communities.
Residents of Savannah, Mobile, Galveston, New Orleans and other coastal cities continued
to lament the almost complete defenselessness of their region to seaborne attack. In the
event of war with Spain, Spanish naval artillery could easily bombard "Pensacola and other
seacoast cities in Florida, and Galveston and other ports of Texas . . . . " Spanish ships
could also strike at will against the cities along the Mississippi River. Aside from the
physical destruction that a war with Spain might bring to the region's cities, southerners in
commercial centers also feared that the Spanish navy would paralyze "the ocean
commerce of all the Gulf ports of the United States." Given these concerns, many
southerners along the coast condemned those who called for a war with Spain without
first making adequate preparations to defend the Gulf Coast.39
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Southern anti-interventionists feared that jingoes would exploit the national
hysteria over the tragic explosion and rush the nation into war regardless of its
unpreparedness or the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry. One southerner noted that
after the tragedy in Havana, "the jingoes are talking on every street comer in the
land . . . Jingoes, some who had long challenged the patriotism and martial spirit of
opponents of a war with Spain, bore the brunt of bitter personal attacks from some
southerners. Eager to deflect criticism from those who challenged their patriotism and
manly vigor, some in the South reaffirmed their own loyalty to the Union while steadfastly
opposing being driven into a war "by the hasty and ill advised actions of a few hot headed
men who will never get near enough to a war to learn the smell of gunpowder."40
In North Carolina, a Populist newspaper turned the tables on the jingoes in
Congress by questioning their manhood and patriotism. Calls for war, the editor wrote,
reminded us "of the racket that comes from an angry male cat—the further from the enemy
the louder the racket." In a similar indictment, a rural Alabaman voiced the common belief
that if war broke out, most jingoes would seek positions far from the seat of war. Others
would probably seek medical exemptions. In the event of a war with Spain, he continued,
Rheumatism, lameback, sprains, bad eyes, and consumption will hold high
carnival. You just can't tell what a sickly country this is till a war comes
on. Some patriots will take to the woods.41
A general disdain for jingoism helped forge an anti-interventionist coalition
between the commercial centers along the coast and points in the interior. These critics of
jingoes in the interior, like their counterparts in the South's port cities, bitterly attacked the
character of those most adamant for war. Some southerners claimed important financial
interests with vested interests in Cuba largely controlled the interventionists. More
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specifically, many of the attacks against advocates of war centered around their alleged
association with financiers that had purchased several hundred million dollars of bonds
floated by the Cuban junta. They pushed for American intervention as a means of insuring
a rebel victory and, according to some anti-interventionists, guaranteeing the payment of
interest and principal on the Cuban bonds. The jingoes' support for American intervention
and war, therefore, was sometimes explained as yet another example of the nefarious
power of key financial interests over American policy. A Savannah editor expressed his
disgust by suggesting, "If the speculators and Cubans in New York could only get the
well-balanced people of this country to lose their wits .. . and thereby cause a w ar. ..
there would be much rejoicing among the unpatriotic Americans and patriotic Cubans."
The editor then praised the calmness of the administration and urged continued
moderation.42
The perception that a war with Spain in 1898 could injure their own economic
interests also led some in the southern interior to oppose war, even after the Maine
explosion. Agricultural producers feared that a Spanish blockade of Gulf and South
Atlantic ports would make it impossible for their goods to reach distant markets. In such
an event, "cotton wouldn't be worth 50 cents a bale . . . there would be no demand for i t .
. . . " Similarly, others believed that a war would lead to a decline in prices for such
southern goods as lumber and sugar. In addition, some southerners expressed concern
that a war would lead inevitably to the annexation of Cuba and increased competition from
Cuban agricultural producers. According to one Arkansan,
Viewed from any standpoint the South needs no war. It needs peace and
development—not war and stronger competition to reduce it to beggary.43
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The historian C. Vann Woodward has suggested that southern opposition to a war
with Cuba stemmed largely from a fear that a foreign war would divert northern capital
and national treasure away from the South. The cost of fighting a foreign war, and the
possibility that American capitalists would invest heavily in an American-occupied Cuba,
threatened to limit the amount of money available for the development of the South. And,
indeed, many southerners did feel profound anxiety over becoming involved in a war with
Spain just as the nation was recovering from the depression of 1893. Aware of the
horrible suffering produced by the depression, and the immense capital needs of their own
region, many in the South opposed intervention in Cuba and a war with Spain. Public
discourse in the region reflected this widespread desire to keep American capital at home
for use in domestic development. Given the difficult economic times through which the
United States had just passed, a Populist editor averred, "We don't think the United States
is in condition to look after the interests of the people of some other country at present."
Senator Donelson Caffery, of Louisiana, also feared the economic repercussions on his
region in the event of a war with Spain. Writing to his wife, he suggested that in the event
of a Spanish war and the inevitable acquisition of Cuba, "our part of the country won't be
worth anything. . . .',44
Unanimous Congressional approval of a $50 million appropriation war
preparedness measure during the first week of March further alarmed those southerners
who feared that a war would divert American capital away from the economic and social
uplift of the South. One critic from Georgia suggested that national treasure would be
better spent building school houses and sending more children to school. Furthermore, the
Georgian conjured up images of the devastation of the post-Civil War South as a warning
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to those who would rush heedlessly toward war. Rather than spending its money on
peaceful pursuits,
this great government proposes . . . to murder thousands of human beings,
beside desolating one or more countries and making countless widows and
orphans. General Sherman spoke truthfully when he said 'war is hell.'45
During the final two weeks of March, 1898, the prospects for a peaceful resolution
to the Spanish-American crisis diminished markedly. On March 17, Senator Redfield
Proctor, a conservative from Vermont, delivered a powerful speech before the Senate in
which he presented an eyewitness account of conditions on the island of Cuba. A selfmade millionaire and former cabinet officer, Proctor enjoyed widespread credibility both in
Congress and among the general public. More important, Proctor's conservative leanings
earned him the respect of Wall Street and the financial community. When Proctor rose
from the well to deliver his speech on Cuba, therefore, his words carried far more weight
than those of Cuban propagandists associated with the junta or those of the yellow press.
Proctor's thoughtful analysis of the situation in Cuba struck an emotional chord
with many Americans. During his two-week visit to the island, Proctor interviewed scores
of leading officials and businessmen and concluded that the situation was indeed
desperate. Although he could not confirm press reports that approximately one quarter of
the population had died since the beginning of the rebellion, he did verify that nearly four
hundred thousand Cubans had been forced into reconcentration camps. There, Proctor
revealed, "with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none," one-half of the
reconcentradoes had died and one quarter of the survivors were critically ill.46
Proctor's speech dramatically affected several important groups that had been
consistently opposed to intervention. The emphatic humanitarian appeal of the senator's
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remarks helped erode resistance to war among America's clergymen. In the national
religious press, support for intervention became much more widespread. More
importantly, Wall Street and leading businessmen enthusiastically rallied around Proctor's
message and ended their long-standing opposition to war. Several of the nation's leading
commercial journals reversed their editorial position and called for war; similarly, a group
representing some of the most important firms on Wall Street petitioned the president to
intervene in Cuba to end the horrible slaughter of civilians.47
Increased humanitarian concern after Proctor’s speech also forged broader
southern support for war in late March of 1898. For years, southerners had been exposed
to newspaper columns accusing the Spanish, especially under General Weyler, of
committing heinous crimes against the civilian population of Cuba. Reports of brutal,
inhumane conditions in the reconcentration camps also appeared regularly in the southern
press. Undoubtedly, these press accounts served to build widespread sympathy for the
Cuban cause across the region. However, many southern editors often counterbalanced
these "yellow press" accounts with queries regarding the veracity of the stories.
Consequently, southerners, like other Americans, viewed many of the most outrageous
accounts from Cuba with a great degree of skepticism. The influence of Senator Proctor's
report on conditions in Cuba carried considerable weight among southerners eager to
intervene in the island for humanitarian reasons, but lacking adequate justification.48
In light of Proctor's revelations of Spanish barbarity and cruelty, American
temporizing and moderation were no longer possible. The senator's speech shocked the
nation and prompted one southerner to observe,
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The feeling is almost universal that the time has arrived when the United
States must interfere in behalf of the suffering Cubans—that the hour has
arrived when the horrid barbarities of the Spaniards must cease.
Even the editor of the Savannah Morning News, long an opponent of intervention,
proclaimed that Proctor provided ample justification for war. The time for American
neutrality was over and it was time for the nation to answer the "call of humanity.1'49
Just a few days after Proctor's speech in the Senate, four naval officers briefed
Secretary of Navy Long regarding the conclusions of the Naval Court of Inquiry over the
explosion of the Maine. The next day, March 20, Long discussed the report with
McKinley and other key Cabinet officers. The findings of the court probably surprised
none of the men present; the full report of the court, which would be turned over to the
president on March 24, blamed the explosion of the Maine on a submarine mine of
unknown origin. In an effort to maintain control of events after the public release of the
court's report, McKinley worked furiously to build a bipartisan consensus for his policy of
seeking a diplomatic solution to the growing crisis. The president believed that ending the
war, providing aid for the Cuban people and terminating Spanish rule over Cuba should
take precedence over avenging the loss of the Maine. McKinley, therefore, sent the report
of the Naval Court to Congress with his recommendation for $500,000 for Cuban relief
and a threat to Spain to end the war or face American intervention on humanitarian
grounds. Regarding the Maine, the president informed Congress that he had forwarded a
copy of the court's findings to Madrid and expected Spain to respond as an honorable
nation. In sum, McKinley continued to counsel patience, yet he understood that Spain's
failure to cooperate with large-scale American relief would give the United States a cause
for war.50
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The events of March 1898, the speech by Senator Proctor and the report of the
Naval Court of Inquiry, converted some southern opponents of intervention. Yet these
revelations did not completely break southern opposition to war against Spain. The editor
of the New Orleans Daily Picayune, a paper with close ties to the city's commercial
community, believed that America should help suffering Cubans by sending food and
medical supplies.

American's humanitarian concerns and sympathies for the Cuban

people, the editor continued, "should not get [us] in a war with Spain." Several
commercial bodies in the South continued to oppose direct intervention and war because
of their long standing concern that a war would do considerable economic and physical
damage to the region. In New Orleans, representatives of the leading commercial
organizations of that city unanimously adopted a resolution praising McKinley's effort "to
exhaust all honorable means to avert the horror of war . . . . " The group also declared the
president's desire to secure "peace with honor... [as] the true part of patriotism . . . . "
Similarly, the Augusta Georgia Exchange and Board of Trade forwarded a resolution to
Washington commending "the wise and conservative course of the president" and urging
their representative to support the administration's policy.51
In addition, some of the South's cane sugar producers supported the president's
policy of non-intervention. The region's largest cane growers, many of whom had bolted
the Democratic Party over the question of tariff protection, undoubtedly felt a stronger
sense of partisan allegiance to McKinley than other southerners. In addition, they realized
that Republicans had been largely responsible for the passage of the Dingley Tariff of 1897
which restored some tariff protection for their staple. More important, however, large
sugar producers feared that a war against Spain and the liberation of Cuba would restore
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peace to the island and allow for the speedy recovery of the Cuban sugar industry. As the
largest producer of cane sugar in the world, prior to the Cuban Rebellion, Cuban
producers could flood the American market with cheap raws and deflate prices for
domestic cane. Fears that Cuba might be annexed and placed under an American trade
umbrella created even greater anxiety. According to Senator Donelson Caffery, himself a
large sugar planter from St. Mary Parish, Louisiana, "The permanent acquisition of Cuba
is the destruction of our sugar industry." The combination of these concerns led a planter
from the heart of Louisiana's sugar producing region to exclaim^ "The war scare does not
meet with much encouragement in Assumption [parish]; a very large majority of the
planters and business men look with disfavor on the craving for battle shown by the
jingoes."52
Other southerners publicly opposed war because they believed the war would
place undue burdens on the South. Because of its proximity to Cuba and the relative
defenselessness of its seacoast, some in the region expected the South to bear the brunt of
fighting. Not only would southerners be forced to muster in large numbers for the defense
of their seacoast, but some believed that southerners would be called upon to invade the
island of Cuba because of their familiarity with tropical climates and a supposed immunity
to tropical diseases. One North Carolina woman, anxious about the high cost of war to
the South, proclaimed, "I am clear for the South's letting the Yankees have their way
about the war . . . ,"53
Alexander Clay, a senator from Georgia, sympathized with many of the concerns
raised by southern opponents of war but concluded that American intervention in Cuba
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was necessary. In an April 4 speech before the Senate, Clay expressed some of the unique
issues that confronted the South as the nation braced for a war:
Coming as I do, from a Southern State, I realize the South will be the great
sufferer in case of war between Spain and the United States. I know that
our seacoast and our citizens will have to bear the brunt of the invasion, if
any occurs.
The senator continued by predicting that war would bring ruin to "the products of the
South, especially her cotton . . . . " Nonetheless, Clay concluded that despite the possible
injury to his native region, he would make the difficult decision to support a war if all
other measures failed to secure Cuban independence.54
After the release of the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, many southerners,
like Clay, advocated war with Spain as the only honorable means to avenge the loss of 266
American sailors and the U.S.S. Maine. Southerners, like citizens in other parts of the
nation, reacted with horror to the destruction of the battleship and the loss of life; so, too,
many reacted with fierce indignation at the official report that suggested Spanish
culpability. In light of Proctor's speech and the Naval Court's report on the Maine
explosion, most southerners, like Clay, joined long-time interventionists in support of a
war against Spain. Indeed, some even predicted that intervention in Cuba and a foreign
war could have positive implications for the South. For the first time in the debate on the
Cuban question, southerners often claimed that a Spanish-American war would greatly
advance the cause of national reconciliation. If the South supported the war and sent
soldiers to fight, the region could end the socio-cultural isolation and political ostracism
that lingered as a result of Civil War and Reconstruction. Furthermore, a foreign war
offered the South an opportunity to affirm its loyalty to the Union and redeem its martial
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image. William Fleming, a congressman from Georgia, raised these issues in a speech
before Congress. During the period of national crisis after the Maine explosion,
the bitterness of strive and the rivers of blood that separated us from 1861
to 1865 can not now separate us from the love that we bear that old flag of
our fathers. We love it still and stand ready to defend it, if need be, with
our lives.
A southern newspaper editor, mindful of the rural character of his audience, raised the
possibility that a Spanish-American war could reunite the sections in his own unique way;
"They’ve talked of the Concert of the Powers—s'matter with Yankee Doodle and Dixie."55
The former consul-general to Cuba, Fitzhugh Lee, also sounded the themes of
southern loyalty and national reconciliation. During a speech in Chicago to dedicate the
erection of a Confederate monument, Lee reaffirmed his and his native region's absolute
loyalty to the Union. He also averred that as citizens of the United States, "it is our
[southerners'] duty to promote its glory, its grandeur, and its growth." And if war with
Spain did come, he urged his audience, northerners and southerners alike, to support the
government and work to make the United States "a great, undivided republic." With both
sections united, Lee predicted that the United States would triumph over any foe and
emerge as one of the world's great powers.56
Many southerners reaffirmed their own patriotism and loyalty to the nation by
criticizing those interests who supported a "peace-at-any-price" policy toward Spain.
Weary of continued opposition by Wall Street even after the events of March, a New
Orleans interventionist proclaimed, "It is time for the United States to take some action
even though the money lords . . . disapprove." The belief that northern capital controlled
American foreign policy, a constant fixture in shaping the South's world view, reflected
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both the region's widespread hostility toward big business and a belief that the best
interests of concentrated capital were often hostile to the public good. One southerner
observed that a war with Spain was preferable to having "the government of this proud
and free people . .. driven by the order of the money power. . . ,"57
Although some southerners discussed the impact of a war on national
reconciliation and sectional redemption, it is doubtful that these ideas represented
important factors in shaping the South's view of events in Cuba. Instead, most in the
South developed an opinion on the Cuban question based largely on their understanding of
similar situations in the history of the United States; more specifically, the attitudes of
many southerners derived from their historical memory of certain parallel events, such as
the Civil War and Reconstruction. In addition, other southerners, especially those in the
coastal South or engaged in seaborne commerce, formulated their opinions regarding
American policy in Cuba based largely on economic considerations. Among these more
commercially-oriented southerners, the economic implications of a possible war with
Spain seemed to determine their position. Only when a war with Spain appeared
inevitable did notions of reconciliation and redemption receive widespread acceptance in
the South. As noted by Gaines Foster, in Ghosts of the Confederacy, public discussion of
these themes appeared prominently in southern discourse in the days and weeks following
the report on the explosion of the Maine.58
On March 28, 1898, President McKinley delivered a message to Congress in
response to the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry. In his communication, the president
indicated that he had sent the details of the report to Spain and expected the government
in Madrid to act honorably to resolve the matter. Furthermore, he called on both Spain
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and Cuba to declare an armistice. Until Spain responded to his memorandum, the
president indicated his desire for Congress to exercise restraint and give full consideration
to his plan of action.59
Many southerners expressed disappointment at McKinley's message. In
Lynchburg, Virginia, a group of residents met the day after the president's address and
drafted a resolution expressing their outrage at the apparently neutral tone of his message.
Nowhere, their statement proclaimed, did the president express the "horror and
indignation at the atrocious crime" felt by most Americans. Nor did the president display
appropriate compassion and sympathy for the families of those who lost their lives aboard
the Maine. In an impassioned plea for action, the Lynchburg resolution concluded,
It is not necessary to say the President's present Pro-Spanish position is
humiliating and disappointing to Virginians. We demand that the
unmeasurable insult to our flag and the murder o f266 American sailors
shall not be treated as a mere 'incident' but our Government shall demand
satisfaction, and accept no compromise . . . .60
Other southerners personally attacked the president's character for failing to take
stronger action after the Maine report. Some in the South viewed the Maine tragedy as an
act of "cowardly assassination," and believed that Spain deserved the harshest possible
punishment from the United States Only the president's lack of patriotism prevented
popular opinion from manifesting itself in a declaration of war. According to a New
Orleans editor, "It is a pitiable spectacle to witness the President of 70,000,000 free
people acting like a bulldozed negro and shedding tears in the face of an enemy . . . ."
Like other southerners, the New Orleanian urged Congress to circumvent the president
and act on the public's behalf.61
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In the Senate, Marion Butler, of North Carolina, bitterly denounced McKinley's
message and reaffirmed his region's dissatisfaction with the administration's Cuban policy.
Rather than providing for the immediate independence of Cuba, McKinley's appeal to
Spain and Cuba to declare an armistice would force Cubans to "stop fighting for their
liberty and surrender to the cruel rule of Spain." Such an outcome might satisfy the
demands of Spanish bondholders, but it would meet the strong disapproval of the
American public. Regarding the president's comments on the Maine. Butler scorned,
Shall we sit two months after our vessel and our sailors have been
destroyed by Spain and refer to the outrage and the crime as an 'incident'
and talk of arbitration?
Butler concluded that "stockjobbers" and "bond sharks" had not destroyed Americans’
patriotism and that the American people would demand a satisfactory outcome to the
Cuban question—revenge for the Maine and the independence of Cuba.62
*

*

*

The consensus for war that emerged in the South after March of 1898 reveals very
little about the region's deeply held attitudes and beliefs regarding either the Cuban
question or American foreign policy. Clearly, after the report of the Naval Court of
Inquiry implicated Spain in the explosion of the Maine, southerners, no less than persons
in other regions of the country', viewed war as an acceptable means of exacting vengeance
for the loss o f266 men and a U.S. battleship. So, too, many southerners, after Proctor's
speech in Congress, supported a war against Spain as the only way to end the
humanitarian crisis on the island of Cuba. Consequently, the South's reaction to these
emotionally charged events differed little from the rest of the nation's.
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An extended examination of Southern discourse from the beginning of the Cuban
Revolution, however, revealed several deeply-held values and traits that shaped the
South's world view prior to the crisis of 1898. Many southerners, especially in the rural,
interior regions of the South, displayed considerable sympathy for the rebels and for
American intervention. This group of southerners, generally located outside the major
centers of commerce and trade, felt compassion for the Cuban rebels whom they often
identified with as liberty-loving patriots struggling for freedom. On many occasions, these
southerners drew historical parallels between the Founding Fathers or the leaders of the
Confederacy and the Cuban rebels fighting against an oppressive, tyrannical power.
Undoubtedly, southern racism toward non-white peoples often diminished their
commitment toward the cause of Cuban freedom. Although sympathizing with the rebels
and supportive of Cuban intervention, they often doubted the insurrectos ability to
succeed either militarily or politically without substantial American aid.
On the other hand, southern non-interventionists appeared most prominent in the
region's coastal cities where commerce served as the economic life-blood of the
communities. Spokesmen for a New South, often editors and businessmen in these port
cities, feared that a war with Spain would seriously injure the economy of the region.
They predicted that a war would devastate the South's port cities, paralyze the region's
economy and siphon away much needed northern capital. Support for war among this
group of southerners emerged only on the eve of McKinley's declaration of war.
Undoubtedly, some believed war preferable to the economic stagnation that accompanied
the uncertainty of American policy toward Cuba in late 1897 and early 1898. More likely,
however, their public opposition to war diminished amidst widespread popular approval
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for intervention and war for fear of being portrayed as unpatriotic or as minions of the
money power.
The most important features of earlier debates revealed how southerners perceived
not only events on the island, but their government and the formation of foreign policy.
The popular image that emerged of the federal government, among both interventionists
and non-interventionists, was marked by extreme cynicism. To many southerners,
interests hostile to the South controlled the foreign policy of the nation. Wall Street,
northeastern big business, and the money power dictated policy prerogatives through the
Republican party and the president. Southern interventionists blamed these groups for
obstructing the public will; southern non-interventionists blamed them for inflaming
jingoes to secure the payment of foreign bonds. In sum, despite the region's return to the
halls of power in Washington, most southerners still felt a profound sense of
powerlessness to control the foreign policy of the nation.
Finally, themes reminiscent of classical republicanism marked much of the rhetoric
of southern non-interventionists. From the beginning of the Cuban Rebellion, some in the
South articulated their concerns over foreign involvement. To some southerners,
intervention in Cuba would lead inevitably to American occupation, colonization, a larger
role for the federal government and a vastly increased army and navy—all of which were
anathema to a republican government. As the nation embarked on its first foreign war in
over fifty years, these troubling concerns about the future of American foreign policy were
temporarily subordinated in the rush toward war. Nonetheless, they lingered in the minds
of many southerners.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SOUTH AND THE DECLARATION OF WAR, 1898

We were told the [McKinley's Cuban] message
would be so scathing of Spanish treachery and crime,
so charged with genuine American patriotism, so
strong and firm for Cuban independence, that war
would immediately follow....But here is the message—it is in the interest of Spain and not in the interest
of Cuba; a message in the interest of the bondholders
and not in the interest of liberty; a message that
causes rejoicing among the bond dealers and stock
gamblers in Wall Street; a message that causes
every Spanish fiend and devil who has been
persecuting Cuba and dishonoring our flag to build
bonfires and rejoice.
— Senator Marion Butler, 12 April 18981

[Women] need to study and practice the science of
peace to draw men away from war. Universal peace
at the fireside will do more to educate man to
universal peace among nations than many arbitration
treaties, which may at any time be declared null by
warlike man.
— Sallie Cotten, 11 May 18982

The Negro should not haste to arms in this war
between the United States and Spain, because he has
not had a chance to learn the tactics of war. His
bams and storehouses are empty, and he should stay
home as long as possible and take care of his family.
He has nothing to fight for unless it is for the
excercise of his part of the constitution....
— S.C. Moore, 9 June 18983
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By early April of 1898, southerners appeared ready to rally around a presidential
declaration of war against Spain. Humanitarianism and a desire to avenge the loss of the
Maine inspired southerners to support such an action. Southerners even talked of the
possible benefits of war, especially the prospect of achieving national reconciliation by
cooperating with the North against a common foe. Proponents of overseas expansion,
including those in the South, also hoped a war would lead the nation into an era of
increased international activity. Following a war, expansionists believed, the United States
would possess territories that could either serve as additional markets for American goods
or could serve as supply and naval bases for American merchantmen en route to larger
markets in Asia and Latin America. For those who prophesied commercial greatness for
the South, like John Morgan and Hannis Taylor, the prospect of obtaining additional
markets for raw cotton and southern textiles overseas was compelling. The benefits of
internationalism, these expansionists hoped, would quickly become evident and forge a
broad consensus across sectional lines in support of American internationalism.
The South's experience in the Spanish-American War, however, doomed any
prospect that the region would support a policy of annexation of foreign territory and
colonies. After McKinley's declaration of war, the southern consensus of opinion began to
break down over questions about the motives of those in power and the wisdom of an
aggressive foreign policy. During the war, southern enthusiasm for the conflict diminished
rapidly as a result of the government's conduct of the war. Among southerners hoping for
national reconciliation, the appointment of mainly northern officers in the army and the
deployment of largely northern units to the front proved very disappointing. In addition,
reports of mismanagement in the War Department and the resulting deaths of thousands of
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volunteers in camps did little to inspire southern confidence in the federal government. To
many in the South, the end of the Spanish-American War offered more problems than
promise; the aftermath of war appeared to foreshadow the end of republican institutions
and the beginning of American empire.
*

*

*

On April 11,1898, President McKinley sent to Congress his assessment of the
Cuban situation. The president stated that his own goals were to end the conflict in Cuba
and, thus, relieve the suffering of innocent Cubans. He also wanted to end the war
because doing so would prevent any further threats to American property and lives on the
island. Reflecting his own frustration with the situation, McKinley also outlined the failure
of recent attempts to negotiate a settlement with Spain. Given the "intolerable" state of
affairs on the island, and the impasse in negotiations, McKinley asked Congress to
approve the use of force to impose peace on the island.
McKinley's message also addressed the subject of the recognition of Cuban
independence. The president reiterated his opposition to recognition because he believed
that it would do nothing to bring about the immediate pacification of Cuba. Furthermore,
he doubted that an indigenous Cuban government existed that could meet the conditions
of recognition as established in international law. More important, however, the president
realized that American recognition of a Cuban government could restrict the United
States' freedom of action in dealing with Cuba in the future. A legally recognized Cuban
government might overrule the actions of the United States or it could dictate terms and
conditions of peace at the conclusion of hostilities. After the conclusion of the rebellion,
McKinley averred, the United States could alter its position regarding recognition as the
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situation warranted. In the meantime, he believed it was best for himself and the nation to
maintain complete freedom of action in resolving the crisis in Cuba4
Many members of Congress criticized McKinley's message as being too
conservative. Democrats were especially critical of the president's refusal to recognize
Cuban independence. Attacking the president for being out of touch with public opinion
on the subject, Democrat Joseph Bailey of Texas condemned McKinley's statements as
"weak and inconclusive." William J. Bryan, the Democrat's presidential candidate in 1896,
proclaimed his support for recognition of a government in Havana of such a character that
the United States would not have to fear that one of its ships would blow up while under
its supervision.5
In the Senate, Marion Butler, a Populist from North Carolina, bitterly condemned
the administration's policy. Although he had made few comments on the Cuban question,
Butler had supported an earlier attempt to raise $50 million for war preparedness. The
president's message, the North Carolina senator complained, failed to guarantee Cuban
independence. Now, claiming to represent the political opposition, Populists, Democrats
and free silver Republicans, Butler introduced a joint resolution proclaiming that the
sinking of the Maine as an act of war and Spain's failure to administer affairs on the island
humanely justified American interv ention Speaking shortly after the reading of
McKinley's message on April 11,1898, Butler stated, "These resolutions express my
feelings and sentiments, and I believe that they express the feelings and sentiments of the
American people. The crime of February 15 must be avenged by Cuban independence! "6
Despite considerable support for Cuban independence in the Senate, Butler could
not overcome the opposition of the well-organized Republican majority that had declared

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

148
its fealty to the administration. Nonetheless, Butler launched a vicious verbal attack on
the president that reflected both his desire to inflict political damage on McKinley and the
Republicans and his concern for the future course of American policy in Cuba.
Undoubtedly, the senator also believed that many of his fears were shared by his
constituents in North Carolina and the South. He claimed that American intervention in
Cuba was justified under the circumstances, but Butler questioned the wisdom of giving
the president the authority to intervene without first recognizing Cuban independence.
Butler noted that since Spain had already suspended hostilities against the Cubans,
American intervention would effectively stop "the Cuban patriots, who are struggling for
their liberty." The senator vowed never to approve of a measure to intervene without
recognizing the independence of Cuba because to do so would mean "to become an ally of
perfidious Spain to crush the Cuban patriots . . . ." Finally, Butler raised the common
southern concern over the influence of Cuban bondholders on the administration's policy.
The bond syndicate, he maintained, opposed the recognition of Cuban independence
because they feared their bonds would never be repaid by an independent government in
Havana. The administration, according to Butler, had refused recognition so that
bondholders might barter for the independence of the Cuban Republic in the future and
saddle the next generation of Cubans with an onerous mountain of debt. In a final appeal
to his fellow senators, Butler asserted that, "If you fail to declare the independence of the
island, all of this is possible."7
House Republicans, in support of the administration's policy, introduced their own
resolutions authorizing the president to use force to end the war in Cuba and establish a
free, independent government on the island. Consistent with McKinley's message, the
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resolutions did not recognize either the Cuban government or Cuban independence.
Because of a ruling by the House Rules Committee, under the leadership of Republican
Speaker Thomas B. Reed, debate on the resolutions was limited to only forty minutes.
Prior to introducing the resolutions, Republican leaders had received assurances from their
party's members that they would support the measures, and, thus, show their solidarity
with the president. Democrats responded to the Rules Committee's limit on debate with
outrage; several congressmen engaged in a brief fracas. Order was quickly restored,
however, and debate began on the Cuban resolutions.
Hugh Dinsmore, a Democrat from Arkansas and the ranking Democrat on the
Foreign Affairs Committee, led his party's opposition to the Republican resolutions.
Dinsmore, along with John S. Williams of Mississippi, submitted the minority report from
the committee as a substitute; it differed from the majority report in that it required the
recognition of the Cuban government. During House debate of the resolutions, the
congressman from Arkansas assailed Spain's administration of Cuban affairs and then
condemned Republicans for failing to recognize Cuban independence. Like Butler,
Dinsmore raised the possibility that financial interests guided the Republicans' strategy in
dealing with the Cuban question. In the absence of an officially recognized Cuban
government, the United States would be liable for the payment of outstanding bonds in the
event of American intervention. Most important, Dinsmore alleged that the United States
had an obligation to recognize the Cuban government because of its achievements in the
struggle for Cuban liberty; he objected to any plan that gave the president the authority to
impose a government on the island without the consent of the native Cubans. In an
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impassioned plea amidst great applause from fellow Democrats, the congressman
proclaimed,
We talk about liberty. Then, let us give to the Cubans liberty. We talk
about freedom. Let us give to them the right to establish a government
which they think will be a free government, and which does not reserve to
us, The Government of the United States, the right to say, after it is
established, "Ah, this is not a 'stable' government; we can not turn it over to
you yet; we must look after this thing."8
Although Dinsmore's remarks failed to convince House Republicans to break ranks
with the administration, they did help solidify Democratic opposition to the Republican
resolutions. On April 13, in a highly partisan vote, Congress defeated the minority's
substitute resolution by a vote of 150 to 190. Southern members provided over one-half
of all votes in favor of recognizing Cuban independence; only eight southern
representatives opposed the measure. Southerners' votes for the substitute reflected a
variety of concerns. To be sure, many members believed that their constituents supported
Cuban independence. Others genuinely distrusted Republican motives for intervention and
hoped that recognition of the Cuban government would restrict the administration's efforts
to install a "puppet" government in Havana. Most important, however, the vote on the
minority resolution was an attempt by Democrats to appear out ahead of public opinion on
the question of Cuban independence and embarrass Republicans by forcing them to vote
against it. After the defeat of the Democratic substitute, Congress passed the majority
resolution authorizing the president to use force to intervene to stop the war in Cuba by a
vote of 325 to 19. Reluctant to use military force to end the rebellion in Cuba, 7 other
southern members joined the 8 who voted against recognition to provide 15 of the 19
dissenting votes. Although southern members provided the bulk of negative votes, the
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vast majority of southern Representatives, unwilling to go on record against intervention
and the perceived wishes of the southern majority, voted overwhelmingly for the
measure.9
Unlike the brief debate on Cuban resolutions that occurred in the House, the
Senate took four days to consider the alternatives and pass its resolutions. The majority
report from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adhered closely to the president's
request that he be given wide latitude to intervene in Cuba without recognizing Cuban
independence. The majority resolutions authorized McKinley to use the full armed forces
of the United States to demand a Spanish withdrawal from the island and to establish a
free and independent government in Havana. A minority report, introduced by David
Turpie and Joseph Foraker, both northern congressmen, recommended a substitute
resolution that recognized the Republic of Cuba. Much of the debate during the four-day
period centered on the minority resolution.10
Most of the South's senators spoke in favor of the Turpie-Foraker resolution. Like
their southern counterparts in the House, the region's senators reviewed the history of the
Cuban crisis and the accomplishments of the Cuban rebels against Spain. They also
reaffirmed the notion that the Cuban insurgents shared with heroes from America's history
a common desire for liberty and self-determination. Senator William Bate, of Tennessee,
suggested that in a search of history, one will always find the words "rebel and insurgent"
linked with the word "liberty." As the leading defender of liberty in the hemisphere, Bates
argued the United States should "do that which is right" and recognize the Cuban
government. Recognition, he concluded, was not only morally correct, "but reflect[ed]
the will of our constituents."11
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Southern senators also attacked the proposition that the United States should not
grant recognition to the Republic of Cuba because the rebels had not met all the legal
conditions required for recognition under international law. Opponents of the minority
substitute, including the "senator of the sugar trust", Donelson Caffery of Louisiana,
proclaimed that the rebels could not guarantee law and order over much of the island and
lacked control of any major port; therefore, they did not merit recognition. Caffery's
opposition to the Turpie-Foraker resolution probably had far more to do with his concern
for the economic future of domestic sugar cane growers, including himself, than it did his
concern over legal minutiae. Caffery, along with many other domestic sugar producers,
feared that the end result of American recognition would be the incorporation of Cuba, the
world's largest sugar producer, into the American union; the subsequent loss of possible
tariff protection, sugar producers feared, would be disastrous for the domestic sugar
industry. Ironically, Louisiana's other senator, Samuel D. McEnery, emerged as one of the
most vigorous critics of Caffery's subterfuge. While not attacking Caffery personally,
McEnery's remarks in the Senate were clearly designed in response to Caffery's claims
rejecting recognition of the Cuban Republic. McEnery asserted that the rebels had met a
higher obligation for recognition than existed under international law. After three years of
conflict, he argued, the rebels had proven their commitment to liberty and selfdetermination. Now, McEnery averred, we must admit that "the Cuban people have
internal sovereignty, that they have the right to determine their political end, that they have
the right to establish their own form of government."12
Finally, southern senators supported the minority resolution because they feared
that without its passage, the majority resolution would give the president a free hand to
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pursue a war against Spain and erect a government in Havana that would be a mere proxy
for the administration. Most of the South's senators found the Republican plan to be
politically unwise, and, perhaps, unconstitutional. They also raised the popular southern
concern that Cuban bondholders directed the Republican's policy toward Cuba. Senator
Augustus Bacon, of Georgia, reiterated the belief that without the recognition of the
Cuban Republic, the United States would be liable for paying bondholders.13
Despite their opposition to the president's policy and the majority resolution on the
question of recognizing the Cuban Republic, southern senators affirmed their support for
armed intervention to end the war in Cuba. They also reaffirmed their loyalty to the nation
and their region's commitment to the cause of Cuban liberty. Augustus Bacon, in a speech
before the Senate, declared the righteousness of America's cause, the loyalty of the South
to the Union, and his region's commitment to the cause of Cuban liberty in spite of the
many possible hardships the South would face.
In the histories of peoples a time comes for sacrifice. Such a time seems
now at hand. I doubt not that the North is equally ready to make sacrifice
with the South, but in the condition of things the sacrifice to be made in
this war must be more serious in the South than in the North. We have few
or none of the factories at the South which will make the munitions of war
. . . nor are we the large producers of the food crops which will be needed
to supply them [troops]. On the contrary, our enterprises will be largely
paralyzed by war, and our great product of cotton is to be put to a price
that will not only not be remunerative, but be an absolute disaster to the
man who produces it.
Bacon continued by predicting that war also threatened great physical damage to the
South. Contact with Cuba would bring yellow fever to the South's shores, and "the first
hostile gun that is fired will find its echoes in our hills and valleys." Nonetheless, Bacon
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averred that the South was willing to make these sacrifices, not for the holders of bonds,
but for humanity's sake.14
On April 16, at the conclusion of debate, the Senate took a series of important
votes on the matter of Cuban intervention. In a highly partisan vote, the Senate approved
the resolution recognizing the Cuban Republic "as the true and lawful government of that
island." Eleven Republicans joined with the Democrats to pass the measure by a vote of
51 to 37. Among southern senators, 18 voted in favor of the resolution; only three
southern senators, Caffery, Morgan, and Pritchard opposed. Shortly after the passage of
the Turpie-Foraker resolution, the Senate then adopted a measure by a voice vote, the
Teller amendment, disclaiming any intention on the part of the United States to exercise
sovereignty over Cuba, thus, asserting the right of self-government for the people of
Cuba.15
The deadlock between the House and Senate on the question of the recognition of
the Cuban Republic resulted in the creation of a conference committee. Speaker Reed
worked successfully to keep House Republicans in line behind the president's plan that
opposed recognition. Republican leaders in the Senate also gained additional support for
maintaining McKinley's complete freedom of action. Aware that they were losing ground,
Democrats in the conference committee agreed to delete the Turpie-Foraker amendment
from the Senate resolutions. In short, the conference report recognized Cuban
independence without acknowledging the legitimacy of the Cuban Republic. At
approximately 2:45 on the morning of April 19, both chambers of Congress passed the
compromise report by large margins. By passing the resolutions, Congress ended the
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possibility of future negotiations with Spain and paved the way for the president to seek a
declaration of war.16
Although the South's congressmen differed on some of the details surrounding
Cuban intervention, virtually all of them agreed on the necessity of using force to stop the
Cuban war. They believed that by supporting war, they accurately reflected the prevailing
public mood of the South. Aware of widespread southern support for war against Spain,
especially after Proctor's speech and the Naval Court's findings relative to the Maine
explosion, no southern politician risked publicly opposing the actual war resolution of
April 20, 1898.
During debate in Congress over the various resolutions pertaining to Cuba, some
in the South felt compelled to assert their loyalty to the Union. Anxiety over the question
of loyalty resulted not only from the experience of the region in the Civil War, but from a
perception in some quarters that southern Democrats' actions in Congress represented an
attempt to obstruct the administration's plan for intervention. In addition, articles from the
Spanish press, reprinted in southern newspapers, suggested that the sectional divisions of
the Civil War had not been resolved and that the South would be disloyal in the event of a
foreign war. A Populist from Alabama, defending his region's loyalty, proclaimed, "The
South is just as ioyal as the North, East, or West, and in case of a conflict, southern men
will be found at the post of duty. . . .”17
As the nation prepared for war, many southerners confirmed their loyalty to the
Union and their support for war against Spain through public demonstrations and by offers
to enlist in the armed forces. During a celebration in Austin marking the anniversary of
the Battle of San Jacinto, a speaker proudly stated that today, "there is no north, no east,
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no west, no south, but there is a common country." He also praised the president for
signing the congressional resolutions and the ultimatum that demanded Spain's exit from
Cuba. These actions, the speaker continued, were exemplary of the "temper and
atmosphere of this hemisphere, which was dedicated to freedom by our revolutionary war"
and reaffirmed at the battle of San Jacinto. At the end of the address, he made a
passionate plea,
Let us then meet together today and renew the spirit that animated our
fathers to dedicate this continent to Christian civilization and let us live
together the American revolution, the independence of Texas won at San
Jacinto and the independence of the Cuban patriots.18
At a mass meeting at Cathedral Hall in Galveston, several hundred spectators
witnessed a procession of speakers pledging their loyalty to the Union and praising
American intervention in Cuba. A nearby observer, Ethel Hutson, noted that the favorite
quotation of the speakers seemed to be "My country, right or wrong!" She also remarked
that "Dixie" was played after every other speech and elicited great applause. Hutson's
keen observation of the meeting clearly revealed the dual loyalties felt by some
southerners. While speeches expressing southern loyalty to the Union brought "fragments
of enthusiastic patriotism" from the crowd, the playing of "Dixie" produced raucous
"cheers." Amidst the excitement and popular enthusiasm for war, some in the South
continued to cherish the memory of the Lost Cause at the same time they celebrated the
possibility of reunion. After witnessing the events at Cathedral Hall, Hutson wondered if
her brother, a native southerner, could subordinate his affections for his native region and
grow, "after fighting for the 'Stars and Stripes,' to feel an ardent affection for the ugly
thing."19
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Despite some southerners' reservations about fighting under the banner of the
Union, thousands in the region vowed to join the army in the event of a war with Spain.
Many different motives probably inspired southerners to volunteer for war in 1898. Like
other wars, the conflict with Spain offered excitement and opportunity; fighting in a war
appeared a good alternative to those bored with the mundane affairs of agriculture and
business. One prospective volunteer predicted that "army life . .. will be no worse than
manual work and so long as the war lasts there will be plenty of excitement." For younger
southerners, the Spanish War also offered an opportunity to prove their martial worth to
the rest of the nation and to their parents who had fought in defense of the Old South.
Having grown up in the shadow of the generation of the Civil War, a foreign war
presented young southerners with a chance to capture glory and honor previously reserved
for their fathers. In a letter to a friend, Willis Brewer, congressman from Alabama,
remarked,
This generation. . . like the several which preceded it, must have the glitter
and dust which constitute the twin elements of glory. We are Crusaders
again, as we were in 1861 and 1846. It seems that somewhat like a quarter
century is sufficient time in which to capitalize or bank up our sympathies.
On these we now move to bloodshed.
Still other southerners offered their services to the army because they felt sympathy for the
cause of "Cuba Libre" and were outraged by the actions of Spain. The end result, Joseph
Wheeler observed, was a flood of offers of service from across the South "that very far
exceeded the number it would be possible for the Government to accept."20
Veterans of the Civil War in the South seemed particularly captivated by the idea
of serving in the army. For Confederate veterans, a foreign war offered not only the
chance for them to prove their loyalty to the Union, it also presented them with an
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opportunity to reassert and restore the martial reputation of the region. Volunteering their
services, therefore, provided former Confederates with a chance to exorcise some of the
demons that had haunted them since the end of the Civil War. On May 3, five United
Confederate Veterans camps in New Orleans tendered their services to the army and
proclaimed that "no warmer defenders of their country's honor and flag . . . will be found
in this crisis." Similarly, a Confederate veterans' group in Florida pledged their personal
services "to the country whenever and wherever the nation's needs require." Many other
individual Confederate veterans also volunteered to join the army. In offering their own
services to the government, members of the Grand Army of the Republic from Virginia
and North Carolina praised the response from the South's Confederate veterans. In a
resolution, the G.A.R. camps proclaimed:
We rejoice in the consciousness that in the impending struggle all the
people of our beloved land-knowing no East, no West, no North, no
South—are vying with each other in their readiness to defend the flag, help
the oppressed, resent the insult to our country, and avenge the lives of our
gallant seamen treacherously slain aboard the Maine. . . .
The enthusiastic response of southerners to the call to arms led many southerners to
predict an end to sectional animosity. Josephus Daniels, editor of a Raleigh newspaper,
suggested that after the South's men volunteered and fought under the Stars and Stripes,
"no bloody shirt waver can hereafter obtain an audience."21
John Brown Gordon, the commanding general of the United Confederate
Veterans, also believed that the Spanish-American War offered special opportunities for
the South. As a New South prophet, Gordon tirelessly encouraged reconciliation with the
North as the best way to attract northern capital to the region after the Civil War. On the
other hand, he remained a southern romantic who glorified the Lost Cause and sought to

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

159
preserve the South's social order. The war with Spain, he believed, could advance both of
these goals. By supporting the war effort, he believed the North would more fully accept
the South and provide additional economic investment for the region; he also believed that
a foreign war would provide an environment conducive for the further embellishment of
the martial spirit of Confederate arms. Consequently, amidst calls to cancel the United
Confederate Veterans' reunion in 1898, Gordon ordered that preparations continue despite
the declaration of war. In a General Order to other U.C. V. camps ordering that the
reunion proceed as planned, Gordon suggested,
The assembling of the surviving heroes of the Confederacy—will act as a
stimulus, as it will revive the martial spirit of the people, and will be an
object lesson, and inspiration for the youth .. .; it will awaken sentiment,
arouse enthusiasm, inspire and quicken the patriotic resolve and purpose to
enlist in defense of the flag . . . as many of our old Veterans and their brave
sons are doing. In our holy reverence for our dead, and care for our living
heroes, we honor our Nation.
At the reunion in Atlanta, Gordon declared that the war would completely "obliterate" all
sectional distrusts, reunite the American people, and produce an era of cooperation and
national greatness.22
Despite the ubiquitous and forceful arguments in support of war advanced by the
region's interventionists, jingoistic debate in Congress in April and the likelihood of an
armed conflict with Spain provided a sense of urgency for southern critics of war who had
withheld much of their vitriol after the Maine explosion and Proctor's speech. Afraid of
being characterized as disloyal or unpatriotic, few southerners openly revealed their
continued opposition to intervention in Cuba during February and March of 1898. The
apparent consensus for war that existed in the region, therefore, was based on public
discussion of the issues unduly shaped by external pressures rather than representing the
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actual attitudes and concerns of the South's population. In April, the resurgence of
southern opposition to war reflected a sense of desperation; critics of intervention
undoubtedly feared that their last opportunity to prevent actual hostilities was slipping
away. Renewed southern opposition also resulted from their trepidation over the future
course of American foreign policy after becoming involved in a foreign war and, most
likely, acquiring overseas territory. Finally, opponents of war in the South again raised
their concerns that their region would likely suffer the greatest burdens in a war with
Spain without receiving any tangible benefits. With a multitude of voices from the South
once again raised in opposition to war, it became evident that the consensus that had
existed was illusory.
Southern sugar producers, especially in Louisiana, emerged as the most vocal
critics of war. By 1898, tariff reform and dramatic reductions in Cuban sugar production
had restored profitability and economic stability to the South's sugar growing regions.
Since the beginning of the Cuban Rebellion in 1895, the amount of sugar imported from
Cuba had declined significantly. Given the shortages in raw sugar, southern producers
found a ready market at higher prices for their product. Fear that a war with Spain might
result in the acquisition of Cuba and its inclusion under an American tariff umbrella
alarmed the region's sugar producers. So, too, they felt anxiety over the prospect of a
complete recovery of the island's sugar producing capability after the removal of Spanish
authority. Not surprisingly, several newspapers in the sugar growing parishes of Louisiana
continued to oppose war even as Congress made the final preparations for armed conflict.
An Opelousas, Louisiana, editor proclaimed that the people of his region "deprecated war
. . . if it could be avoided." Other individuals found a remarkable absence of enthusiasm
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for war in other parts of the sugar growing parishes of Louisiana. Frank Richardson
observed that in New Orleans, the commercial center for Louisiana's sugar trade, "War
shouts seem to be filling the air everywhere and still very few I meet are in favor of it." In
a letter to the Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, an Assumption Parish planter
observed,
The war scare does not meet with much encouragement in Assumption
[Parish]; a very large majority of the planters and business men look with
disfavor on the craving for battle shown by the jingoes. If the jingoes
would be the only sufferers from the miseries of armed conflict, perhaps
there would be less opposition.23
Outside of the sugar growing regions of the South, opponents of war resurfaced in
different parts of the region and represented a variety of interests. Many southern
agrarians, especially cotton producers and some Populists, shared sugar growers' concern
over the consequences of a war with Spain on their own economic livelihood. These
fanners tended to focus on the short-term impact of a war on their ability to find markets
and on prices paid for raw cotton In general, they feared a war with Spain would
produce a blockade of southern ports, thus, denying the South's cotton access to markets.
Without available markets, they predicted, the price of cotton would plunge dramatically.
Their opposition to war, however, resulted from more than just a narrow concern over the
price of cotton; they believed that farmers would bear an unfair burden for financing the
war without receiving any material benefits in return. Louis de Lacroix, in an angry letter
to Populist Senator Marion Butler, attacked him for betraying Populist principles and
voting for a $50 million war appropriation to pursue an unnecessary war. While southern
farmers suffered deprivation, he concluded, Butler, and others in the federal government,
"increased the national debt and the burden of taxes resulting therefrom." Finally, Lacroix
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reminded the senator that, "The bills must be paid, paid by the common people, your
constituents, the homy handed sons of toil, whose interests you profess to foster."24
Other southerners opposed war after evaluating the expected costs of intervention
against the anticipated results. Although few in the South sympathized with Spain, many
southerners questioned the wisdom of intervening in Cuba to provide independence for
non-white people on the island. Sympathy for the native Cubans did not warrant the
spilling of American blood, the destruction of southern commerce and the devaluation of
the South's agricultural goods. Undoubtedly influenced by the anxiety of the local
business community, a New Orleans editor proclaimed, "Few who consider the matter
seriously will justify such a war." Southern opponents of intervention also raised the race
question since most native Cubans were non-white. Consequently, many in the South
believed native Cubans to be racially inferior and, therefore, incapable of enjoying freedom
or self-government. Recalling the region's experience in the Civil War, a southern editor
warned,
A little over thirty years ago the crest and rivers of our own dear southland
almost ran with blood split [sic] to free the dear negro~a war in the interest
of humanity. . . . God deliver us from any more wars in the interest of
humanity.
An article in a leading agricultural journal, Southern Planter, echoed the reservations of
those who viewed Cuban affairs in terms of race. According to the journal, "the Latin
races are not fitted to govern themselves, and are still less fitted when having amongst
them negroes and half-bred negroes, Indians and Spaniards, as in Cuba." America, the
journal article concluded, should heed George Washington's advice and avoid
entanglements with foreign people and nations.25
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Finally, significant opposition to intervention in Cuba reemerged in some of the
South's leading industrial and commercial centers, especially in those cities located in
coastal regions. Earlier pleas to arrive at a diplomatic resolution to the Cuban crisis in
order to save the South's coast from naval bombardment and its commerce from a
paralyzing naval blockade having failed to stem the rush toward war, southern business
opposition easily embraced the idea that Congress and the president desired war for purely
selfish reasons. According to these critics, politicians desired war with Spain because they
had been paid off by bondholders and other powerful economic interests; in addition, war
and the acquisition of overseas territories would greatly enlarge patronage opportunities
for the party in power. As a result, they believed that what Congress portrayed as a war
for humanity, was "really for ulterior political purposes, and finally for conquest." Harsh
condemnation also appeared in Dixie, a leading southern industrial and commercial
journal. In an article on the causes of the war, the journal's editor rejected the notion that
the war was about humanitariamsm or the revenge of the Maine. Instead, moneyed
interests, the owners of the "yellow press" and corrupt politicians were all responsible for
the conflict. The editor continued,
In the halls of Congress the political demagogue has brayed long and loud
for war. His mouthings have been spread broadcast over the land and fell
like sweet music upon the ears of unthinking people. Scenting a harvest of
dollars, the scavengers of journalism took heart and inaugurated a
propaganda the like of which has never before cursed the peace of nations.
The cesspools of the world were dragged in search of evidence that would
embroil the nations in bloody war, and all this under the cloak of
patriotism.
Far from being inspired by patriotic motives, he concluded "it was greed for gold" that
unleashed the chain of events that led the United States into war. As a spokesman for the
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region's industries, he envisioned nothing of benefit from the struggle with Spain; instead,
he predicted "desolation and ashes of war, all for the miserable reward of money."26
The attitudes of southern women and African-Americans regarding the Cuban
question is more difficult to discern given the scarcity of extant public commentary on the
subject. Although most southern white women probably sympathized with the Cuban
insurgents in their revolt against Spain, they, too, rejected American intervention and war
as an alternative to diplomacy. White women in the South, like most men, appeared to be
offended by Spain's maladministration of Cuban affairs. They shared a humanitarian
concern over alleged abuses of civilians on the island under the policy of reconcentration.
Nonetheless, the thought of a war with Spain often evoked painful memories associated
with the desolation wrought in the South during the Civil War. A young North Carolina
woman observed that her grandmother "worried over it [the war] a good deal, and nanny
conjures it up in her imagination as much like the Civil War." Undoubtedly, white
women's opposition to war also emanated from their role in the home, as parent, spouse,
and caregiver. In these capacities, they voiced their objection to sons and husbands
volunteering for service in the army. Mary Hutson, of Texas, after being asked by her
sons to support their efforts to volunteer, declared, "I see no necessity for either of you
going, and I would not . . . . I am not very patriotic about this war, believing we are going
to be made to bear the brunt of the war . . . . " One southern newspaper editor revealed his
observations regarding women's behavior when confronted by the prospect of their sons
and husbands volunteering for war. In an article laced with sarcasm, the editor wrote,
The war fever is just raging within our bosom and our patriotism has been
on the very eve of bubbling over several times, causing us to talk of going
out and joining the mighty army . . . , but the very mention of it causes a
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rebellion in the home circle, Mrs. Holland leading the host of little Echoes
against us and declaring that our first duty is to them, and so far they have
quelched every outbreak of ours that threatened the destruction of Spain 27
Historian Judith Papachristou has suggested that women's worldview emerged
from their belief that they had a larger responsibility as the moral preservers of the society.
In other words, while male policymakers, and their male peers, viewed the Cuban question
in terms of political economy and aggressive nationalism, women emphasized calmness
and moral reflection. According to Papachristou, women viewed the declaration of war as
the ultimate act of moral declension. Some southern women probably embraced the idea
that they could influence the course of policy by their efforts in the home. Sallie Gotten,
speaking at the Women's Exposition in Charlotte, North Carolina, emphasized women's
responsibility to "elevate society." "Women," Gotten contended, "need to study and
practice the science of peace to draw men av/ay from war." Cotten urged women to take
up the cause of universal peace by educating their families to practice love and peace at
home. By using their moral influence, women could temper the aggressive nature of men
and promote the cause of peace.28
Following the first battles of the war, women in the South lamented their losses. A
young ensign from North Carolina, Worth Bagley, was the first casualty of the war; his
death created anxiety among southern women that the war could be long and bloody. As
casualty lists mounted, some women questioned the government's motives for going to
war. Aware of the hardships faced by the army in hot, tropical camps in Florida and Cuba,
Addie Daniels, the daughter of Josephus Daniels, "prayed that the United States was right"
in declaring war. "It would be fearful to go through all this," she concluded, "if it were
not a righteous cause."29
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Despite their fear and anxiety about the future course of the war, many women still
undertook the task of providing support for their loved ones in the army. While most
women engaged in private efforts to provide the best possible care for their sons,
husbands, and others, others coordinated their activities by forming temporary relief
organizations. These organizations provided moral support at home, bolstered patriotism
in the community and coordinated the collection and distribution of supplies, food and
medicines to soldiers in the volunteer army. One of the largest and most successful
women's relief organizations in the South, the Louisiana Women's War Relief Association,
had approximately one thousand dues paying members from Louisiana, Mississippi and
Texas. From its headquarters in New Orleans, the L.W.W.R.A. provided a wide variety
of supplies to troops stationed in Florida's camps. The support provided by women during
the Spanish-American War, however, did not represent support for American policy. It
merely reflected their concerns as wives, mothers and sisters for men placed in harm's way.
At the war's end, S. A. Cunningham, the editor of Confederate Veteran, praised the efforts
of southern women during the war despite their obvious disapproval of the government's
policy. Cunningham noted:
Our noble women who are not going to be 'reconstructed,' but who have
sons, husbands and others dear to them in the volunteer army, have gone
about providing for their comfort, just as might have been expected; yet in
all they have done and are doing there is the same undying devotion to
Dixie and its sad yet glorious memories.30
The experience of southern white women during the Spanish-American War
confirms many of Papachristou's conclusions regarding how women developed their view
of the world. In the South, the historical memory of the Civil War substantially shaped the
views of all those who opposed America's declaration of war against Spain in 1898. Men
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and women, however, differed in the meanings they attached to the Civil War experience.
Where most southern men opposed war in 1898 on the basis of economic and legal
concerns, women objected to it because of war's damaging effect on family and society.
For women, war should be avoided not because it threatened the Constitution or
commerce, but because of its deleterious moral impact on individuals. As the moral
guardians of their families, therefore, they used their influence at home to muster
opposition to a violent solution to the Cuban question.
African-Americans in the South reacted with ambivalence to the events leading up
to McKinley's declaration of war. From the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, their
views regarding direct American intervention on the island appeared neither consistent nor
unanimous. Although most southern blacks sympathized with the Cuban rebels, and
hoped for the success of their revolution, they were undecided on the benefits of American
intervention in achieving Cuban independence. In general, African-Americans viewed the
struggle in Cuba as a revolution of native blacks against the oppressive rule of Spanish
white officials. Since many of the leaders of the revolution were of African ancestry, such
an analysis proved compelling. While American intervention would hasten an end to the
fighting, many blacks doubted it would achieve Cuban independence. Given their own
experience of slavery and life in a white dominated America, many southern blacks feared
that the United States would intervene in Cuba and block indigenous efforts to create an
independent Cuban republic governed by black Cubans.
The destruction of the Maine, allegations of continued humanitarian abuses against
native Cubans and the national rush toward war, appeared to allay temporarily the fears of
blacks who questioned the government's Cuban policy. The Maine disaster seemed
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particularly significant in building black support for war against Spain since over thirty
African-American sailors lost their lives in the explosion. The entire record of Spain's
barbarous conduct in Cuba, many blacks agreed, justified American intervention by April
of 1898.31
Booker T. Washington, and some other African-Americans, saw opportunities in
black support and participation in the war against Spain. White Americans, they believed,
would be more likely to accord them acceptance and respect if they volunteered their
services in defense of the nation. Service in the army also offered blacks a chance to
prove their valor, martial worth and manliness in combat; their efforts in the army,
therefore, would destroy popular notions of white racism based upon the inferiority of
blacks. At the end of the war, some blacks believed, black participation in the war effort
would result in whites according them greater social equality in American society. For
some blacks, the crisis of war represented a test of their loyalty and patriotism to the
Union, and an opportunity for social advancement. Aware of these concerns, Booker T.
Washington, in a speech marking the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Hampton
Institute, declared, "What need the Nation may have for our service, I know not, but this I
know, that whether in slavery or in freedom, the Negro has always been loyal to the Stars
and Stripes, and should the clash of arms come, the Negro, with voice and sword, will be
found by the side of his late Southern master, willing to lay down his life for his country's
cause."32
True to the spirit of Washington's message, thousands of African-Americans rallied
in support of their nation in the days following the declaration of war. In New Orleans,
over four hundred black residents attended a mass meeting at the Grand Army Hall to hear
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patriotic speeches and offer their pledges of support in the war against Spain. Other mass
meetings were held across the South. More important, however, tens of thousands of
African-Americans flocked to army recruiting stations. In some states of the South,
especially in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Texas, military officials
summarily rejected black recruits. Even when they had difficulty meeting their state's
quota of volunteers, most southern states preferred to keep their militia units completely
segregated. North Carolina and Alabama, the only two southern states that allowed black
volunteers, refused to place black units under the command of black officers.
Consequently, both potential black recruits and black volunteers quickly became
disillusioned with the volunteer army as a means to bring about social change; for it
appeared as nothing more than another instrument of white supremacy.33
White racism seriously dampened the enthusiasm and patriotism displayed by the
South's African-Americans. Rather than accepting black expressions of loyalty and service
at face value, many southern whites questioned the motives of African-Americans.
Undoubtedly, southern whites believed the decision to muster-in black volunteers was a
direct challenge to white supremacy and would make it much harder to maintain a
segregated South after the war. If blacks successfully served their country in a foreign
war, it would be more difficult for white segregationists to deny them the rights of full
citizenship. Samuel Robertson, congressman from Louisiana, feared that if large numbers
of African-Americans were allowed to fight in Cuba,
they will claim to be saviors of the country, and when they return it will be
impossible to live in peace and quiet with them in the South; I believe that
the glory of the defense of our country should be committed to the hands
of the Caucasian race . . . . The feeling here is so strong in this matter that
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I would advise you not to agitate the question as it will be exceedingly
unpopular. . . .
Other white southerners responded violently to the presence of black volunteers in their
midst. Reports of racial violence against black troops in Florida, North Carolina and
South Carolina exposed the difficulties faced by blacks seeking an opportunity to serve
their nation. In Anniston, Alabama, white authorities spread rumors regarding the
misconduct of black soldiers in order to rally violent opposition to them. The white
commander of the Third Alabama Colored Infantry, Robert L. Bullard, praised the
conduct of his men who maintained strict order even when attacked by "a howling, frantic
mob."34
During the first months of the war, the experience of African-Americans in a white
dominated army confirmed rather than refuted the arguments of black opponents of war.
From the beginning of the conflict, black opposition to the Spanish-American War had
been strong and vocal. They doubted that African-American support and participation
would achieve any of their race's goals, especially freedom for native Cubans and greater
social equality at home. Many southern blacks recognized the irony of blacks volunteering
to fight for a country that refused to recognize their own civil rights. America's history of
slavery and racism created anxiety that the federal government would merely use black
troops to conquer non-white peoples for further exploitation. Aware of these concerns,
preachers often urged their congregations to think long and hard before rushing to enlist in
the army. One black clergyman from Virginia feared that black Cubans might find
American rule harsher than Spanish rule; he suggested that the United States would likely
create a segregated "Jim Crow" colony under the "Mississippi Plan" once in control of the
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island. In addition, many black opponents of war feared that a foreign war would shift
public attention away from racial injustices at home and focus it on race issues abroad.
Indeed, the editor of a Richmond African-American newspaper, John Mitchell, Jr.,
predicted an ironic fate for those blacks who joined the army and fought to provide
greater freedom for the black race. Mitchell doubted the humanitarian motives that filled
white policymakers' rhetoric; he, too, predicted that once conquered, blacks in Cuba, the
Philippines, and elsewhere, would face life in a white-dominated, segregated society. For
African-Americans, therefore, they should not expect more liberal racial policies in the
aftermath of war. On the contrary, the conquest of darker-skinned peoples overseas and
the creation of white ruled governments would only reinforce white supremacy at home.35
African-American opponents of war sought to carefully balance their love of
country and sense of honor with their own historical experience with slavery and racial
oppression in evaluating the wisdom of volunteering their services. Many concluded that
blacks should not volunteer unless white authorities guaranteed them a greater degree of
equality at the end of the war. A letter to the editor of a black North Carolina paper
stated,
The Negro should not haste to arms in this war between the United States
and Spain because . . . He has nothing to fight for unless it is for the
exercise of his part of the Constitution . . . . The Negro from the
Revolutionary war on down to the Civil War has fought gallantly—in the
first he fought for 200 years of slavery; in the last for a proclamation minus
freedom. The white man says to him to-day, "You are not a man, sir, and
you are to serve and take such punishment as I see fit to give you." There
is not much encouragement to fight. . . . We are politically disfranchised
in many places, lynch law is king, and Jim Crow car is forced upon us. Let
the Negro stop and think and not rush too fast into battle unless he sees he
is going to be treated better after it is over.36
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The experience of African-Americans in the Spanish- American War disheartened
those who predicted it would provide substantial opportunities for the elevation of their
race abroad and greater social equality at home. Disappointment with the United States'
failure to recognize the government of the Cuban rebels or the rebellion of native peoples
in the Philippines indicated that the American government was willing to export the germ
of white supremacy to its newly acquired colonies. At home, white soldiers monopolized
the glory received from the war rather than face the ignominy of acknowledging the
valuable contributions made by black troops, especially at the battles of El Caney and San
Juan Hill in Cuba. In the South, black troops faced the additional indignity of provoking
violent attacks with their mere presence. After Spain's military defeat in Cuba, one black
observer commented, "From the race riots and lynching going on in the South and among
black and white soldiers, the American- Spanish war has not as predicted brought about a
better feeling among the two races."37
Undoubtedly, widespread disappointment existed among African-Americans in the
failure of their patriotism and volunteerism to redefine race relations. Their belief that
overseas expansion and war presented real opportunities for their race at home and abroad
led many African-Americans to offer qualified support for their nation's foreign policy. To
be sure, some falsely believed the government would turn to blacks to help administer the
affairs of colonies populated by non-white peoples; others hoped they could capitalize on
economic opportunities in the new possessions. At the very least, it was assumed that the
colonies would offer an escape from the repressive racial atmosphere of the United States.
Most African-Americans, however, expected their support for expansion and war to be
rewarded by a significant improvement in social conditions at home. In almost every
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respect, the Spanish-American War failed to produce any real benefits for AfricanAmericans. Instead, blacks' experience with war bred even greater suspicion of the
government's motives for expansion and led many to the conclusion that the United States
was determined to exploit native peoples in overseas colonies under the administration of
white rulers. Such a plan of expansion not only offered African-Americans no real
opportunities, it reinforced racial hostility and white supremacy at home.
*

*

*

The apparent southern consensus in favor of war against Spain proved illusory. As
the nation readied for war, southern opposition reemerged voicing a variety of concerns.
Southern women, who had been virtually silent during earlier debates on the Cuban
question, expressed great anxiety over the possibility of their homes and families once
again being destroyed by the ravages of war. Although they provided great aid and
comfort for loved ones during the conflict, they remained vigorous moral opponents of
war against Spain and a jingoistic foreign policy. African-Americans in the South, too,
quickly turned against the war and a policy of overseas expansion. Initially, many blacks
believed the war offered them opportunities for economic and social advancement. Most
southern siates refusal to accept black volunteers, a universal ban on black officers, and
widespread attacks by whites against their presence in camps across the South,
discouraged African-Americans about the possibility of dismantling the institutions of
white supremacy. Ultimately, most blacks viewed the war as a means for the United
States to export white supremacy abroad and exploit other non-white peoples.
White southerners, too, expressed reservations about war. The refusal of
McKinley and Congressional Republicans to recognize the Cuban Republic troubled
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southerners suspicious of Republicans' motives for supporting war. The rejection of
Turpie-Foraker suggested that Republicans had other goals than just the liberation of
Cuba from Spanish oppression. Southerners also saw few real economic opportunities
resulting from a war with Spain. For the South, neither Cuba nor the Philippines appeared
to be lucrative potential markets for the region's goods. On the contrary, the products of
both islands competed with those of the South. In addition, residents of southern
commercial cities along the coast expected to suffer considerable physical and economic
damage from the Spanish navy. Finally, white southerners preoccupation with race led
many to question the wisdom of intervening on behalf of non-white peoples. The white
South's racial concerns were clearly demonstrated by its response to black volunteers in
their own region. Most troubling of all, however, southerners anticipated that the end of
the war would create a host of new problems, political, social, and economic, that would
greatly outweigh any possible benefits of America' "Splendid Little War" with Spain.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SOUTH AND THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION:
COMMERCIAL PROMISE AND CULTURAL CHALLENGE

Clark Howell, of Georgia, in an address at Buffalo,
tells the attitude o f the South on the Philippine
question in a way which will give very little aid and
comfort to the 'anti-expansionists' of any part of the
country. He says the Philippines are as actual
a part of the national domain as are California,
Alaska or Oregon, and the only question with him is,
'What are we going to do with them?' This may be
called the voice o f the new south....The Georgian
takes a practical view of the Philippine case, for he
sees in the islands a market for a large amount o f the
leading product of the south, cotton manufactured
into fabrics. It is to the interest of the south...that as
much as possible of the country's products in raw
material be manufactured here before it is
exported.
—Beeville Bee. 29 Dec. 18991

[The Philippines] will make a number of nice places
to be filled by the President....These offices,
judiciously promised in doubtful states, might be
used to good advantage in the campaign. The
Philippines seem doomed to a carpet-bag
government.
—Savannah Morning News. 19 June 19002
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The speed and decisiveness of the United States' victory against Spain in the
Spanish-American War raised the hopes and expectations of those southerners who had
supported the war. The complete destruction of Spain's Pacific Squadron by George
Dewey's Asiatic Squadron on May 1 revealed the weaknesses of the Spanish Navy and
allayed the fears of southerners in coastal communities who expected a naval attack from
Spain. Less than two months after Dewey's victory in the Pacific, the United States Navy
destroyed Spain's Atlantic Squadron at the Battle of Santiago Bay. With the bulk of its
navy destroyed, and its armies isolated from reinforcements and supplies, Spain sued for
peace in July of 1898. Given the United States' commanding position in the Pacific and
Caribbean, most observers assumed the terms for peace would require Spain to surrender
many of its colonial possessions, including Porto Rico, Cuba, and all or part of the
Philippine archipelago.
During the brief summer of war, some white southern expansionists lobbied in
support of the war effort and extolled the virtues of overseas expansion. For this small
group of southerners, including several New South prophets, the war presented unique
opportunities for the uplift of the South. Undoubtedly, the war raised the hopes of those
who desired sectional reconciliation. Southern popular support for the war and the
participation of thousands of southern soldiers in the army would silence those who
questioned the region's loyalty. In the future, the people of the South did not expect to be
taunted by the spectre of "the bloody shirt." In the absence of sectional antagonism, some
southerners expected their region to be fully accepted in national life.
During the war against Spain, unfolding events on the battlefield, in the halls of
diplomacy, and in Congress, raised serious concerns among southerners that revealed a
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persistent division of opinion on the proper course of American foreign policy. Rather
than promote the cause of sectional reconciliation, the war and its aftermath produced
bitter feelings. The South received few opportunities to vindicate itself on the battlefield,
and few southerners received positions of leadership in civil and military posts during the
war. More important, however, the national government appeared to abandon the goals it
professed when it declared war against Spain, and instead adopted a policy of conquest.
For southerners, who originally rallied around war as a means to avenge national honor
and liberate suffering Cubans from the oppressive rule of Spain, this shift in policy served
as a shocking repudiation of the nation's highest ideals and raised fears that the very nature
of the American republic was undergoing a dangerous transformation.
*

*

*

During the summer of 1898, some southerners defended the war against Spain as a
means to promote the cause of sectional reunion. The image of thousands of southern
volunteer soldiers dressed in blue uniforms and serving under the flag of the United States
provided a visible and powerful response to those who questioned the South's loyalty.
New South promoters hoped that the South's participation in the Spanish-American War
would permanently erase anti-southern prejudice in the North and lead to material benefits
for the region. In a commencement address at the University of North Carolina, only one
month after Dewey's victory at Manila, the former minister to Spain, Hannis Taylor,
proclaimed that reunion had been attained by the South's support of the war. The nation
had "pledged its troth as one man," he concluded, "and by the perfect spirit of union that
has bloomed out of that resolve has been driven from the temple of our national life the
last lurking spectres of the civil war."3
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Matthew C. Butler, a former Confederate officer and long-time senator from
South Carolina, also sounded the theme of reconciliation. Speaking before the Empire
Society of the Sons of the American Revolution in New York, Butler proclaimed that the
Spanish-American War had helped Americans forget the passions produced by the Civil
War and its aftermath. It had also given all white Americans a chance to reflect on
universal traits. White Americans, he continued, shared a common racial and cultural
heritage; so, too, they were brought up under a common system of government.
Regarding the prospect for reconciliation, Butler averred, "Never in our history have the
American people been so united in heart and purpose as they are to-day." Butler then
addressed the concerns of anti-imperialists who feared the divisive social effects of
the war’s aftermath by proclaiming his own supreme confidence in the American people,
operating through democratic institutions, to resolve all matters arising from the war in the
best interests of the nation. "As for me," Butler concluded, "the cry of imperialism [holds]
no terrors. We are not made of the stuff that tolerates imperialism."4
Contrary to Butler’s pronouncements, most southerners did not see the SpanishAmerican War as an event that ended sectional differences. The brevity of the war also
provided the South with few opportunities to establish its loyalty within the Union. The
South exalted its heroes from the war, Richmond Hobson, Worth Bagley, Fitzhugh Lee,
and Joseph Wheeler, but most believed that McKinley's War Department offered
southerners too few opportunities to prove either their loyalty to the Union or their martial
prowess. With the opening of peace talks in July and a formal armistice in August, only a
few thousand southern volunteers were ever attached to expeditionary forces for
assignment in a theater of war; partisan considerations dictated that most assignments
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were given to regiments from states friendly to the Republican Administration in
Washington. As a result, most southern volunteers waited out the war in army camps,
primarily in Tennessee and Florida. One southern volunteer reported that his unit was
"disappointed by the speedy surrender of the Spaniards. We feel cheated." Rather than
engaging a foreign enemy, as they had hoped, most southern volunteers battled tropical
diseases in stateside camps. As casualties mounted from disease, and with few
opportunities to prove themselves against Spain, many southerners blamed the
administration, especially the War Department, for betraying the cause of sectional
reunion.5
The war also failed to alter fundamentally regional attitudes about an aggressive
foreign policy, especially a policy of territorial expansion. To many southerners, the end
of the Spanish-American War produced a Pandora's Box of potential problems for the
United States. Recalling their earlier objections to war, southerners warned that acquiring
overseas territories, especially the Philippines, would doom republican government and
usher in the age of American Empire. The evils associated with this transformation,
including a more powerful, centralized government and a greatly enlarged, permanent
military establishment, seriously alarmed southerners who still held vivid memories of the
Civil War and Reconstruction. Most important, the acquisition of overseas territories
raised vexing questions about the status of the islands' people within the American Union.
For most southerners, the difficult debate centered around their own hostility to their
government maintaining people in colonial status thousands of miles from America's
shores balanced by their own desire to maintain white supremacy at home.
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Despite their anxieties over territorial expansion, southerners expressed far fewer
concerns over the American occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico than over the Philippines.
Most southerners predicted that the cost of administering the Caribbean Islands and
providing for their defense would not require an enormous increase in taxes. Nor did they
feel that islands so close to American shores would require either the creation of a vast,
new colonial bureaucracy or an enormous increase in America's military forces. By the
conclusion of the armistice, the American army had pacified Spanish resistance on both
islands and taken steps toward establishing new civil governments. In Porto Rico, the
American army, under the command of General Nelson Miles, administered affairs on the
island without incident. After Spain's capitulation, the American military governed Porto
Rico with widespread popular approval from the island's inhabitants. In Cuba, the Spanish
army required considerably more time to evacuate the remnants of its army that had once
numbered over 150,000 men. In addition, the problem of erecting civil government in
Cuba was more problematic because of the existence of the Cuban Revolutionary
Government.
Although most southerners supported the recognition of the Cuban Republic prior
to the declaration of war against Spain, white racism and attitudes of Anglo-Saxon
superiority led many of them to retreat from their support for immediate Cuban selfgovernment. By the summer of 1898, most southerners appeared satisfied with the
provisions of the Teller Amendment, which denied any American intention of permanently
exercising sovereignty over Cuba, but gave the United States a free hand to influence and
shape a new Cuban government. To be sure, some southerners remained fearful that
Cuban occupation would provide the Republican Administration with opportunities for
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patronage and self-aggrandizement, but most sympathized with McKinley's reluctance to
turn the reins of power over to native Cubans. For many southerners, the war revealed for
the first time that most of the Cuban rebels, including its leaders, were of African ancestry.
The natural resentment felt by Cuban rebels at America's reluctance to recognize them as
the legitimate rulers of the island increased tensions between American officials and
members of the Cuban Revolutionary Army. Reports of inauspicious encounters between
Americans and native Cubans on the island only reinforced white southerners' negative
stereotypes of black Cubans.
Many southerners doubted the Cubans' ability to govern themselves without a
prolonged period of American supervision. Matthew Butler, as a member of the United
States Commission in Cuba, reported to Secretary of War Russell Alger that Cuba's racial
and social problems complicated the task of granting self-government to the Cubans.
Although the rebels had struggled gallantly for their freedom, Butler acknowledged, "to
go to the extent of recognizing their Government. . . would retard good government."
An Arkansas editor praised the Cuban rebels for their bravery on the battlefield, but added
that "as a body they are without discipline, headstrong and turbulent." Undoubtedly, many
southerners agreed. In a commentary that summarized these growing doubts, as well as
reflected popular notions of white paternalism, a Houston editor proclaimed:
The Cubans will be disappointed if they imagine they are to be turned loose at once to
work their own sweet will upon the island. They are evidently incapable of establishing
now such a government as we want to see in Cuba. The war has disclosed weaknesses in
the Cubans that we of this country did not know existed some months since . . . . we can
not turn them loose until they are strong in mind and body and able to 'walk alone.' Until
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then the United States must and will exercise a general supervision over the island. If,
southerners and other Americans concluded, native, non-white Cubans could not govern
themselves, then the United States should take up the "White Man's Burden" and educate
and civilize the people of Cuba. One rural Alabama editor suggested that the superiority
of American culture and institutions would serve to uplift the people of Cuba. Americans,
as Anglo-Saxons, he stated, possessed the "hand of industry, progress and prosperity—a
triple alliance—and under its magic touch, the Pearl of the Antilles will be the gem of the
ocean.6
Southern expansionists touted the material benefits that would likely accrue to the
South after acquisition of territory in the Caribbean. The new possessions, they
maintained, offered potential new markets for southern goods, especially raw cotton and
textiles. In addition, southern expansionists supported American possession of Cuba for
strategic purposes. Given its strategic location astride sea routes into the Gulf of Mexico
and proposed routes to a Central American canal, southerners maintained a keen interest
in controlling Cuba as a means of protecting Gulf Coast commerce. According to some
southerners, surrendering control of the island jeopardized America's ability to assert
economic power in the entire hemisphere
John T. Morgan, Hannis Taylor, Daniel A. Tompkins, and other commercially
oriented southerners, vigorously endorsed plans to establish American authority in the
possessions acquired from Spain. After the string of American military successes in the
war, Taylor, who before the war had campaigned for intervention in Cuba as a
humanitarian measure, now lobbied vigorously for establishing American sovereignty on
the island for economic and strategic reasons. He thought that American capital could
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profitably exploit the island's natural resources and that the navy could establish stations to
safeguard America's vital waterways in the Atlantic and the Gulf. Unlike most southern
expansionists, Taylor dismissed the idea that Cuba's racial composition posed any serious
difficulties for the United States. He proposed that America could force segregation on
the native people and create an all-white government. Convinced that white supremacy
could be maintained, Taylor actively supported the acquisition of overseas territories and
eventual statehood for Cuba.7
The most prominent and vocal southern expansionist, John T. Morgan, shared
Taylor's belief that the United States should control its new island possessions for
commercial and strategic reasons. While rejecting the extreme notion of annexation of all
of its new possessions, Morgan believed that the United States could exercise effective
control over overseas territory simply by building military bases on them or by sending
cultural missionaries. The United States, rather than establishing its sovereignty over the
islands, could use its moral and political influence to educate native peoples regarding
Christianity and democracy. To aid in the task of "Americanizing" its new possessions,
Morgan wanted to offer free homesteads to southern blacks who emigrated to the islands.
The resulting mass emigration of African-Americans, Morgan believed, would lessen racial
tensions in the United States by reducing the number of black citizens; at the same time,
African-American emigres would serve as missionaries for American culture and
institutions abroad. Like Taylor and other southerners who supported territorial
acquisition, Morgan championed the "southern solution" regarding the extension of
citizenship to native, non-white peoples. Morgan, as a southerner, realized that simply
granting citizenship did not necessarily confer any meaningful political power. Comparing
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America's perceived responsibilities in the territories with southern whites' experience with
slavery, Morgan stated,
We tried the institution of slavery, in the actual and physical control of an
inferior race and, while it lifted up the negro to a state of civilization far
above that of his family in Africa and was, in that sense and in the Christian
sense, the greatest missionary work that was ever done, it reacted upon our
people with a degenerating effect. . . . The political slavery of the
inhabitants of any of the islands we may occupy, would possibly entail evils
upon our home Government of like kind, in the outcome. The most we can
do for the advancement of those people, is to secure peace and liberty of
action to them.
Eventually, Morgan continued, the native people would recognize the obvious superiority
of American political and religious institutions and adopt them as their own.8
In the interim, while native populations received education in American culture and
democracy, the United States must maintain a strong, visible presence in the islands for
strategic and commercial reasons, Morgan believed. The United States, as a burgeoning
world economic power, needed naval stations in overseas territories to protect its
commerce on the high seas. In addition, numerous naval stations would help guarantee
America's freedom on the seas. Naval stations, Morgan argued, would not only serve the
interests of America's navy and merchant marine, but they would give the United States a
preponderance of influence over the affairs of the islands where they were located. In an
article in The Independent. Morgan discussed his views of territorial expansion in terms
similar to those of the philosopher Brooks Adams in The Law of Civilization and Decay.
Morgan, like Adams, stated that the failure of the United States to maintain effective
control over its new possessions was equivalent to accepting America's inevitable decline.
The United States, as a "progressive and competitive nation," must use "the genius of our
race, employ the energies of our people" and accept the challenge of overseas expansion.
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Otherwise, Morgan concluded, "our posterity will be led to regret that their fathers had
not bequeathed to them the greater benefits that our race have secured under the British
flag."9
The idea of the United States exercising control over Spain's former colonies in the
Caribbean enjoyed considerable public support in the South. Few southerners disputed
the strategic value of both Porto Rico and Cuba; American control of the islands would
allow the United States to keep commercial channels open in the South Atlantic, the Gulf
of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. If some foreign power, or a native government hostile
to the United States, assumed control of the islands, they could threaten seaborne
commerce, especially that trade originating from the region's Gulf ports. American
control of these possessions seemed especially important amidst continued debate
regarding the construction of an isthmian canal. Southerners also recalled their region's
antebellum desires for Caribbean expansion. Like an earlier generation of southerners,
contemporaries defined Cuba and, to a lesser extent, Porto Rico, as within the territorial
limits of America's "Manifest Destiny." Given their proximity and strategic value to the
South, Cuba and Porto Rico fit well within the limits of most southerners' definition of the
"American System."10
But if southerners seemed untroubled by the idea of governing Cuba and Porto
Rico, reports from within the administration that McKinley might retain permanently the
Philippines seriously alarmed them. During the summer and fall of 1898, newspapers
across the South printed editorials critical of the administration's expansionist rhetoric. In
August of 1898, a national journal conducted a survey of the American press and found
that none of the South's major newspapers favored "colonial expansion." The survey,
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published in Public Opinion, indicated that about half of the South's newspapers opposed
expansion without reservations; the other half consistently opposed expansion in the past,
but offered qualifications. Although a crude gauge of public attitudes because of the small
sample involved, the results of the newspaper survey probably accurately reflected popular
attitudes. A clear majority of southerners opposed colonial expansion after the SpanishAmerican War. The uncertainty shown by a segment of the press undoubtedly stemmed
from the methodological criteria established by Public Opinion. Rather than determining
separate opinions for the acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippines, the survey
combined the two possessions to determine approval or disapproval of "colonial
expansion." Given many southerners' approval for keeping Porto Rico, as reflected in the
regional press, it is likely that the newspapers classified as "wavering" supported the
acquisition of Porto Rico but not of the Philippines.11
During the period of diplomatic negotiations between Spain and the United States
over the future status of the Philippines, a southern consensus existed against the retention
of the Pacific archipelago. For many in the South, the goals of the Spanish-American War
had been achieved with the defeat of Spain's military and the liberation of Cuba. To go
beyond the narrowly defined objectives of the administration's initial policy, by seizing
colonial possessions in the Pacific, would jeopardize America's credibility abroad.
Southerners, most of whom supported a war against Spain to liberate Cuba and avenge
national honor, refused to endorse a policy of colonialism because it violated many of their
own deeply held beliefs, such as a fear of a stronger central government and a large,
standing army. Still scarred by the memory of Reconstruction as an attempt by corrupt
northern politicians to exploit and pillage a prostrate South, many in the region considered
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colonialism yet another manifestation of the depravity of American politics. Southern
white racism toward non-white Filipinos, too, contributed to widespread hostility to a
policy of Philippine annexation. William Tarry', in a letter to his sister, discussed the
common southern concern that American foreign policy had been unduly corrupted. It is
"a war waged by the politicians of the country for the purpose of plunder & conquest &
robbery. The black Republican party north waged the war against the South for the
purpose of stealing our slaves & robbing the people generally & now they want to rob
Spain of her property.. .." In an equally critical fashion, a North Carolina Populist
newspaper editor, alarmed at reports that officials in Washington were considering the
acquisition of the Philippines as a colony, condemned the President and congressional
Republicans as "greedy Shylocks" and urged them to "give us a rest and not press their
plan to make this a war of conquest and plunder."12
Most southerners also opposed the permanent retention of the Philippines based on
their belief that it would lead to a radical transformation in the nature and scope of the
federal government and necessitate burdensome new taxes. From a practical standpoint,
many southerners opposed a policy of colonialism due to the high financial costs
associated with empire. The war alone had cost approximately $250 million; maintaining
colonies in the future would require similarly large appropriations on an annual basis.
Consequently, a majority of southerners, especially poor southerners, found it extremely
injudicious for the government to raise taxes and expend millions in public funds to secure
territory abroad while so many Americans still suffered from crushing poverty at home.
The editor of a leading Populist paper, Texas Farm and Ranch, reminded his readers that
all Americans would shoulder the burden of paying not only the immediate cost of the
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war, but for all associated costs in the future, such as administering territory and paying
veterans' pensions. The end result of an expansive foreign policy, he concluded, would be
billions in public debt, high taxes, and continued poverty for millions of southerners.13
Equally important to many southerners was the widespread fear that the permanent
acquisition o f the Philippines would lead to the creation of a large, standing army. During
debate at the Texas State Democratic Convention, for example, a majority of delegates
spoke against "the acquisition of any territory, the government or control of which will
necessitate an increase in the standing army of the United States." In drafting their state
platform, Texas Democrats passed a resolution specifically renouncing the permanent
retention of the Philippines for that very reason. The creation of a large, standing army,
these Texans and many others believed, defied the republican principles of the
Constitution and represented the entering wedge of military government. Rather than
viewing the army solely as a means for the United States to defend its own sovereignty
and to defend its colonial possessions, southerners, thus, regarded it as a potential threat
to their own liberty.14
Anti-annexationists outside of the South occasionally speculated that the
government pursued a colonial policy for the purpose of building a large army for use
against political radicals, labor unions and various dissident groups; in the South, the
public feared the military might be turned against the region's segregated social
institutions. In other words, American colonialism and the concomitant growth of the
army and the federal bureaucracy, represented a potential threat to the liberty to maintain
white supremacy in the South.15
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Finally, and most important, racism played a significant part in shaping southern
white's attitudes on the Philippine question. To most white southerners, and many
northern whites as well, the non-white people of the Philippines were semi-civilized; they
could never be assimilated. Not only were Filipinos unassimilable, some in the South
suggested that the attempt to integrate "nine millions of savages 8,000 miles away from
home" into the American body politic would have devastating effects on American society.
Workers, some predicted, would see their wages slashed with the introduction of millions
of people willing to work for a fraction of prevalent wages. Although a few big businesses
might benefit from cheap Filipino workers, the "fate of the working man would be
imperiled." In the long term, such a misguided policy as annexation, one southerner
remarked, would not only injure the American working class, but it threatened to "overrun
[the U.S.] with a horde of ignorant and vicious people [who] imperiled our very
democratic institutions."16
The white majority's commitment to white supremacy placed many southerners in
an awkward position on the Philippine question. In erecting an elaborate system of
segregated institutions in their own region, southerners claimed African-Americans lacked
the requisite social and political skills to participate fully in American society. By passing
Jim Crow laws, and creating a de jure system of segregation in the South, southern
legislators not only reflected the white majority's hostility toward African-Americans, they
degraded all non-white people. When northern politicians suggested creating similar
social and political institutions for the Philippines, however, southerners bristled. Some
northern supporters of annexation stated that Filipinos might profit from a brief period of
tutelage as a colony under white American rule. During that period, native Filipinos could
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be instructed in American democracy and civilization in preparation for eventual selfgovernment as a state in the Union. Again, southerners realized that the inclusion of the
Philippine population into the American union, with full political rights, jeopardized thenown ability to permanently maintain rigid segregation in the South. In a poignant editorial
in the Confederate Veteran. S. A. Cunningham clearly defined the position of most white
southerners on the Philippine question. He reaffirmed not only the South's commitment to
the Union, but to the founding republican principles "established by the blood of their
ancestors." In the recent struggle against Spain, he continued, northerners should not
have been surprised at the South's display of support and loyalty. If the national
government, however, embarked upon a policy of conquest and the annexation of territory
inhabited by millions of non-white people, the South would strenuously object as one
people. For, as Cunningham concluded, "[we] are determined upon a white man's
government, and when race riot begins [we] may be counted and recounted to a man to
maintain [our] part of it, and in doing which neither cost nor privation will be
considered."17
Widespread opposition in the South to Philippine annexation was best indicated by
petitions to the Senate in late 1898 and early 1899 urging that body to reject any measures
to extend colonial rule over the archipelago. Across the region, Erving Winslow of the
Anti-Imperialist League distributed postal cards for citizens to petition the Senate to reject
the annexation of "any other foreign territory without the consent of the people thereof,
believing such action would be dangerous to the Republic, wasteful of its resources, in
violation o f constitutional principles, and fraught with moral and physical evils to our
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people." From the armistice in August of 1898 to the final vote on the Treaty of Paris in
February of 1899, hundreds of southerners signed and mailed these cards to their senators
and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These petitions arrived from every state of
the South and were signed by people in a wide variety of occupations. Approximately half
of the cards were signed by farmers; the other half from various professionals, including
attorneys, educators, and clergymen. White women, as well as men, contributed to this
campaign to defeat Philippine annexation. Among the more notable signatories were
Henry Ingersoll of Tennessee, a member of the American Conference on International
Arbitration; Warren Candler, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South; Josephus
Daniels, editor of the Raleigh News and Observer: and five bishops of the Protestant
Episcopal Church. By February of 1899, Anti- Imperialist petitions containing the
signatures of over 2,100 southerners had arrived in Washington for consideration by the
Senate.18
Southern opposition to retaining the Philippines increased as McKinley edged ever
closer to a "large policy" of expansion that included the annexation of the Philippines.
Among the five delegates appointed to attend peace talks in Paris, only George Gray, a
Democrat, stood in opposition to the designs of the administration. The remaining
members, William Day, Whitelaw Reid, William Frye, and Cushman Davis, operated under
instructions from McKinley to acquire the entire Philippine archipelago from Spain. At
Paris, the American delegation demanded that Spain surrender Cuba, cede Porto Rico and
an island in the Marianas in the Pacific (Guam), and the Philippines. Given the United
States' superior military position, Spain made only a few perfunctory challenges to the
peace terms. In order to soothe Spain's injured pride and hasten a conclusion to the talks,
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Senator William Frye, a delegate at the conference, proposed a cash payment to Spain of
twenty million dollars. On December 10, 1898, with a profound sense of resignation
eased only by the prospect of receiving a monetary settlement for the Philippines, the
Spanish delegates agreed to sign the Treaty of Paris.19
McKinley's decision to acquire the entire Philippine archipelago resulted from his
belief that it represented the best available course of action. Relinquishing control of the
islands after the war, he believed, would be both imprudent and impolitic. McKinley
realized that the American public would not likely accept returning the islands to Spain.
Nor would Republican expansionists and businessmen sanction turning over control of the
Philippines to a third party, especially if it was a commercial rival of the United States.
The president also dismissed another alternative, maintaining an independent, neutral
Philippines, because it lacked any substantial public support. Over time, the public would
demand to know what it received from the Philippines in return for the expenditure of
millions of dollars to defend and guarantee the independence of the islands. Faced with no
acceptable alternatives, McKinley rallied public opinion and Republicans in Congress in
defense of the treaty with Spain.20
During Senate debate regarding the Treaty of Paris, southern senators expressed
general satisfaction with its provisions regarding Cuba and Porto Rico. Given the
existence of the Teller Amendment, the status of Cuba after the treaty's passage was
largely predetermined. As for Porto Rico, southern senators accepted its eventual
acquisition because it seemed to conform more closely with historical patterns of
American expansion. Porto Rico's proximity to the United States made it easy to defend
and administer, and its inhabitants seemed accepting of American rule. Most important,
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southern members argued, both Caribbean islands were defined as a part of North America
by the Monroe Doctrine and could be easily "Americanized." According to John
McLaurin of South Carolina, the powerful civilizing influence of "our people will rapidly
bring them into harmony with our free institutions."21
The disposition of the Philippines, on the other hand, was an entirely different
matter and became a major source of contention. To some of the South's senators,
acquiring the Philippines meant a rejection of historic American isolationism that had
served the nation so well in the past. George Washington's admonition to avoid foreign
entanglements, they argued, rang as true during the present debate as it did a century
earlier. America's enormous material wealth and relative domestic tranquillity, southern
senators maintained, stemmed from the fact that America had focused its energies on
domestic concerns and wisely avoided the wars of Europe. To obtain the Philippines,
however, would "throw ourselves upon the red-hot stove of international politics in the
Eastern Hemisphere." Given the charged climate associated with imperialism in the Far
East, with Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan all vying for territory,
American acquisition of the Philippines seemed an invitation to perpetual conflict with
other colonial powers. In an appeal to his colleagues in the Senate, Alexander Clay of
Georgia, offered this analysis:
The danger of frequent and almost constant wars between foreign nations
in the far East, which always bring ruin and disaster, should be a warning
against the acquisition of this foreign territory and population. Why do we
want to invite a condition of affairs that will take a hundred thousand of our
citizens from peaceful pursuits and transfer them to military life, to be shot
down in defense of Malays? In the language of Mr. Carnegie, "Why do we
wish to enter the far East, a mine of dynamite, always liable to explode?"22
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Other southern senators objected to the acquisition of the Philippines because they
thought the imposition of colonial rule over Filipinos undermined the United States
Constitution and the concept of republican government. As a constitutional republic, the
United States could not govern people against their will unless it was for the purpose of
extending the full rights of citizenship at some future date. A senator from Georgia
admonished his colleagues, "We can not have and maintain one form of government for
citizens of the United States and another form of government for a subjugated race.
Subjects are unknown to our form of government."23
Such remarks made southern senators appear hypocritical. While they denied
suffrage to most African-Americans in their region, many southern senators raised
constitutional objections to taking similar measures against non-white people in the
Philippines. Their rhetoric, however, was calculated for effect. Aware that most
Americans rejected statehood for a territory populated by Malays, Asians, and Spanish,
southerners hoped they could defeat annexation schemes by denying the possibility of
holding the islands as a colony. In other words, if the United States was unwilling or
unprepared to grant eventual statehood to the Philippines, it should relinquish control of
the islands at the earliest possible date. In defending their anti-annexationist position,
southern senators sought to shame their Republican counterparts by raising these vexing
constitutional questions. Donelson Caffery even tried to use the words of the Republican
party's greatest leader against it. He quoted the Gettysburg address, "that this was a
government of the people, by the people, and for the people, that liberty might not perish
from the earth." During the Civil War, Caffery proclaimed, when the attention of most
men was determined upon ruin and destruction, Abraham Lincoln "arose in our midst,
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inspired, as it were, from on High . .. and uttered [this] sentiment and announced [this]
truth." If Republicans wanted to remain true to their founding principles, Caffery
concluded, they would have no choice but to oppose the annexation scheme.24
The region's senators understood that by defeating annexation, they could achieve
several important goals consistent with their own subjugation of black southerners. For
one thing, it represented a partial vindication of their claim that Reconstruction had been
unconstitutional. In addition, it lessened the possibility that the federal government would
impose its will against the white majority in the South in order to reverse segregation in
the future. Finally, and most important, by forcing the issue of Philippine statehood and
defeating annexation, southern senators blocked the inclusion of approximately seven
million non-white people into the American Union. Their entry into the American
population, as either citizens or colonists, it was assumed, would destroy the nation's
racial homogeneity, further complicate the delicate race question, and threaten the ability
of white southerners to maintain separate, racially segregated institutions.
Southern senators also warned their colleagues that pursuing a colonial policy
toward the Philippines threatened to involve the United States in a military quagmire. In
rejecting the Filipino's right of self-determination, the United States could expect
opposition from nationalist groups on the islands. Prior to the Spanish-American War,
native Filipinos, under Emiliano Aguinaldo, challenged Spanish sovereignty in the
archipelago. Spain managed to suppress Aguinaldo and the insurrection for a time by
buying off rebel leaders, including Aguinaldo. In exchange for approximately 400,000
pesos, the Philippine revolutionary and some of his followers agreed to leave the islands
for Hong Kong in December of 1897. During Spain's war with the United States,
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however, Aguinaldo and his followers seized the opportunity to launch another revolution
against Spanish rule. Returned to the Philippines from his exile in Hong Kong in May of
1898 by George Dewey and the United States Navy, the revolutionary leader rallied native
Filipinos against Spain. Within weeks, Spanish authority collapsed, and Aguinaldo and his
followers established a provisional government and asserted their independence. Given
the sympathy and aid shown by Dewey, and the silence of American authorities concerning
the creation of the provisional government, Aguinaldo and Filipino nationalists fully
expected the United States to recognize the legitimacy of his government at the end of the
conflict with Spain.25
By the end of 1898, as the Senate wrangled over the question of Philippine
annexation, Aguinaldo and his provisional government exercised virtual control over the
entire archipelago. United States forces, on the other hand, controlled only the city of
Manila and portions of Luzon province. Several southern senators warned against the
annexation of the islands because any attempt to assert American sovereignty over the rest
of the islands would likely provoke forceful resistance from Filipino nationalists. Senator
James Berry of Arkansas, expressed his sympathy with the Filipinos' desire for selfgovernment. Recalling his experience with Reconstruction, Berry remarked, "those of us
who live in the States of the South have some knowledge of the wrongs and outrages that
may be perpetrated even by Americans where they seek to govern by strangers and by
military power and unwilling people." Claiming that the South waged the Civil War in
defense "of the doctrine that all just powers of government are derived from the consent
of the governed," he proclaimed his steadfast opposition to forcing "upon the inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands . . . the curse of carpetbag government."26
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Another southerner in the Senate, Hernando Money, warned his colleagues that
the United States should renounce any intention to annex the islands; otherwise, a war that
began in the name of freedom and liberty, would become one of conquest and subjugation.
The result, Money predicted, would be "a call for fresh volunteers" with "thousands of the
best American youth laying their bones upon the plains and in the jungle of Luzon and in
other parts of the Philippines." Southern anti-annexationists in the Senate concluded that
Aquinaldo and his followers were no more likely to accept American colonial rule than
they had Spanish colonial rule; the Treaty of Paris in its present form merely transferred an
anti-colonial war from Madrid to Washington. The dilemma o f asserting American rule
over the Philippines, many of the South's senators grimly warned, could result in a long,
expensive, and bloody war of conquest in the Philippines. Rather than fight a colonial war
thousands o f miles from America's shores, southern senators argued, the United States
should allow the Filipinos the right of self-determination.27
Southerners in the Senate also spoke out against the annexation of the Philippines
because they predicted the costs associated with extending and maintaining American
sovereignty over the islands far outweighed any possible benefits. Their objections
countered claims made by some northern senators that the Philippines would provide the
United States with a valuable strategic and commercial presence in the Southwest Pacific.
By the time debate began in the Senate regarding the disposition of the Philippines,
numerous northern trade journals had predicted great things for the Philippines. The
islands could prove extremely valuable to the United States both as a potential new market
and as a source of raw materials. In addition, the port at Manila, some annexationists
contended, could be developed into an American "Hong Kong" as America penetrated the
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enormous market of China. With Manila serving as a coaling station for America's
merchant marine and navy, the ability of the United States to project power in the Far East
would be greatly enhanced. Annexing the Philippines, therefore, had incalculable value to
the American economy.28
Southern senators expressed a much different view of the economic value of the
Philippine Islands. Although interested in acquiring new markets overseas, southern
spokesmen doubted the potential of the Philippines to consume America's surplus goods.
They also understood that Filipinos would never be major importers of southern products,
especially agricultural staples. Donelson Caffery, senator from Louisiana and a leading
sugar producer, claimed that the Philippines represented more of an economic liability for
the nation than a potential asset. In an analysis of Filipinos as consumers, Caffery
concluded,
What do the dwellers near the equator consume? A half-civilized man
wants but little. Such people always export more than they import. Their
wants are very few. They feed at home, and the balance of trade is always
in their favor. Those distant possessions would cost more in ten years for
garrisons than they would yield profit to the United States in a century.29
Like Caffery, most southern Senators rejected northern assertions that the islands
would provide an important new market for American commerce. Senator John McLaurin
of South Carolina, for example, claimed that in the context of the total import-export
trade of the United States, the addition of the Philippine trade would be insignificant.
Reiterating Caffery's allegations that "semi-civilized people" made poor consumers,
McLaurin caustically remarked, "We will have to teach them to wear shirts and breeches
before we can trade with them much." In the meantime, McLaurin concluded, the expense
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to the nation of maintaining the islands would be immense compared with the possible
economic benefits.30
Trade figures between the United States and the Philippines prior to the SpanishAmerican War supported the allegations of southerners who minimized the importance of
the Philippines to the economy of the United States. In 1896, the total import and export
trade between the Philippines and the United States amounted to only $5,145,303 or less
than 8.5% of all trade between the United States and Asia and Oceania. Furthermore, if
existing trade patterns remained intact, the value of trade between the archipelago and the
United States worked to the distinct advantage of the Filipinos. Again, using 1896
figures, the United States recorded almost a $4.85 million trade imbalance with the
islands. Although these trade figures represented commercial relations under Spanish
control of the islands, southern senators doubted that American annexation would result in
any significant improvement in the trade picture with the Philippines.31
Given the slight economic benefit of the Philippines, southern Senators challenged
those who favored sending an army of occupation to the islands to guarantee American
control. Most American observers of foreign policy agreed that in order to maintain a
stable government in the Philippines would require an army of from 100,000 to 400,000
men. Given this scenario, Alexander Clay of Georgia submitted an appropriations
estimate for 1900 designed to show the high costs associated with American colonialism.
According to these estimates, naval appropriations would increase 50% and army
appropriations a staggering 500% over the previous fiscal year. Clay conceded that not all
of the increases in military appropriations resulted from United States involvement in the
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Philippines; he did, however, claim that if the United States did not become involved in
territory outside the Western Hemisphere, such increases would not be required.32
Rather than send an army of occupation to the Philippines, as many northern
annexationists and the administration suggested, several southern senators recommended
using American economic power to assert authority over the islands. As a group, they
rejected the notion that the United States either had to annex the islands or concede the
trade of the Orient to other colonial powers. Instead, the United States could pursue a
policy of neo-colonialism in the archipelago, monopolize the trade of the Philippines, and
acquire access to markets in other parts of the Far East. Senator Money asked his
colleagues if it "was necessary to the spread of American products, either manufactured or
raw" to subjugate or conquer foreign consumers? On the contrary, he concluded, the
superiority of American labor and the high quality of United States products had created
access to global markets and would continue to do so with or without the formal
annexation and occupation of the Philippines/3
Despite their material concerns, the most important issue for the South's senators
appeared to involve questions of race. The Philippines' population consisted of
approximately seven million people, with only a small fraction being white. The vast
majority of the inhabitants of the islands were non-whites of Asian origin. Southern
senators, like some northern anti-annexationists, emphasized the racial composition of the
islands as a means to defeat annexation. Because the Constitution denied the right to
acquire colonies, they argued, the archipelago would have to be granted eventual
statehood and its inhabitants extended citizenship. Their line of reasoning played upon
widely held racist assumptions regarding the inferiority of non-white people. According to
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the South's senators, the islands' population was biologically inferior and unassimilable;
efforts to include them in the American body politic would erode America's racial
homogeneity and, therefore, the Anglo-Saxon character upon which republican institutions
rested.34
Senator Donelson Caffery urged his fellow senators to reflect upon the racial
composition of other territories acquired by the United States in the past. Except for
Hawaii, which he claimed to be an anomaly due to strategic considerations, all territory
previously acquired by the United States contained a sizable white population or the
capacity to support a large white population after its annexation. As a result, the
transition from territorial self-government to statehood comported with existing
democratic institutions. Given its distance and hostile equatorial climate, however, the
Philippines were never likely to attract large numbers of whites. The majority of the
population would remain largely Asian in character and incapable of establishing self-rule.
In conclusion, Caffery stated, "If we know in advance that a certain territory is inhabited
by a people incapable of self-government, we know that we can not take them into our
Union, and, knowing that, we know that we ought not to take them at all."35
Senators from the South claimed to speak with more authority on the race
question than those from the North. They claimed that their more intimate experience with
African-Americans, as slaves and as freedmen, provided them with greater insight into the
mind and capability of people they deemed to be inferior. Benjamin Tillman, of South
Carolina, speaking before the senate as the professed "Senator from Africa" because of his
state's majority black population, criticized northern annexationists for failing to appreciate
the significance of racial concerns. Tillman attributed their position to their ignorance of
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African- Americans; I "realized what you are doing, while you do not . .. for I would save
this country from the injection into it of another race question." South Carolina's other
senator, John McLaurin, also proclaimed his expertise in matters involving "inferior
races." As a senator from South Carolina, he felt "peculiarly qualified to speak upon [this]
phase of the question, and it is that pertaining to the incorporation of a mongrel and
semibarbarous population into our body politic, a population that, so far as I can ascertain,
is inferior to but akin to the negro [sic] in moral and intellectual qualities and incapacity
for self-government." He, like Tillman, proclaimed that Philippine annexation would
seriously complicate relations between the races and weaken white American's control
over their common social and civil institutions.36
New South promoters, however, dismissed many of these concerns and favored
retaining the spoils of America's war with Spain, including the Philippines, as a means to
increase commercial activity in their native region. During consideration of the Treaty of
Paris and the annexation of the Philippines by the Senate, southern champions of territorial
expansion renewed their efforts to convert other southerners to their cause. After the
Spanish-American War, support for Philippine annexation and a "large policy" of overseas
expansion seemed to be strongest in the South's larger business centers and among those
involved in large-scale commercial enterprises. In these communities, progressive
newspaper editors, expansionist politicians, and various business leaders, built support for
a policy to exploit the spoils of the war with Spain. These spokesmen urged the United
States government to expand American power and influence over newly acquired
territories in order to secure new markets overseas for American goods. According to
their plan, southern exports of agricultural staples, textiles and manufactured iron and steel
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products to global markets would provide an economic boon to the South and alleviate
the region's chronic poverty.
The relative absence of opposition to the Treaty of Paris and Philippine annexation
in some of the South's larger cities indicated the appeal of the economic vision of the New
South boosters and their ability to articulate their message. Unlike their rural
counterparts, few urban southerners answered the Anti-Imperialist League's appeal to
petition the Senate to defeat both measures. In the case of Texas, fewer than thirty
persons mailed petition cards from the cities of Dallas, Forth Worth, Galveston, Houston,
and San Antonio; over three hundred petitions came from various small towns in rural
parts of east and central Texas. The almost complete absence of petitions from the South's
leading commercial centers along the coast is particularly striking. Residents from coastal
cities, including Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans and Galveston, sent
less than 5% of all the anti-expansionist petitions received by the Senate. The response of
the South to the postal card campaign sponsored by the Anti-Imperialist League clearly
suggests that in those communities more closely tied to the national and international
market, namely large coastal cities and commercial cities in the interior, the expansive
policies of the McKinley Administration enjoyed their greatest support. In these towns
and cities, the New South message of expanded overseas markets and economic uplift
appeared to offer more promise, rather than anxiety, regarding the future of America in
the age of imperialism.37
Southern supporters of expansion also benefited from the public reaction to
reports of Filipino attacks against American forces outside of Manila. For some
southerners, the assault of Filipino rebels, composed of "half-civilized tropical savages,"
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against American trying to bring liberty and democracy to the islands raised a number of
important issues that required the United States to maintain and assert its authority over
the islands. The deaths of American soldiers and the challenge to American authority
made the Philippine question a matter of national honor and international credibility.
According to some southern editors, those responsible for the attack should be punished
and the rebellion crushed; otherwise, both Filipinos and European colonial powers would
doubt the United States' resolve to hold its territory. "To haul down the flag now," a
Little Rock editor proclaimed, "would be a national disgrace and would make the United
States the laughing stock of the world." Still others in the South understood the
Philippine situation in terms of the "white man's burden" that required the United States to
maintain a "firm hand" over the archipelago. The attack against American forces was
launched by "ungrateful savages" who neither appreciated nor understood the superiority
of American democracy and its civilizing institutions. Despite this setback in United
States—Philippine relations, it remained "the duty of the American people . . . to consider
the conditions and needs of the people in our possessions, and to work out for them a
scheme of government which will develop the best that is in them . . . . " Only with the
strong and determined hand of American influence, some suggested, could the Filipinos
ever be capable of any form of home government.38
On the eve of the vote on the Treaty of Paris, with its provisions for the acquisition
of the Philippines, southern senators were keenly aware of how the fluid situation in the
Philippines had shaped public debate in their native region. Still, most of these senators,
like many o f their constituents, remained deeply concerned over a broad range of issues
regarding the expansion of American sovereignty to the remote Pacific archipelago.
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Underlying all of their objections, however, were two fundamental factors: a fear of
enlarged federal power and a desire to maintain white supremacy in the South. To be
sure, the two items were not unrelated. For southerners, the experience of Civil War and
Reconstruction provided valuable guidance in evaluating the present situation. The
memory of a large, powerful military exercising sovereignty against the will of the white
majority in the South seemed analogous to what imperialists proposed for the Philippines.
A policy of colonialism, southerners claimed, defied the Constitution and republican
government, paved the way for militarism, and offered little or no protection for individual
civil liberties. Given their own history, southerners feared providing the federal
government with the tools to accomplish the acquisition of the Philippines, a large
military, an extended colonial bureaucracy, and additional tax revenue. No matter how
remote, many southerners still feared that the powers of the federal government might
once again be unleashed on the South to remedy the evils of segregation. Furthermore,
the prospect of the federal government intervening on behalf of African-Americans in the
South appeared more likely if the Philippines were incorporated into the American Union.
In the event of statehood, Filipino representatives would form a powerful voting bloc in
Congress. More than one southern senator raised the spectre of one-seventh of all House
members representing Filipino constituents, constituents who shared a different religion,
culture, language and values than white Americans. Surely, they reasoned, it would be
much more difficult to maintain an oppressive, segregated society in the South in the
presence of a more powerful federal government influenced by significant numbers of non
white constituents. To most southerners, whether in Congress or back home in their
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native region, Philippine annexation represented a huge gamble. Few appeared willing to
accept the risk.
On the afternoon of February 6, 1899, the Senate entered into executive session
for final consideration of the Treaty of Paris. After weeks of long and arduous debate, the
fate of the treaty still remained very much in doubt. Events leading up to the vote,
however, bolstered the administration's position that ratification was necessary. News
reports on February 5 indicated that Filipino rebels had attacked an American garrison
outside of Manila causing numerous deaths and casualties. Pro-treaty forces used these
reports to rally support for the passage of the treaty as a show of American resolve and
determination to exercise control over the Manila-area. In addition, the administration and
other Republicans proclaimed the Filipino attack a direct assault on American sovereignty;
in an executive order the previous December, McKinley had declared United States
sovereignty over the entire archipelago. Passage of the treaty and the acquisition of the
islands now became a matter of patriotism and national honor. To reject the treaty,
administration spokesmen contended, would give the appearance of indecisiveness and
jeopardize the lives of Americans already in the Philippines. Aware of this attack, and the
apparently fluid circumstances in the islands, the Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris by a
margin of one vote, 57 to 27.39
In contrast to their harsh rhetoric condemning the Treaty of Paris and the
annexation of the Philippines, southern senators did not vote en masse against its
ratification. Of the 21 southerners casting votes, eight voted in favor of the treaty, while
the remaining 13 voted against. Although the South provided almost half of the negative
votes, those who broke with their established southern position and voted in favor of the
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treaty provided the margin of victory. (See Table 7) Some of the yes votes came from
southern senators who claimed to have been swayed by the attack on United States forces
by Filipino rebels. In executive session, Senator McLaurin, one of the most outspoken

TABLE?
Southern Votes in the Senate on
Ratification of the Treaty of Paris
Yea Votes
Marion Butler
Alexander Clay
Samuel McEnery
John McLaurin
John Morgan
Edmund Pettus
Jeter Pritchard
Will Sullivan
Nav Votes
Augustus Bacon
William Bate
James Berry
Donelson Caffery
Horace Chilton
John Daniel
James Jones
Stephen Mallory
Thomas Martin
Roger Mills
Hernando Money
Samuel Pasco
Benjamin Tillman

Partv Affiliation

State

Populist
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat

N.C.
Ga.
La.
S.C.
Al.
Al.
N.C.
Ms.

Partv Affiliation

State

Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat

Ga.
Tn.
Ark.
La.
Tx.
Va.
Ark.
FI.
Va.
Tx.
Ms.
FI.
S.C.

(Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, p. 1184.)
critics of the treaty, decided to vote in favor of ratification "in light of the news that has
come to us over the cable in the past two days." The attack had changed conditions on
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the island, he proclaimed, and required that the United States stand firmly behind the
administration's plans to pacify the Filipinos. Another southern senator, Samuel McEnery
of Louisiana, changed his mind regarding the treaty after receiving assurances that his
resolution against the permanent annexation of the Philippines be considered after the
conclusion of the treaty vote. Finally, the Democratic Party and its leader, William J.
Bryan, did little to preserve party unity on this crucial vote. On the contrary,
resolution against the permanent annexation of the Philippines be considered after the
conclusion of the treaty vote. Finally, the Democratic Party and its leader, William J.
Bryan, did little to preserve party unity on this crucial vote. On the contrary,
the national party appeared divided on the treaty question. Although most Democrats
opposed ratification, Bryan urged senators to vote for ratification and take up the matter
of the Philippines at a later date. In the meantime, he counseled the passage of the Treaty
of Paris as the best means to conclude formally the war with Spain. Faced with these
circumstances, and assured that they would be given the opportunity to vote on the
McEnery Resolution, eight southern Senators voted for the measure.40
*

*

*

In the months after ratification, many southerners who had supported the treaty
tried to mobilize the South in support of the new expansionist policy. The South's leading
spokesman for territorial expansion, Senator John T. Morgan, appealed to white racist
beliefs in seeking to build broader support for Philippine annexation in the South.
Morgan, one of the southern Democrats who crossed party lines to vote for the Treaty of
Paris and Philippine annexation, embraced most features of the McKinley Administration's
expansive foreign policy. He suggested that the acquisition of territory in the Caribbean
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and the Pacific would provide new markets for southern goods, especially Alabama steel
and iron, cotton, and textiles. Insular possessions also offered strategic advantages for the
United States in penetrating the potentially vast markets in Latin America and Asia. The
Senator from Alabama, unlike most other southerners, did not believe the annexation of
territory, inhabited by millions of non-whites, would complicate the race question. On the
contrary, he urged southerners to support Philippine annexation because it would offer an
attractive location for the mass emigration of African-Americans. The resulting out
migration of blacks, Morgan concluded, would reduce the African-American population
and ease racial tensions. To allay the anxieties of those who feared the addition of the
Philippines as an American state, Morgan suggested the "southern solution;" non-white
Filipinos might be citizens, but they would not necessarily have political power. In sum,
Morgan claimed the potential benefits of expansion, for the nation and the South, far
outweighed any political or social problems that might arise.41
Another Alabaman, Joseph Wheeler, shared Morgan's enthusiasm for overseas
expansion. A former Confederate general who commanded American forces during the
war with Spain, Wheeler defended the extension of American sovereignty to insular
possessions as perfectly consistent with the United States Constitution and the teachings
of America's greatest statesmen Speaking before the 1899 Confederate Veterans' annual
reunion in Charleston, he proclaimed that to forbid the extension of American
constitutional power to overseas territories admitted to some deficiencies in our political
institutions and people. Wheeler then recalled the history of expansion across the North
American continent and the wisdom of the leaders who made it possible; he also
emphasized the prominent role played by the South in the extension of American
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sovereignty over the western territories. Regarding the aftermath of the war with Spain,
Wheeler averred,
The position in which the American people find themselves to-day was not
sought by them, but is the logical result of conditions thrust upon the
country by a course of events beyond our control. No power in our grasp
could have stayed the tide, and now we stand before the gaze of civilization
confronted by grave responsibilities. The supreme test of American
institutions is involved, and the American system of government is on trial.
Given the challenges produced by the aftermath of war, Wheeler concluded, President
McKinley was absolutely correct in asserting American control over the Philippine
archipelago.42
Even Senator John McLaurin, who surprised his colleagues in the Senate by voting
for ratification of the Treaty of Paris, emerged as a prominent spokesman for overseas
expansion. In part, he defended his actions in the Senate by shifting attention away from
constitutional questions involving the status of Filipinos toward the commercial
advantages offered by Philippine annexation. In embracing neo-colonialism, McLaurin
avoided the vexing questions of race and the constitutionality of holding formal colonies
within the American Union. During a speech at the annual American-Asiatic Association
banquet, the South Carolina senator extolled the commercial benefits of expansion for the
South, especially for iron, steel, and textiles. In a brilliant summary of the foreign policy
position taken by many New South prophets, McLaurin declared
In striving for commercial progress, commercial expansion and commercial
supremacy, I would not favor the incorporation into our body politic of any
semi-barbarous races totally unable to appreciate our system of
government, but I do favor the policy of expansion. The South cannot
stand still and conservatively oppose commercial expansion. To do so
means to go backward toward the ruinous conditions of thirty years ago.
The unexpected and unintentional acquisition of the Philippines is to mark
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an epoch in the history of this country. The world's conflict in the East at
this time is in reality the outgrowth of commercial competition. It is a
question of markets and market places.4"
Several New South newspaper editors also joined in the public debate in support
of overseas expansion. Led by Charles Mooney of the Memphis Commercial-Appeal and
Howell Clark of the Atlanta Constitution, these editors created a vision of a dynamic New
South sharing in the riches of international trade. Hostile toward anti-imperialists, they
supported McKinley's foreign policy and his decision to annex the Philippines. Expansion
into the Pacific, Mooney suggested, would give the South a huge competitive advantage
in seizing the trade of the Orient. Southern cotton growers would no longer be plagued
by the problem of overproduction, nor would they chafe at sharing profits with British
middlemen. Control of the Philippines, Mooney concluded, would produce an economic
boom in the region when the "700,000,000 people who wear cotton" in Asia turned to the
South for textiles. Howell Clark, in a speech at Buffalo in December of 1899, reiterated
the vision of the New South to an audience composed largely of northern Republicans.
The Atlanta editor supported expansion in the Caribbean and the Pacific as consistent
with American history and the Constitution. The inevitable "Americanization" of the
insular possessions, Clark noted, would produce vast new markets for southern goods,
especially textiles. After the passage of the Treaty of Paris, the editors of other New
South newspapers, in Baton Rouge, Chattanooga, Galveston, Little Rock, Nashville, and
New Orleans expressed similar expression of support for McKinley's foreign policy and
the annexation of the Philippines as a means of achieving regional economic uplift.44
The escalation of the conflict in the Philippines between Filipino rebels and
American forces doomed any chance the New South prophets had to create a consensus in
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support of McKinley's policy toward the Pacific archipelago. In the weeks following the
brief skirmish outside of Manila on February 4, both sides built up their resources in
preparation for future conflict. On February 23, having secured the assistance of rebel
groups in the city of Manila, Aguinaldo launched a poorly coordinated attack to seize the
city from American forces. The Filipinos suffered heavy casualties, largely as a result of
American artillery, and quickly withdrew into the jungles north of Manila.
During March and April, American forces under the command of General Elwell S.
Otis, extended the area of American control approximately thirty miles north and east of
the city of Manila. Led by General Lloyd Wheaton, an American punitive expedition into
the jungles north of Manila resulted in the seizure of two small villages, Pasig and Pateros.
With the arrival of reinforcements in March, Otis ordered Wheaton to move on the rebel
capital at Malolos. On March 30, Americans and Filipinos fought outside the earthworks
of the city. The next morning, Americans overran the Filipino positions only to discover
that Aguinaldo and his main forces had evacuated the city under the cover of darkness.
Otis, sensing that Aguinaldo would view the capture of his capital as a fatal blow, failed to
order the immediate pursuit of the rebel army. Instead, he waited in Manila to receive
word of Aguinaldo's surrender. It never came.
The conduct of General Otis during the Philippine War evoked considerable
condemnation of the administration's Philippine policy. Despite his early successes, Otis
failed to capitalize on these victories and push ahead for a complete victory. Deemed to
be too cautious by his critics, "nervous Nelly" Otis displayed an obsession for protecting
his lines of communication and for the paperwork associated with a colonial bureaucracy.
Many of his concerns were grounded in the difficulties of extending American authority
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into the jungles of the Philippines. Nonetheless, the popular image in the United States of
"Grandma Otis" was of a general who avoided searching for Aguinaldo and his forces in
favor of sitting safely in Manila poring over mountains of paperwork and filling out
additional requests for men and materiel.
The United States army campaigns in the Philippines during the summer of 1899
only added to the scorn for Otis and raised new doubts regarding the wisdom of the
American annexation of the islands. The summer months, or the rainy season, produced
fewer American expeditions, limited successes, and a sharp decline in the morale of
American forces. Several towns were captured in Luzon but abandoned because Otis was
reluctant to detach units for garrison duty. As the summer progressed, poor weather, bad
sanitation, and inadequate transportation created enormous health problems for American
troops. Tropical diseases, especially dysentery, were rampant in some units. By August,
only half of the men in these were healthy enough to fight. Letters from soldiers in the
Philippines revealed the desperation of their situation and their dissatisfaction with the
war. In a letter to his parents, George Briggs, a North Carolina volunteer in Manila,
reported that he was "sick of this country" and would be willing to "give my hope of
heaven to get back to America." Since the war with Spain was over, Briggs continued,
"we feel that our contract is filled and want to get back to god's country again." For many
of the soldiers in the islands, what was desired was either a total war effort to destroy the
rebels, or to abandon the Philippines and return to the United States.4s
The growing dissatisfaction with the war felt by some American soldiers in the
field was shared by much of the American public. Many southerners, who had protested
against the annexation of the islands, pointed to the conflict in the Philippines as proof of
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the administration's misguided policy. Southern anti-annexationists, along with their
northern counterparts, had warned of the dire consequences that would result from the
United States annexation of the islands. As the war bogged down into a bloody, brutal,
and costly operation against bands of roving guerrillas in the jungles, the worst fears of
anti-annexationists were realized.
Even during the earliest, most successful phase of the Philippine rebellion, southern
critics of annexation seized the war as an issue to use against imperialists and the
administration. Letters from soldiers appeared in the southern press and painted in stark
relief the horror and brutality of fighting a war in jungles 7,000 miles from home. Capt.
Elliot of the United States army, on duty in the islands, had a portion of a letter reprinted
in several regional papers. A beleaguered Elliot reported, "Talk about war being hell, this
war beats the hottest estimate ever made of that locality!" A Georgia editor followed
Elliot's letter with the American casualty lists to date in the Philippines: "210 killed, 51
died from wounds, 278 died from disease, 1,184 wounded, 15 missing...Is it any wonder
they call the island on which we have had most of the trouble Luzon."46
The ever increasing costs associated with annexing the Philippines also brought
complaints from across the South. In addition to paying $20,000,000 to Spain for the
islands, the cost of quelling the insurrection and asserting American authority in the islands
would likely double or triple the original cost of acquisition. Many southerners questioned
why the administration would go to such extraordinary lengths to acquire the Pacific
archipelago whose people resisted American rule. Some concluded that jingoes in
Congress, especially Republicans, pursued a policy of colonialism for selfish ends. They
expected to benefit from increased patronage opportunities with the addition of overseas
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territory. McKinley and the executive branch were blamed for grabbing additional
territory as an excuse to increase the personal power of the president. Along with
territories, and a colonial war, would come a vast new bureaucracy and a large, permanent
military establishment under the direction of the chief executive. One Houston editor, in a
succinct analysis of the situation, declared, "every day we keep up the policy of
imperialism brings us a day nearer to a monarchy."47
General Otis's summer campaign generated great scorn among southerners. The
indecisive nature of the conflict and the apparent caution displayed by Otis in engaging the
enemy irked southerners who favored Philippine annexation. American authority, southern
annexationists suggested, must be asserted quickly and forcefully across the islands.
Sufficient force should be employed in the islands "to convince the Filipinos that they have
masters now different from the effeminate creatures who formerly attempted to rule
them." Most southerners, however, blamed Otis and the president for the problems in the
Philippines. Otis, one South Carolinian observed, lacked the energy to conduct the
campaign in the Philippines. Until the administration adopted a firmer policy in the
Philippines, "things will drag along pretty much as they are dragging along now. And it
will cost the lives of more of our soldiers and the lives of more Filipinos and vastly more
money to continue the conservative policy . . . . The taking of the islands was a
mistake."48
Black southerners, too, appeared divided on the question of Philippine annexation.
During the war with Spain and the Philippine insurrection, thousands of AfricanAmericans volunteered for service and fought in America's overseas possessions. Black
supporters of expansion favored the annexation of the islands and suggested that
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participation in the war would advance the cause of social equality for African-Americans
at home. P. B. S. Pinchback, former Radical governor of Louisiana, and John Lewis, an
Atlanta Methodist preacher, urged blacks to place their country ahead of their race and
support the administration's policy in the Pacific. The successful annexation of the
Philippines, and the pacification of the islands, they declared, would bring great economic
and political opportunities for blacks who fought in the war. Black participation,
furthermore, might be rewarded with white respect and a loosening of social controls.
Another black expansionist, J. W. Smith, editor of the A. M. E. Church organ, Star of
Zion, pleaded with members of his race not to be left behind in the inevitable march of
civilization. The spread of American civilization and institutions would proceed with or
without the cooperation of African-Americans. Smith, therefore, believed blacks should
participate in the extension of American authority as a means of demonstrating their
loyalty to the Union and their usefulness as a race. "The duty of the Negro," Smith wrote,
"is to go in and work side by side with the white man in developing these new possessions,
for all of them will be Americanized in time . . . . When this becomes a fact, the future of
the Negro will be bigger with promise than ever before."49
Most African-Americans in the South, however, condemned the war in the
Philippines, which they viewed as an unjust and immoral attempt to force white supremacy
on unwilling Filipinos. And they feared a war waged against dark-skinned people in the
Philippines would unite white northerners and southerners and threaten AfricanAmericans' limited freedoms at home. In other words, the popular vilification and
degradation of Filipinos might result in domestic racial violence or in the enactment of
even greater restrictions on the conduct of African-Americans. There were well-founded
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reasons for this fear among blacks, especially in the South. Several prominent white
politicians, including Donelson Caffery and John Morgan, suggested colonizing millions of
African-Americans in the Philippines as a means of solving the race question. Even
Senator Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina, an outspoken champion of white supremacy,
received surprisingly warm receptions for his racist rhetoric in many parts of the nation
during a series of lectures in 1900. A black editor in Arkansas expressed the common fear
of African-Americans regarding the Philippine War when he admonished members of his
race not to volunteer "to fight the brave men there who are struggling and dying for their
liberty." To do so, he concluded, would be,
to curse the country with color-phobia, jim crow cars, disfranchisement,
lynchers and everything that prejudice can do to blight the manhood of the
darker races, and as the Filipinos belong to the darker human variety, the
Negro fighting against himself. Any Negro soldier that will cross the ocean
to help subjugate the Filipinos is a fool or a villain.50
Amidst this growing tide of criticism from southerners, congressional imperialists
and their allies in the press challenged the patriotism of the South. Despite the rhetoric of
reconciliation and reunion associated with the war with Spain, the early stages of the
Philippine insurrection produced a sectional division of opinion. Widely perceived as a
war waged by northern Republicans to further their political careers and the interests of
northern industry, southerners did not flock en masse to volunteer for service in the
Philippines. As one Louisiana editor wryly observed, "Two weeks of enlistment of
volunteers to fight the Filipinos have passed without anybody getting killed in the rush at
the recruiting offices." Some southerners defended their lack of enthusiasm for the war as
a sign of genuine patriotism. They were reluctant to volunteer to support an imperial war
of conquest that disgraced the Constitution and the honor of the country. Responding to
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charges that efforts to recruit volunteers in south-central Virginia had been
"discouraging," a Danville editor replied,
The failure of enlistment to thrive in the South is due to patriotism, rather
than lack of it. Southern people are not in sympathy with the war for
which they are asked to enlist for they stand for the principles enunciated in
the Declaration of Independence, and for their application abroad, as well
as in our own country. Our people are opposed to the policy of territorial
expansion by conquest and the war that is being waged on a people who
desire to be free.
It is unlikely that most southerners shared the high-minded idealism expressed in the
Danville Register. Certainly many southerners spent the summer of 1899 working the land
during the important growing seasons for cotton, tobacco and other staples. Nonetheless,
the editorial did accurately reflect widespread southern hostility toward a war that was
seen as misguided and unnecessary.51
As the war dragged on for month after dreary month, troop levels in the
Philippines were steadily increased. Some in the South predicted that Philippine
annexation would lead to a massive increase in the permanent military establishment of the
United States. They feared, however, that considerations beyond the scope of national
defense contributed to the creation of a large, standing army. Some southerners adopted
the view that corrupt politicians and the nation's largest businesses merely used the
Philippine War as an excuse to build an army for use against those who threatened
domestic tranquillity. To that end, the permanent army being created for the Philippine
War would likely see action against Populist agitators, labor unions or any other
individuals or groups who threatened the status quo. In the future, the army might even
be turned against southerners who refused to abandon segregation and white supremacy.
Although an extreme view, it was one shared by some northern anti-imperialists and
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Midwest Populists. In a scathing attack against the Republican architects of the Philippine
policy, a Birmingham editor concluded,
Outside of the demands of imperialism and colonialism, many large
influences are clamoring for a large standing army. The trusts and
plutocrats in general want an army strong enough to crush labor uprisings .
. . . If labor rises in strength, they want enough, aided by machine guns, to
mow them down in the streets. While the republican party remains in
power [the consumer] will be a cipher.52
By the end of 1899, victories by the United States army in pitched battles with the
Philippine insurgents compelled Aguinaldo to adopt new tactics. In November, he
ordered his units to break into small, roving bands of guerrillas to harass enemy lines.
Aware that he could not achieve a military victory in a direct confrontation against
superior American forces, Aguinaldo sought a protracted conflict that would break the
United States' will to fight. Filipino guerrillas, ill-equipped to accommodate prisoners of
war, often killed wounded American soldiers rather than cared for them. American
troops, fighting a frustrating war of "search and destroy" against guerrillas, often resorted
to the brutal "water cure" to extract information from captured prisoners and civilians
alike. Despite fairly rigid press censorship, atrocity stories filled American newspapers.
One southerner observed that the newspapers contained numerous horrible reports about
the Philippine war "that sickened his heart." Furthermore, he could not conceive "of any
thing more causeless and unjustifiable than this wanton sacrifice of human life, and of
Government money that is going on in the Philippine islands." By the end of the year,
with over 70,000 American troops in the Philippines, and with the human and financial
costs of the colonial war mounting daily, many southerners hoped imperialism would
become a major issue to use against Republicans in the election of 1900.53
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Among southern whites, widespread public opposition to the war in the Philippines
was manifested during the presidential campaign of 1900. After the vote on the Treaty of
Paris, William J. Bryan defended his support for ratification on the grounds that the
disposition of the Philippines could be taken up at a later date. The first goal, according to
Bryan, was to reach a formal conclusion of hostilities with Spain. In the interim, however,
Bryan expressed his strident opposition to the administration's policy toward the islands.
He neither anticipated nor supported a colonial war against Filipino insurgents. In
preparing for the Democratic convention, Bryan forcefully articulated the common
constitutional and moral objections to the Philippine War. In the process, he placed
himself in the ideological camp of the Anti-Imperialist League. When the League's
national convention met in early 1900, they approached Bryan about abandoning free
silver and accepting a possible third party bid for the election in November. Unwilling to
desert his basic principles, Bryan continued to push for the inclusion of an anti-imperialist
plank in the Democratic platform.
At a state Democratic convention in March, Bryan declared that the three most
important issues in the upcoming presidential election were silver, trusts, and imperialism.
In a broader sense, he viewed the election in terms of "Who would rule America?," the
plutocratic alliance of big business and corrupt politicians or the common people. A few
months later he again sounded his battle cry in the North American Review. He attacked
Republicans for clinging to the gold standard as a means to further consolidate the wealth
of the nation in the hands of a privileged few. He also suggested that the administration's
foreign policy, especially in the Philippines, was symptomatic of the contemptuous way in
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which Republicans viewed common Americans. The forcible annexation of the islands and
the handling of the Philippine insurrection, according to Bryan, violated every principle in
the Declaration of Independence. Proponents of the war who claimed annexation would
offer material rewards for the United States should be prepared to place a cash value on
the lives of American soldiers killed in action. In typical Bryan fashion, he concluded,
"We cannot set a high and honorable example for the emulation of mankind while we
roam the world like beasts...." The need in the next election, therefore, was to defeat
the plutocrats whose action defiled the constitution, impoverished American citizens, and
degraded mankind.54
Aside from southern goldbugs and Republicans, most people in the South
supported Bryan's position on the dual issues of silver and imperialism. Across the South,
the Democratic majority thundered their protests against the war in the Philippines as
another manifestation of the Republicans' disregard for the Constitution or the interests of
the common man. Just as the administration had sponsored high tariffs and the
preservation of the gold standard to enrich its benefactors, it now waged a colonial war
for equally selfish motives. The war, many southerners concluded, would consolidate
power in the executive branch and provide extensive business opportunities for the
nation's leading commercial interests. One southern observer reached the conclusion that
only self-aggrandizement could explain a foreign policy that offered so few rewards for the
nation. After the long, bloody colonial war of conquest in the Philippines, he
hypothesized, the political "spoilsmen" and the "tariff and trust gatherers" would line up to
receive their rewards.55
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Many other prominent southerners shared this critical view of McKinley's war in
the Pacific. Willis Brewer, a congressman from Alabama, reprinted for campaign
distribution a speech he delivered in Congress under the title of "This Damnable War."
Unlike many Democrats, he did not condemn the entire Republican party for a war
instigated by the president; he acknowledged that there were Republicans who opposed
the president just as there were "thoughtless" Democrats who supported him. The
question of imperialism, Brewer affirmed, and "the evils of this policy of conquest and
spoilation" were so great, that he offered to give his support "to any Republican who
antagonizes it [rather] than to any Democrat who favors it." To that end, he blamed the
war in the Philippines on the perfidious conduct of the McKinley administration and its
failure to respect the liberty of native Filipinos. In deploying thousands of American
soldiers to the islands and forcibly crushing any resistance, what message had the
administration given to the Filipinos? What encouragement, Brewer continued, had we
offered for them to submit to American rule? The Civil War and Reconstruction provided
guidance for the nation in its present dilemma. Amidst loud applause, Brewer thundered:
For my part, I have lived under the lawless domination of aliens, and I
know what it means. They pillaged the States of the South for many years;
men who came among us as adventurers, with lust in their eyes, poverty in
their purses, and hell in their hearts. What better sort are we to give to a
civic government in the remote islands Mr. McKinley is so anxious to
conquer?"
Aside from a concern for native Filipinos, Brewer asserted that the current policy would
have a devastating effect on the people of the United States. The conquest of the
Philippines would come only after the loss of thousands of American lives and the
expenditure of millions of dollars. More important, it would forever alter the nature of the
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national government, entangle the country in foreign imbroglios, and lead to the moral and
racial degradation of the United States.56
The conclusions reached by Brewer in his speech before Congress held special
resonance for southerners. The memory of the Civil War and Reconstruction did prove
instructive. Within its powerful frame of reference, southerners understood the war in the
Philippines within the context of their own historical memory of an earlier conflict. At a
Memorial Day celebration held at the Confederate Memorial Cemetery in Atlanta,
Governor Allen Candler of Georgia presented his own thoughts about the government's
conduct in the Philippines. He praised southerners who served in the Spanish-American
War as soldiers who "fought not to promote the ambition of a crowned head.. . but for
the God given right of local self government." But Candler then blasted Republicans who
pursued a war of conquest against the Filipinos who wanted nothing more than to govern
themselves. The colonial war being pursued by McKinley denied the rights for which the
United States was founded, "and for which you fought as no men have fought in two
thousand years at Manassas and Shiloh, Gettysburg and Chickamauga." Republicans,
"drunk with [their] excesses of usurpation," are enslaving Filipinos for their own selfish
ends, without governmental representation, "just as they held you and taxed you in the
days of reconstruction."57
Bryan, and national Democratic leaders, continued to pound away at the issue of
imperialism throughout the summer of 1900. At their national convention in July, the
party declared in their platform that "imperialism was the paramount issue of the
campaign." Although Bryan continued to address the twin themes of silver and
imperialism on the stump, on August 8, before a crowd of fifty thousand people, he
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deviated from his standard presentation and delivered a speech exclusively on the subject
of imperialism. The speech, which later became a major campaign document, challenged
the administration's Philippines policy on economic, constitutional and moral grounds.
"The contest of 1900," Bryan declared, "is a contest between Democracy on the one hand
and plutocracy on the other." He attacked those who promoted the annexation of the
Philippines as a means of asserting America's commercial power for placing profit ahead
o f humanity. He also lashed out at those who directly benefited from the war and
expansion—army contractors, ship owners, and most of all, public officials. According to
his interpretation of the Constitution, the Philippines could not be held as a colony;
therefore, the army should evacuate the islands and prepare for the gradual extension of
local self-government. Finally, Bryan questioned the motives of those who clamored for
the creation of a large standing army for use in the Philippines. Most supporters of a large
military, he asserted, were Republicans closely aligned with the nation's business interests.
Bryan, like many southerners, feared that the real motive for the massive expansion of the
army was anathema to individual expression and liberty. Could it be, Bryan suggested,
that the Republicans sought an army for use to suppress domestic dissent? Or to disable
those who challenged the authority of the Republican party or the status quo? The
Democratic nominee even suggested that the Army built forts near large cities to
intimidate labor activists and other dissenters.58
Bryan's address condemning McKinley's Philippine policy received enthusiastic
support from most southerners. Except for a few goldbug newspapers and single-issue
silver independent papers, the regional press was effusive in its praise for Bryan's anti
imperialist stance. The editor of a Savannah newspaper praised "The Commoner" for
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making the issue of imperialism so clear to the average person. "The Philippine policy of
the Republican party is a mistake," he declared, "and should be abandoned at once."
Another southern editor asserted that Bryan had laid the issue before the American public
in such a way that it would be difficult for McKinley to justify his course of action in the
Pacific. During the election, he continued, "the people are not fools and know a snake
when they see its tail. They will not submit to imperialism." For some southerners, the
issue of imperialism appeared as important to the future of the nation and their region as
free silver. Given the tide of militarism that infected American institutions since the
Spanish-American War, some suggested that "the republic established by the fathers is in
peril."59
Although the issue of imperialism and the national election elicited little
commentary among southern white women, Rebecca Felton of Georgia urged the region's
women to use their moral suasion to influence mens' votes in the upcoming election.
Felton, a prominent Populist spokeswomen, condemned McKinley's policy of imperialism
as nothing more than a policy of "greed and usurpation" that threatened to destroy the
republican institutions of the United States The president's decision to wage war without
the consent of Congress, Felton maintained, established a dangerous precedent for the
government. In the future, the executive might ignore other powers reserved for the
legislative or judicial branches; in effect, the president could establish a monarchy.
According to Felton, many of the evils associated with Republican foreign policy resulted
from the party's close ties with big business. She blamed the architect of this relationship,
Senator Marcus Hanna, for promoting a war against Filipino rebels as a way to appease
key contributors from the commercial sector for their financial contributions to the party.
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"Hannaism," Felton affirmed, "means a more costly, bloody and prolonged war" in the
Pacific. The only way to prevent these men from plunging the nation into deeper trouble
was to vote them out of office.60
Republicans, on the other hand, sought to minimize the issue of imperialism and
close the distance between their party's position regarding the Philippines and that
advocated by Bryan. On the stump, McKinley and his supporters emphasized the
prosperity of the nation under McKinley and the gold standard and portrayed rebelling
Filipinos as inferior people who failed to respect the legal acquisition of the Philippines
from Spain. Characterizing Aguinaldo's forces as barbarous savages, Republicans asserted
that it was the United States' responsibility to take up "the white man's burden" and bring
civilization and good government to them. In other words, McKinley's party suggested
that the United States must prepare the people of the Philippines for self-government, by
force if necessary, and then extend that privilege to them when they were ready for it. In
many respects, this policy differed little from what Bryan advocated for the islands.
However, by failing to define what he meant by self-government, or providing a timetable
for its implementation, McKinley did not commit his administration or party to any
specific course of action. Finally, in speeches and in the Republican press, McKinley's
supporters challenged the patriotism of those who questioned the administration's policy in
the Philippines. By questioning the government's policy while American forces were in
combat in the Philippines was associated with giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
Bryan, Democrats, and the Anti-Imperialist League all placed the lives of American
soldiers in jeopardy by opposing the war effort. The anti-war movement, and those who
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favored abandoning the islands, provided moral support for Aguinaldo's forces and
encouragement for the rebels to continue their struggle even in the face of desperate odds.
In the final month before the presidential vote, Bryan backed away from
imperialism in favor of free silver as the "paramount issue" of the campaign. Republican
charges of Democratic treachery in prolonging the war and increasing the danger to
American soldiers compelled Bryan to focus less attention on foreign policy. Bryan also
understood southern Democrats' reluctance to engage in a national debate on the race
question. The Democratic party's reliance on the white majority of the South discouraged
their presidential candidate from appearing too determined in defense of "dark skinned
Filipinos." The hypocrisy of Democrats pleading for self-determination for Filipinos while
maintaining white supremacy in the South also weakened the party's ability to make
imperialism the central issue in the November election.61
The election of November 6, 1900, resulted in yet another resounding victory for
McKinley and the Republican party. While not a mandate for imperialism, the issue
probably served as a contributing factor to McKinley's increased margin of victory. By
wrapping his administration in the flag and associating his party with the army in the
Philippines, McKinley picked up additional support among recent party converts in the
Upper Mississippi Valley and the West Coast. For most Americans, the return of
economic prosperity served as a powerful antidote to Democratic charges that imperialism
threatened the survival of the Republic. Bryan, in failing to articulate a dramatically
different course of action in the Philippines, failed to elevate the issue of imperialism
beyond a battle of semantics. He, like McKinley, spoke of eventual self-determination for
the Filipinos; but he, unlike the president, would haul down the flag before demanding that
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the rebels respect and consent to American authority on the island. For many Americans,
especially those who already supported McKinley and the gold standard, the thought of
retreating from the Philippines while engaged in a military struggle with the native
population was simply unacceptable. National honor and international credibility, as the
Republicans stated in their platform and in public speeches, demanded the United States to
pacify the Filipinos and command their respect.62
Not surprisingly, Bryan carried every state of the former Confederacy by large
majorities. In seven of the eleven southern states, he increased his percentage of the
popular vote by an average of almost 3.5 percent over the election of 1896. Although the
issue of imperialism had less to do with Bryan's greater vote totals than did the absence of
an independent Populist candidate, the tone and content of southern public discourse
confirmed the South's sympathy with Biyan's stand against McKinley's foreign policy and
the war in the Philippines. Bryan's warnings of the evils of imperialism conformed with
their own fears and anxieties over the future course of a colonial foreign policy. As the
region most profoundly touched by the Civil War, and psychologically and emotionally
scarred by its aftermath, many southerners found it impossible to ignore the historical
parallels between the conduct of McKinley in the Pacific archipelago and Radical
Republicans during the age of Reconstruction. To many southerners, it appeared as
though Republicans had malevolent intentions in the islands that compelled them to
support a colonial war despite its high cost in lives and treasure.63
The rhetoric of the campaign and the presidential vote also indicated the failure of
the New South prophets to allay the region's fears of empire. Spokesmen for the New
South emphasized the economic possibilities offered by overseas expansion, including the
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annexation of the Philippines, for the nation and the South. Proponents of expansion
promised new markets for southern goods, especially iron, steel, and textiles, in Latin
America and Asia. With these new markets, the South would achieve unprecedented
economic prosperity and never have to face the problem of cotton overproduction and
crushing poverty. Despite its glowing promise, the New South vision failed to carry the
battle over imperialism in 1900. One historian, H. W. Brands suggested that the failure of
anti-imperialists resulted from the fact that "the perils they predicted lay beyond the
horizon of the present, a frontier often nearly impenetrable by political argumentation in
America." Yet in the South, the "perils they predicted" had precedent in America's recent
past. In the South, where the historical memory of the Civil War provided guidance for
the future, and the predicted perils of empire included a complication of the vexing race
question, the promise of the New South prophets seemed far more ephemeral than the
consequences of empire.64
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CHAPTER 7
THE SOUTH, THE ORIENT, AND THE CANAL:
THE TRIUMPH OF THE NEO-COLONIAL PERSPECTIVE

The question of finding profitable markets for
American cotton goods is one of supreme moment.
It is right here that the Nicaragua Canal opens up
possibilities so vast and so alluring. It is right here
that the Nicaragua Canal opens up po way which
that the mind pauses almost staggered before their
contemplation.
Sidney Story, 19001

It has always been insisted that the South was to be
especially benefitted by the canal, and now when it
seems that the president has adopted the course that
seems likely to give it to us in short order, the
Democrats rise up and oppose it. The people are
with the president on this question, and if the
Democrats adopt the plan suggested, they are going
to bring the party into ridicule and contempt. The
people want the canal and they want it the
quickest way possible, and this stuff about not being
fair to Columbia is the merest twaddle.
—Henry Sheffield, 19032
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Southerners did not find all of the foreign policy initiatives of the McKinley
administration as objectionable as the one pursued in the Philippines. As a forcible
annexation of an unwilling people, the Philippine War evoked among southerners the
unpleasant memory of Reconstruction. Many in the South feared the war in the Pacific
archipelago would prove the entering wedge of militarism and confer vast new powers
upon the executive branch. In the future, some southerners claimed, the American
government would rest on the fiat of a virtual monarch, not the will of the people. And
the military might necessary to seize and defend overseas territory might easily be turned
against American citizens. Finally, southerners questioned the wisdom of forcibly
annexing territoiy inhabited by non-white people. With their racist assumptions, southern
whites held a low opinion of Filipinos and other tropical peoples; their incorporation into
the American body politic, these southern racists argued, would only degrade American
democracy, complicate the race question and challenge white hegemony in the South.
Southern expansionists shared many of the anti-imperialist biases held by others in
their section. They, too, harbored racist assumptions about foreign peoples and feared any
dramatic expansion in the power of the federal government. Consequently, full-fledged
imperialists were rare in the South; most southerners sympathetic with the aims of the
McKinley administration's foreign policy emphasized commercial over territorial
expansion. Conquest of territory, they argued, was unnecessary to achieve the goals of
increased trade opportunities in Latin American or Asia. The superiority of American
products, culture and institutions would pry open markets overseas without having to
resort to military force to seize colonies. Neo-colonialism, therefore, was seen as a means
for the South to attain economic uplift without dangerously increasing the power of the
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military and executive branch and without seriously complicating the race question at
home.
*

*

*

The South's embrace of neo-colonialism, as well as its anxiety about employing
United States' troops abroad, became clear in its response to McKinley's policy toward
China. Japan's humiliating military defeat of China in 1895 exposed the weaknesses of the
government in Peking and led to direct intervention by European powers. In return for
compelling Japan to return seized territory in northern China, Russia, France and Germany
demanded economic concessions and exclusive "spheres of interest," which restricted
foreign access into the Chinese market. By 1899, with the Manchu government in Peking
virtually powerless to resist, parts o f China had been reduced to semi-colonies of the
European powers and Japan.
In the United States, Americans interested in protecting future trade with China,
especially import-export firms, producers of petroleum and railroad equipment, and a wide
range of speculators associated with Wall Street, demanded help from Washington. In
the South, the most adamant calls for protecting trade with China emerged from New
South promoters interested in finding new markets for the South's raw and manufactured
cotton goods. Led by the lobbying efforts' of the American Asiatic Association, organized
in 1898 to promote trade with Asia, the McKinley administration slowly formulated a
response to the carving up of China
In September of 1899, alarmed that American trade might be excluded from China
at a time when the United States enjoyed a significant territorial advantage in the Pacific as
a result of the war with Spain, Secretary of State John Hay sent notes to all of the major
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powers involved in China requesting that they preserve commercial equality for all nations
in any spheres of influence under their control. Hay asked each power to repudiate certain
forms of trade discrimination regarding treaty ports, customs duties, and railway and
harbor use fees in areas under their control. These so-called "Open Door notes" did not
mention special exclusivity arrangements in mining, railroad, and capital investments, they
merely urged equal commercial opportunity in China. The notes clearly represented the
administration's and the Sino-American business lobby's desire to protect the Chinese
market for American trade without specifically guaranteeing China's territorial
sovereignty.
The response of the major powers to Hay's notes was largely negative. Only Italy,
which did not even maintain a sphere of influence in China, endorsed the concept of the
Open Door. The remaining powers issued evasive and ambiguous statements indicating
their support for the principle of commercial equality under certain conditions.
Nonetheless, in May of 1900, Hay publicly announced that the foreign powers had given
him definitive assurances of support for the Open Door and left the American people with
the impression that his diplomacy had protected American commerce and prevented the
destruction of China by hostile powers.
Shortly after Hay's announcement, a violent nativist uprising in China threatened to
provoke large-scale military intervention by the European powers and the further
partitioning of China. In June, thousands of Chinese belonging to a secret society named
the Boxers assaulted communities that contained Western missions. Boxer attacks against
Western targets culminated with an assault on Peking, where they laid siege to the foreign
legation. The crisis in Peking created concern in Washington that the foreign powers
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might use the incident to extract additional concessions from the Chinese government or
to enlarge their spheres of influence. In response, Hay issued a circular to the parties
involved urging them to preserve China's territorial integrity after the rebellion was
crushed. At the same time, the Administration dispatched approximately 2,000 United
States marines from the Philippines to aid in the rescue of Westerners trapped in Peking.
America's military presence in China, Hay believed, would curb the land-grabbing desires
of other powers and give the United States a negotiating presence once the siege was
lifted. By the end of August, after an overland march from the port city of Tientsin,
Western forces entered Peking, lifted the siege and crushed the remnants of the rebellion.3
The McKinley administration's China policy, especially the Open Door initiative,
received considerable support in the South. Coming as it did on the heels of massive
United States intervention in the Philippines, Hay's notes comforted some in the South
who feared the Administration's drift toward imperialism and militarism. For most
southerners, Hay's response to events in China represented a pragmatic search for a means
to protect America's commercial opportunities there without becoming involved in another
military quagmire in Asia. By emphasizing the United States' concern for markets in
China while specifically renouncing territorial aggrandizement, Hay deftly united many
anti-imperialists and imperialists in a common cause. In the South, Hay found a broad
consensus in support of his policies. They received support from many New South
prophets, large producers of raw cotton, manufacturers of textiles, iron and steel, and
others involved in foreign commerce, as well as many who had consistently opposed most
elements of McKinley's "large policy" of overseas expansion. The editor of the Memphis
Commercial Appeal spoke for many southerners when he praised the president for

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

236

"pursuing the best course left open to him" in China. The Open Door, the editor claimed,
would allow our people to trade with the Chinese without controlling them.4
Other southern newspapers and journals supported the policy of the Open Door.
Some not only informed the public about the aims of Hay's policy, but sought to enlarge
the Open Door constituency by championing it. These editorials and reports, written by
New South proponents and influenced by the southern textile industry, often exaggerated
the importance of the Chinese trade to the economic health of the South. An article in
Dixie, one of the leading journals of southern industry, made the claim that "the enormous
development of Southern cotton factories has been largely due to the trade opened with
China." In an appeal tailored to create sympathy among the southern masses, the article
further proclaimed, "The men, women and children who have been brought from the
mountains, and from impoverished fields, to work profitably and successfully in cotton
mills in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama, have become dependent
for their daily bread upon the sale of the product of those mills to the Oriental millions.
They will hardly approve a policy of our government which will tamely surrender the
market upon which they are dependent for their daily support."5
Other editors placed the Chinese question in the context of the New South
prophets' vision of future economic uplift through increased overseas trade. According to
them, keeping the Chinese market open for American goods complimented the southern
goal of building an isthmian canal to facilitate the exchange of southern goods and to shift
the nation's foreign commerce southward to ports along the Gulf of Mexico and the
South Atlantic. To fulfill this vision, "it should be the aim of Southern statesmen to
prevent. .. the partitioning of China." The failure of American diplomacy to maintain
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open markets and Chinese sovereignty, many southerners suggested, would do serious
harm to southern people and industries. "[Our] interest in the construction of the isthmian
canal," a Georgia editor affirmed, "would be minimized. English and German spinners
would hold the advantages they now enjoy as against the American mills." Nonetheless,
the editor emphatically proclaimed, "Our whole purpose should be, not to acquire territory
but to conserve our trade."6
McKinley's decision to send marines to rescue the foreign legation in Peking
alarmed southerners who feared the move represented a retreat from neo-colonialism.
Their support for the use of force in China, therefore, rested on the strict assurances of
McKinley that their mission in China would be strictly limited to breaking the siege in
Peking. Such a move appeared acceptable to most in the South because of the presence of
many American missionaries, businessmen and foreign service personnel in the Ancient
City. Some southerners also hoped that American participation in the relief expedition
might prevent other foreign powers from using the incident to close the Open Door and
completely dismember the rest of China. With American marines as a part of the allied
force, many southerners reasoned, the other foreign powers would be more reluctant to
press the Chinese government for additional territorial or economic concessions. Jabez
Curry, a leading New South educator who promoted greater commercial opportunities for
the region, praised McKinley and Hay for their handling of the European powers during
the Boxer affair. In a letter to his son, the elder Curry commended the Administration's
pragmatism in balancing the high-minded rhetoric associated with Hay's circular letter
demanding guarantees for China's sovereignty with a commitment to send United States'
troops to the Orient on a qualified basis so the United States was not "left in the cold in
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the final partition of the sick man's estate." Secretary of State Hay, Curry concluded,
"acted with discretion and showed considerable diplomatic ability."7
In August, after the liberation of the foreign legation in Peking, most southerners
demanded the withdrawal of American forces. By rescuing foreign ministers and
missionaries, they argued, the chief aim of the expeditionary force had been accomplished.
The participation of American marines in the relief effort and the diplomacy of Secretary
of State Hay indicated the importance of China and free markets for American goods to
the rest of the world. Interested parties in the South recognized that the United States had
earned considerable good will with the Chinese government as a result of its words and
actions during the Boxer Rebellion and did not want to jeopardize that relationship with a
prolonged military presence. Given the favorable position held by the United States in
China, one southerner suggested, "we should be extremely careful not to become
entangled in any of the schemes of the other powers for acquiring territory." A rural
editor, mindful of the jealousies and intrigues of other powers in China also warned
against further American involvement in the Asian country. Instead, he advised,
"American troops should be withdrawn as speedily as they were sent there. We have
enough on our hands in the Philippines without buying or snatching more trouble in the
Flowery Kingdom."8
No group of southerners watched events in China as closely as those associated
with the region's textile industry. Although the volume of total trade between the United
States and China was minuscule compared to that with European nations, American
cotton goods exports to China had grown dramatically in the 1880's and 1890's as Chinese
consumers showed a preference for the coarser cotton goods produced in American mills
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over more expensive types of British textiles. Southern textile mills benefited from the
increased volume of trade with China and lobbied to protect and expand the dominance of
American textiles in the China market. In January of 1901, some of the leading cotton
goods manufacturers in the South signed a resolution "expressing their approval of the
action of the United States Government in the protection of American interests in China,
known as the "open-door" policy." The signatories of the resolution emphasized the
importance of the China market not only for the manufacturers of cotton goods, but for
"the Southern planter and cotton grower... and the thousands of employees and laboring
classes who are engaged in cotton mills...." The resolution, signed by representatives of
forty-six southern cotton mills with capital investments of almost $16 million, was
forwarded to the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to demonstrate not only
their keen interest in the open door policy toward China but to urge the administration to
pursue greater access to markets in Central and South America.9
Southern enthusiasm over the possibilities of trade with China and support for the
Open Door partially reflected the extent of the public's faith in New South promoters'
vision of the future and the depth of their own economic despair. The chronic poverty of
the South, and the crippling effects of the 1893 depression, made the South more
sympathetic toward those who championed economic panaceas that did not threaten the
deeply-held social and cultural beliefs of the white majority. For New South promoters,
the case of China presented no special difficulties because the administration's policies
provoked few serious discussions of territorial acquisition and its associated problems. As
a result, the prospect of increasing trade with China became a popular goal of New South
promoters and the mass public alike. Although southern enthusiasm over trade with China
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far overshadowed commercial realities, the allure of a potential market of four hundred
million Chinese purchasing southern textiles and manufactured goods formed an important
component of the New South's economic vision.
The South's neo-colonial consensus in foreign policy was best demonstrated by the
region's persistent support for an isthmian canal. For most southerners, especially the
New South prophets, an American-built canal across the isthmus of Central America
would produce an economic boom in their region without challenging any of the South's
beliefs and values. Because southerners believed a canal would be of special benefit to
their region, many advocates of a canal in the South attacked opponents of the project as
sectional or partisan obstructionists. The foremost proponent of the canal, Alabama
Senator John T. Morgan, consistently championed it as vital to the nation's economic well
being and security as well as emphasized the project's special benefits to the South. The
completion of the canal, Morgan believed, would make the New South the center for
exporting the nation's trade and influence around the globe. In addition, it would provide
new markets for the South's agricultural products and stimulate industrial growth. While
stopping short of proclaiming the canal an economic panacea, Morgan clearly portrayed it
as the South's best hope for prosperity Morgan's persistent support for a canal, observed
historian 0. Lawrence Burnette, J r , resulted partially from a feeling of southern
inferiority. Morgan viewed the South as an economic and political dependency of the
North. Opponents of the canal, therefore, desired to employ the federal government as a
tool to perpetuate the South's inferiority within the Union by blocking the one measure
that would restore some semblance of economic and political parity.10
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Morgan was not alone in viewing the canal question in terms of historic sectional
antagonism. The failure to build a canal was often blamed on the federal government's
bias toward northern interests and the Republican party's cozy relationship with financial
interests that opposed an isthmian canal. The federal government, one Georgian observed,
should ignore selfish economic and partisan interests and proceed with the construction of
the canal for the good of the nation. The people of all sections would gladly support a
canal whether initiated by Republicans or Democrats for "it is the greatest undertaking of
the times and will be an event that will signalize any administration that inaugurates the
work." Construction of the canal was also seen as a way for the Republican
administration of William McKinley to reward the South for its support during the
Spanish-American War and further promote sectional reconciliation. Because the South
had accrued few direct benefits as a result of the war, some argued, construction of the
canal would equalize federal largesse. A Birmingham editor, after touting the canal's
benefits for southern industry and agriculture, concluded, "The completion of the
Nicaragua canal would equalize governmental benefits. At present the disbursements and
privileges of the federal power favor one section, but the building of the canal would give
all sections of the south advantages that would go far to equalize federal power."11
Because the South had always been in the vanguard on the canal issue, some
southerners accused special interests in the North for delaying the construction of the
canal for sectional and economic reasons. The railroads, as an industry which already had
a poor reputation among the South's farmers, were often blamed for blocking plans to
build a canal in order to protect their profits. The nation's largest railroad and shipping
concerns generally transported goods longitudinally for export from ports in the North and
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East to markets overseas. The construction of a canal, some southerners argued, would
place southern ports in closer proximity to most foreign markets and, thus, produce a
readjustment of domestic export products southward. According to one Arkansas editor,
"One reason for their [northern] opposition to the canal was because it was a measure that
tended to benefit the people of the South." Although an extreme view, some southern
critics of the canal's opponents accused northern special interests of blocking the canal
because they viewed the possibility of the South's economic rebirth as a direct threat to
northern economic hegemony.12
Many southerners, especially the New South prophets, continued lobbying in
support of a canal after the Spanish- American War for economic reasons. They realized
that the cost of transporting their goods to markets along the Pacific coast of the United
States, Central and South America, and Asia, would be greatly reduced and provide a
competitive advantage for southern products. So, too, would a canal allow southern
goods to reach markets in a more timely fashion. Southern farmers and manufacturers
alike, southern advocates of a canal proclaimed, would reap huge economic benefits from
the construction of a canal. Finally, New South prophets and the commercial class
predicted the completion of the canal would alter the existing trade patterns for both
domestic and foreign commerce away from ports in the Northeast toward ports in the
South. Given their proximity to an isthmian canal, southern ports expected an enormous
increase in the volume of imports and exports handled at Galveston, New Orleans, Mobile,
Pensacola, Savannah, and other southern ports.13
New South prophets and other regional supporters of a canal benefited greatly
from heightened concern for national security after the Spanish-American War. An

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

243

isthmian canal would shorten lines of communication between the United States and its
newly acquired territories in the Pacific and facilitate the defense of possessions in both the
Atlantic and the Pacific without necessitating the construction of a two ocean navy.
During the war, the sixty-seven day voyage of the U.S. S. Oregon from Puget Sound to the
Caribbean had captured the public imagination and underscored the difficulty of
transferring naval power in the absence of a canal. The Oregon's trip, canal proponents
claimed, would have been reduced by two-thirds, from 12,000 miles to 4,000 miles had a
canal existed. With widespread support in the administration, and among the American
public, building a canal became a popular national cause by 1899.14
After the election of 1900, southern advocates of a canal continued to emphasize
the economic benefits that would accrue to the nation, and especially the South, from the
construction of an isthmian canal. Since the Republican Platform endorsed the "speedy
construction of an isthmian canal," and the Administration had taken diplomatic steps to
secure the necessary legal rights to build a canal along the Nicaraguan route, the reelection of McKinley did not appear to jeopardize the crusade for a canal. To be sure,
many southerners condemned the election results and the sum of McKinley's foreign policy
accomplishments as representing the "Republican tendency towards centralization and
empire." Nevertheless, most southern Democrats continued to support neo-colonial
policies for the peaceful expansion of trade without expanding the nation's permanent
military establishment, raising taxes, creating an imperial bureaucracy, or "inviting foreign
complications and the acquisition of distant territory...." Unfazed by the election, New
South proponents and commercial interests continued their efforts to promote the cause of
the canal as the best means to promote industrial activity and economic uplift for the
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South. After the completion of the canal, a Louisiana editor boldly predicted "that the
Southern States [would] become a veritable bee-hive of human industry and activity; that
its commerce and its manufacturers will eventually dominate the Western world."15
In the months before the new Congress began its discussions of the canal question,
southern business leaders redoubled their efforts to impress upon southern legislators the
importance o f an isthmian canal for the economic future of their region. They urged
Congressmen to avoid partisan wrangling on the subject and to act quickly to obtain land
and money for the construction of a canal. Although implicitly non-partisan, for their chief
aim was to secure the construction of a canal, the rhetoric of members of southern
Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade revealed frustration and anger at
Republicans' failures to pass earlier resolutions by Alabama's Democratic Senator John T.
Morgan. Republicans, they suggested, desired to undermine Morgan's position as the
"father of the Nicaraguan Canal project" for partisan reasons; they chafed at the
Democratic Senator's ability to appear out ahead of public opinion on the canal question.
Nonetheless, southern business leaders spent little time blaming those who they perceived
to be obstructionists and preferred to lobby and influence those members whom they
believed could secure the ultimate passage of a canal bill.16
In December of 1900, the Southern Industrial Convention, one of the largest
business organizations in the South, gathered in New Orleans for its semi-annual
discussion of common concerns among the region's business interests. The five day
meeting attracted hundreds of delegates from every southern state, as well as delegates
from the Ohio Valley, Middle West and California. During the proceedings, numerous
speakers spoke on behalf of the Nicaraguan Canal Bill, expected to be considered during
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the upcoming congressional session. Sidney Story of New Orleans, an officer in the
organization, proclaimed the canal question the most important issue facing the country.
He noted that Americans' interest in a canal dated back over one hundred years, yet it had
failed to materialize. After praising the Administration and the Senate for its negotiations
with Great Britain providing legal access to the Nicaragua route, Story urged Congress to
reject the arguments of the American Trans-Continental Railroads and move forward with
the construction of an isthmian waterway. After the completion of the canal, he predicted
the commerce of the nation would flow from southern ports and that "New Orleans, 700
miles nearer the eastern terminus of the Canal than New York... will control untold
advantages." Remarking on the spectacular growth of the southern textile industry during
the previous twenty years, Story concluded,
The question of finding profitable markets for American cotton goods is
one of supreme moment. It is right here that the Nicaragua Canal opens up
possibilities so vast and so alluring that the mind pauses almost staggered
before their contemplation.17
Other speakers at the convention sounded the familiar arguments for building the
Nicaraguan Canal. Former Confederate General John B. Gordon of Georgia, in his role as
a New South spokesman and businessman, proclaimed that the South looked "with
palpitating heart toward the boundless Orient as an outlet for her great staple—she wants
the Nicaragua canal connecting the Eastern and Western ocean." Gordon then praised the
Administration's Open Door policy toward China; he believed it offered opportunities for
southern farmers and businessmen alike. In the future, Gordon suggested, the United
States should recognize the lessons of the Open Door and use American diplomacy and
economic power to pry open overseas markets without resorang to force. Other
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speakers, including regional business leaders and academics, spoke in support of a canal as
an instrument to promote greater industrialization and economic diversification in the
South. For New South promoters, who viewed the construction of a canal as an integral
part of the region's economic uplift, those who opposed the canal project effectively acted
"to keep caravans of progress from entering our midst to dump their loads of wealth into
our laps for generations to come."18
In a massive show of support for the Nicaragua Canal bill, the delegates to the
Southern Industrial Convention unanimously passed a resolution calling for a memorial to
be sent to the United States Senate. The petition first reminded senators that business
representatives from nineteen states had come to New Orleans for the convention and had
dedicated much of their time to discussing the canal question. The delegates' unanimous
support for the canal, the memorial continued, stemmed from their belief that no measure
currently pending in Congress "could benefit our mining, manufacturing and agricultural
interests in a greater degree, than by aiding in the cheapening of the cost of transporting
their products to markets. The building of this [Nicaraguan] canal is to-day the most
important factor looking to the benefit of our producers in all branches of industrial
pursuits." The convention's delegates, claiming to speak on behalf of the whole people,
urged the Senate and the entire Congress to take up the measure of the canal at the
earliest possible date as the best means to improve the material interests of the entire
nation.19
Responding both to public pressure and the determination of key members,
Congress resumed its discussion of the canal question in December of 1900. Much of the
debate during this session focused on the question of the best possible location for an
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isthmian canal. For over a decade, John T. Morgan had urged construction of a canal
across Nicaragua to take advantage of a large natural lake, Lake Nicaragua, that spanned
much of the isthmus. A Nicaraguan route, moreover, was closer to major American ports,
especially those in the South, and would more dramatically cut transportation costs and
travel time than canal projects proposed further down the isthmus. Morgan's plans
received an important endorsement from the findings of the Walker Commission, an
official body created by Congress to study the canal question. Its preliminary report
reiterated the enormous benefits to American commerce offered by any isthmian canal, but
after assessing costs and benefits, proclaimed the Nicaraguan route preferable. A canal in
Nicaragua, the body determined, would greatly reduce distances traveled between
American ports on the east coast with ports on the west coast and in the Pacific.
Furthermore, by the time the United States acquired territory in Panama, and purchased
the remains of the French New Panama Canal Corporation, the costs of completing either
a Nicaraguan canal or a Panama canal were almost identical. In addition, the Walker
Commission indicated that the New Panama Canal Corporation had shown no disposition
to sell its rights and assets in Panama for fair market value, making the estimated cost of a
Panama canal difficult to estimate In the final analysis, based on the legal difficulties
posed by acquiring the New Panama Canal Corporation, the commission recommended
Nicaragua "as the most feasible route m2u
Despite the endorsement of the Walker Commission, treaty obligations with Great
Britain prevented immediate congressional action. Negotiations between Secretary of
State Hay and the British Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, had resulted in the first HayPauncefote Treaty of 1900. Under the provisions of the treaty, Great Britain renounced
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its rights to joint ownership or control of an isthmian canal with the United States as
provided by the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. In return for the exclusive
right to build, own and operate a canal, however, the United States agreed to guarantee
the neutrality of the waterway and not to build any fortifications in the canal zone. When
the provision forbidding the United States from fortifying the canal zone became public,
opposition to the treaty developed and stalled action on the canal question. When finally
approved in December of 1900, the Senate offered three amendments to the original
treaty's provisions. These dealt primarily with the stipulations prohibiting the fortification
of the canal zone. Initially, Great Britain ignored the Senate's objections, but vexing
foreign policy problems in South Africa and on the continent of Europe made good
relations with the United States a diplomatic imperative. After months of negotiations
between London and Washington, Hay and Pauncefote signed a new agreement in
November of 1901 abrogating the restrictions of Clayton-Bulwer and giving the United
States complete freedom to build, own and defend an isthmian canal. With the major
diplomatic obstacle out of the way, and with the blessing of the official canal commission
and important leaders in Congress, the House, by unanimous consent placed a bill
authorizing the immediate construction of a canal in Nicaragua on the legislative calendar
for consideration after the Christmas recess.21
Most southerners welcomed the news of the second Hay-Pauncefote agreement
and the sentiments of congressional leaders as powerful indicators that construction on a
canal would begin immediately. Debate in Congress, they assumed, would be perfunctory
and quickly lead to the passage of a bill authorizing the purchase of territory from
Nicaragua to begin construction of the canal. With the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer
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Treaty, a southern editor remarked, "nothing will stand in the way. . . . The necessary
legislation for [that] purpose should be completed before the adjournment of congress."
According to many New South spokesmen, no other foreign policy issue was as important
to the economic uplift of the South as the immediate American construction of a canal.
"There is no prospective feature of commercial and national import more conspicuous or
important than the construction of the isthmian canal," observed the editor of the Little
Rock Arkansas Gazette. "There is no enterprise more essential to the advancement of
commercial and national interests than the proposed Nicaragua canal, and particularly to
the southern half of the United States."22
The region's greatest naval hero from the Spanish-American War joined in the
chorus supporting the immediate construction of a canal in Nicaragua. At the PanAmerican Exposition in Buffalo, Richmond P. Hobson delivered an address that echoed
many of the teachings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose monumental work The Influence of
Sea Power Upon History influenced generations of naval officers and policymakers alike.
Hobson, like Mahan, made the case for a powerful navy as the best defender of America's
sovereignty and commercial rights abroad. Naval power, he stated, "had exerted a
profound and determining influence upon the struggles of races and nations, for
prosperity, for greatness, and for life itself." Now, Hobson argued, with the United States
ascending among the ranks of world powers, and its commerce increasing at a remarkable
rate, an isthmian canal had become even more important to the national defense and to
continued prosperity. Aside from the question of the canal and commerce, Hobson
defended the idea of a large navy as a more economical way to provide for the national
defense than a large standing army.
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To allay the fears of many southerners and other critics of imperialism, the
Alabaman suggested that a rapid naval build-up would be relatively inexpensive and
require fewer additional personnel than the army. "Indeed," Hobson proclaimed, "naval
personnel would remain so few that there can be no possible apprehension of militarism."
And, of course, the naval forces required to defend the United States could be further
reduced with the construction of a canal. It is impossible to isolate the source of Hobson's
anxiety about a large standing army. As a naval officer, his remarks could have reflected
prejudice against another branch of the armed forces that competed with the navy for
available resources. More likely, however, Hobson's speech reflected his desire for the
United States, and the South, to prosper economically in an age of great power conflict
without challenging deeply-held ideas and values about the nature of the American
Republic. As a southerner, Hobson was acutely aware of his region's fears and anxieties
regarding the expansion of the army and the annexation of overseas territories; his
proposals provided a means to attain economic uplift without again embroiling the United
States in a national debate over vexing foreign policy questions.24
When Congress reconvened in January of 1902, the odds that a canal bill would be
passed seemed certain. The assassination of William McKinley and the elevation of
Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency placed an even more ardent supporters of a canal in
the White House. On January 7, 1902, as John Tyler Morgan lowered the gavel to begin
discussions of the canal bill, he did so with exuberance and a feeling of deep personal
satisfaction. The senator from Alabama, who had dedicated much of his life in the senate
to building an isthmian canal for the benefit of the nation, and especially the South,
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appeared on the brink of success. For Morgan, the time of public adulation for "the father
of the Nicaraguan Canal" was at hand.25
In the House, southern representatives played a prominent role in championing the
cause of the Nicaraguan Canal project. Over several days in early January, their speeches
discussed the merits of a House measure "to provide for the construction of a canal
connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans" and authorizing the President to
take all necessary steps to secure the necessary legal arrangements with Nicaragua.
Southern members, although careful to point out the commercial and strategic benefits to
the nation, emphasized the importance of the canal project to their region's economic
future. William Richardson, of Huntsville, Alabama, claimed that the progressive spirit of
the South over the past decade had made it one of the world's chief producers of textiles,
almost exceeding the production of northern mills. Given the completion of a canal, he
speculated, the region's great stores of iron, ore, coal, timber and agricultural commodities
such as rice, oats, tobacco, cotton and com would elevate the South from poverty and
make it one of the world's great sources of wealth. For too long, Richardson contended,
southern goods were handicapped in foreign trade, especially with Asia, because of high
transportation costs. What the South today wants, Richardson stated, "was increased
commerce and trade. Give us the Nicaraguan Canal and our just share of the trade of the
Orient, and twenty, yea thirty million bales of cotton in the South will not be a surplus,
and 5-cent cotton will become a memory of the past, while 12-cent cotton will come to
stay."26
Congressman Henry Gibson, of Knoxville, Tennessee, echoed Richardson's
support of the canal bill and noted the great public outcry for immediate congressional
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action. "The newspapers.. . and the magazines have contained elaborate essays upon the
subject," and they are unanimous in support of an isthmian canal. For commercial and
strategic reasons, Gibson maintained, the public and the press demanded that the United
States to begin construction on a canal. The question today, Gibson averred, when
confronted by facts, figures and the overwhelming support of the public, was "whether we
shall stand up like men, like American citizens, like people of progressive ideas, like
statesman who can forecast [the future], and do the duty which we owe not only to the
present generation of our countrymen, but to all the generations yet to come." Or would
Congress, pressured by the lobbying efforts of the transcontinental railroad and the
speculators and stockholders associated with the rival New Panama Canal Corporation to
select the Panamanian route, continue to delay until the body resembled the ass "who saw
two stacks of hay-one on the right hand and one on the left—the two seeming equally
desirable; and, not knowing which to choose, stood in his tracks and died in starvation
within reach of both." To Gibson, and other southern supporters of the canal in
Nicaragua, the time for delays had passed. At the conclusion of debate on the canal bill on
January 9, the House voted 308 to 2 in favor of passage. After two canal commission
reports had recommended the Nicaraguan route, and the passage of the Nicaraguan Canal
bill in the House, only the feverish lobbying efforts of those who stood to gain financially
from the selection of the Panama route stood in the way of the final approval of the
measure in the Senate.27
The efforts of lobbyists for the New Panama Canal Corporation to have Congress
select their route over the Nicaraguan route are unparalleled in the annals of American
politics. Stockholders of the corporation, which owned the exclusive right to build a canal
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across Panama, feared a complete loss of their investment if the United States selected the
canal route in Nicaragua. Although the corporation had made little progress toward
completing a canal, and much of their machinery lay rotting and rusting in the tropical
jungles of Panama, stockholders demanded over $100 million in return for their assets and
franchise rights when approached by the Walker Canal Commission in 1901. Sensing a
complete loss for their stockholders as Congress embraced the Nicaragua route, the New
Panama Canal Corporation hired the services of a powerful New York lawyer and
lobbyist, William Nelson Cromwell, to launch a campaign to salvage the Panama route.
Cromwell, along with one of the corporation's largest stockholders, Philippe BunauVarilla, launched a relentless fight to persuade Congress to approve of the Panama route
and purchase the assets of the New Panama Canal Corporation. In addition, in response
to the passage of the Nicaragua Canal bill in the House, the corporation quickly lowered
the asking price for its assets to $40 million.28
Rather than marking a session of great legislative accomplishment, and the
crowning moment of his public life in the Senate, Morgan found Senate debate in 1902 to
be tiresome and discouraging. The efforts of the New Panama Canal Company to find
political allies in Washington proved successful and thwarted Morgan's plans to speed a
Nicaraguan Canal bill through the Senate. After winning the support of the powerful Ohio
Senator Marcus Hanna, the New Panama Canal Company employed his influence with the
president to convince Theodore Roosevelt to support the Panama route. On January 19,
1902, acting as the agent of the administration, Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin
offered an amendment to the Hepburn Nicaragua Canal bill that authorized the president
to pay not more than $40 million for the holdings of the New Panama Canal Company and
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to begin construction of a canal through Panama at the earliest possible date. If the
president could not arrive at satisfactory terms with either the New Panama Canal
Company or the government of Columbia, which exercised sovereignty over Panama, he
was then to proceed with the canal project in Nicaragua.
Despite the near unanimous approval of the Hepburn Act in the House in January,
the Senate fight over canal routes lasted another six months. Morgan soon realized that
his past support for Republican foreign policy objectives did not assure him of the
administration's support for his chief legislative goal. By persuading key Republicans to
vote for the Panama route, the New Panama Canal Company introduced a strong element
of partisanship into the debate. Republican leaders and the president appeared
uncomfortable with the thought of having a southern Democrat emerge as the "father of
the canal." More important, however, during Senate debate the practical advantages of
the Panama route became clear; the Walker Canal Commission, analyzing the data with
the purchase of the assets of the New Panama Canal Company for $40 million (instead of
the $110 million that was originally demanded), revised its earlier findings and
recommended the Panama route. Panama, the commission concluded, offered fewer
engineering obstacles, provided for a shorter route, and would cost approximately $5 to 6
million less to construct.29
Aware that he was losing the battle for the Nicaraguan route, Morgan made a final
appeal to the public and his colleagues In an article published in the May edition of the
North American Review, the Alabama senator reiterated his familiar arguments for the
Nicaraguan route. A canal in Nicaragua, he stated, would provide greater advantages to
American commerce because it was the shorter route between the eastern and western
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coasts of the United States. Perhaps reflecting his desperation, he also attacked the
character of the inhabitants of Panama as being "people of a low order" who lacked
industry and agriculture. These people, Morgan claimed, would create serious problems
for the United States in extending its sovereignty and establishing law and order in a canal
zone in Panama. Nicaragua, on the other hand, was more sparsely settled and would,
therefore, cost less to defend against native uprisings. Morgan then proclaimed that
Nicaragua had a more healthful climate; Panama as the "dead centre of barometric
pressure" had an "infected atmosphere" that made deadly fevers more widespread.
Despite his objections, Morgan stated that he would agree to the Panama Canal project if
Columbia agreed to grant the United States a perpetual lease to a canal zone in Panama.30
Beginning on June 5, the Senate spent the better part of two weeks debating the
best possible route for an isthmian canal. Speaking in support of the majority report that
endorsed the Nicaraguan route were key Democrats, including John Morgan and the
junior senator from Alabama, Edmund Pettus. Several Republicans, led by Hanna and
Spooner, spoke for the minority report endorsing the Panama route. On the afternoon of
June 19, debate ended and a vote was taken. By the narrow margin of eight votes, the
minority report was approved, 42 to 34. The vote was extremely partisan with Democrats
providing most of the opposition to the minority report. Among southern senators who
cast votes, only one, Jeter Pritchard, a Republican from North Carolina voted for the
Spooner Act. Thirteen other southerners voted against the measure. Historian, Edward
Chester has suggested that the vote on the Spooner Act reflected southerners' concerns
with Roosevelt's aggressive foreign policy style. More likely, however, southern members
voted out of loyalty to their party and out of a strong sense of personal allegiance to John
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Morgan. In subsequent votes, southern members appeared far less willing to obstruct
plans to build an isthmian canal even if it did bear the stamp of the Republican Party.31
Although there was some disappointment in the South over the selection of the
Panama route, most southerners expressed satisfaction that the prospects for the
immediate construction of an isthmian canal appeared more certain. Throughout
congressional debates over the selection of a route, southerners remained more concerned
over the early construction of a canal rather than its location. In this regard, Alabama's
Senator John Morgan misread his region's commitment to the Nicaraguan Canal project.
City leaders in New Orleans, the South's chief commercial center, were delighted with the
actions of Congress. With the construction of a canal appearing imminent, they
anticipated the Crescent City would become the leading port of access to the canal given
its proximity to the isthmus. Business leaders in New Orleans campaigned to make their
city a railroad hub linking interior cities such as Memphis, St. Louis, and Chicago to the
canal via the port of New Orleans. Other southerners were also pleased by the idea of a
Panama Canal and predicted enormous economic benefits for the entire South after its
completion. In November of 1902, Dr. W. C. Stubbs, the director of the Audubon Sugar
School in New Orleans, addressed the annual southern Banker's Convention on the subject
of the economic future of New Orleans and the South. "Our agriculture, interwoven with
other industrial activities, have created a system whose present achievement challenges the
admiration of the world, and almost bewilders the imagination in its possibilities of wealthmaking and power. Our greatness and commercial grandeur," Stubbs concluded," will be
given a large impetus by the completion of the canal."32
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As stipulated by the provisions of the Spooner Act, President Roosevelt and
Secretary of State Hay opened negotiations with the government of Columbia to secure
the right to build a canal across the isthmus of Panama. After months of long, grueling
discussions in January of 1903, the two sides agreed to a plan that provided the United
States with a 99-year lease on a six-miie-wide strip of land in Panama. To compensate
Columbia for this territorial concession, the United States would pay Columbia $10
million upon execution of the treaty and an additional $250,000 annually during the life of
the agreement. The accord reached between Washington and Columbia, entitled the HayHerran Convention, was presented to the Senate in late January to generally favorable
comments. The provisions of the treaty were straightforward; it had been produced by
months of serious negotiations between the two parties. Despite the persistent opposition
of Morgan, the treaty was ratified on March 17 with only five dissenting votes. Among
those casting votes against the Hay-Herran Treaty were four southerners, including John
T. Morgan. The fact that the majority of the South's senators approved the measure
confirmed the importance of the canal project to the region regardless of route or party
sponsorship.33
In the next few months, reports of debate in the Columbian Congress regarding the
Hay-Herran Treaty indicated considerable hostility to the agreement. Many Columbian
legislators suggested that Herran had sold out Panama for a pittance; the annual payments
of $250,000 as specified by the treaty merely equaled the revenue Columbia received
annually from the Panama Railroad Company. Given the value and importance of the
project to American and global commerce, Columbians believed, they should be
compensated more than $10 million for surrendering sovereignty in a canal zone. Within a
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few months of its passage in the United States Senate, it was clear that the Hay-Herran
agreement was in serious trouble in Bogota.
Many southerners condemned the Columbian government for delaying ratification
of the treaty. Canal supporters had waited long enough for construction of an Americanbuilt canal and vented their anger toward Bogota. Southerners generally accepted the
terms of the Hay-Herran Treaty as honestly negotiated and expected Columbia to abide by
its part of the bargain. They also considered the financial and territorial arrangements to
be fair to Columbia. Delays by the Columbian government were seen as a stalling tactic to
extract additional money from the United States. "Columbia," one Louisiana editor
remarked, "will hold out for $40,000,000 for that little strip of land needed in the
construction of the Panama canal." Rather than suffer through additional delays, the
United States should make Columbia understand "that we could lick them and take the
whole country away from them cheaper than that." Although few southerners openly
advocated a war of conquest in Panama, the comments of the Louisianian reflected the
common anger and frustration with Columbia's delays.34
In August, to no one's surprise, the Columbian Senate unanimously rejected the
treaty and sent the Roosevelt administration scrambling for options. Irate over Columbia's
rejection of the treaty, Theodore Roosevelt and his chief advisers contemplated seizing the
isthmus and building the canal without the consent of the Columbian government. Such
an act, he realized, would violate international law and bring condemnation from other
major powers. Bunau-Varilla, of the New Panama Canal Company, approached Hay with
a possible solution to the Administration's dilemma. With the tacit approval of the United
States, Bunau-Varilla and his company could offer financial and military assistance to
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native Panamanians eager to rebel against the government in Bogota. Roosevelt and Hay,
aware of reports from military reconnaissance personnel in Panama, understood that the
native population was seething with discontent. When confronted by Bunau-Varilla's
offer, they indicated their interest in an independent Panama but refused to offer direct
assistance. On November 3, 1903, a group of approximately three hundred men rebelled
against the Columbian government, seized the provincial capital at Colon, and declared the
independence of the Republic of Panama. Within a few days of the rebellion, the United
States officially recognized the new nation and resumed plans for the construction of the
canal.35
The timing of the Panama rebellion and the Administration's unseemly affiliation
with Bunau-Varilla raised some concerns among southerners that the president had little
regard for the Constitution and would employ any method to achieve his objectives.
People in the rural South seemed especially concerned with Roosevelt's apparent duplicity
in the isthmian rebellion. More isolated from the commercial culture of the New South
prophets, these rural southerners appeared unwilling to sacrifice constitutional principles
for the sake of the profits that seemed certain after the completion of the canal project.
They feared Roosevelt, like other Republican presidents in the recent past, ignored both
the Constitution and Congress in dealing with Columbia and Panama. In tacitly
encouraging the rebellion and immediately recognizing Panama's independence, Roosevelt
exposed the blatant hypocrisy of his Administration and the Republican Party. A rural
Georgia editor noted that "forty years ago a civil war was brought on this country because
a few states seceded" and the Republican administration of Lincoln condemned the action
as anarchic. Today, he continued, Roosevelt "hastens to recognize the secessionists of
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Columbia... as a good thing now to help us along.. . " toward his goal of building a canal
in Panama.36
Other rural southerners echoed this displeasure with Roosevelt's tactics in securing
an isthmian canal route. Although few expressly opposed proceeding with a canal in
Panama, some in the South feared that the president's conduct in Panama could set a
dangerous precedent for the future. In short, some southerners suggested that by his
actions, Roosevelt paved the way for the executive branch to conduct foreign policy
without regard to either Congress or public opinion. During previous expansionist
episodes, the greatest support came from northern Republicans. "Now," a rural Louisiana
editor declared, "President Roosevelt the very embodiment of Republican theories, the
personification of Northern ideas, with his cabinet steps forth in violation of law and
recognizes the secession of Panama from the Columbian government. Congress only
could recognize Panama as an independent government, but his strenuosity is much larger
than the government and in overriding the constitution and international law, he also
overrides long established principles sanctified with blood in admitting the right of Panama
to secede." A North Carolinian, W. W. Gordon, also raised suspicions regarding the
motives of northern Republican political leaders during the Panama uprising. In a letter to
Congressman R. Wayne Parker, a Republican from New Jersey, Gordon sarcastically
praised Parker's party for being politically clever enough "to act first and demand the
support of the country afterwards." Gordon suggested that Republicans preyed upon the
public's patriotic desire to support the Administration after it involved the nation in a
foreign policy imbroglio. Despite the efforts of Republicans to conceal their motives,
"nothing can disguise the fact that we acted towards Columbia in a way we should not
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have. . . . I believe the country is willing to have the Isthmus from Columbia, but objects
to the New England custom of cloaking a steal of this sort with all kinds of cant and
hypocrisy."37
Despite considerable criticism of Roosevelt's handling of the Panama affair, most
southerners shared the Administration's frustration in dealing with the government in
Bogota and accepted his actions as a pragmatic attempt to hasten the construction of an
isthmian canal without directly involving the United States in a war against Columbia for
control of Panama. Even many of the president's chief critics in the South believed that
the importance of the canal project to the economic future of the South justified his
actions. A southern editor proclaimed, "The Bronco-busting, Hell-roaring style of
statesmanship does not appeal to us, but the practical kind such as has been exhibited in
this Panama affair meets with Southern approval." Southern commercial interests voiced
little criticism of Roosevelt; they merely wanted construction of a canal to begin at the
earliest possible date. In response to allegations that the Administration had used the
United States navy and marines to block the landing of Columbian troops in Panama, a
Lake Charles editor expressed complete indifference. "Whether we get the Panama canal
by consent of the Columbian government or by the revolution and landing-troops-topreserve-the-peace method, what difference does it make?"38
The Roosevelt administration acted promptly to secure a canal treaty with the
newlv-created Republic of Panama The nation's first minister to the United States,
Philippe Bunau-Varilla, quickly agreed to terms granting the United States the use and
control of a canal zone in Panama into perpetuity. For $10 million and an annual fee of
$250,000, the United States received exclusive rights to build and fortify a canal across a
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ten-mile wide strip of land across the isthmus. In late November of 1903, the Hay-BunauVarilla agreement was presented to the Senate for ratification.39
Roosevelt's conduct in the Panama affair produced considerable opposition across
the nation. Leading newspapers in New York, Philadelphia and Chicago condemned the
actions of the president for ignoring the Constitution, Congress and international law in
stealing away the canal zone in Panama. In the Senate, powerful Democrats, including
Maryland's Arthur Gorman and Alabama's John T. Morgan remained opposed to the
Panama scheme because it was the product of Roosevelt's failure to abide by the
provisions of the Spooner Act. Given the Democrats control of over one-third of all
Senate seats, passage of the Panama Canal Treaty was not certain.40
Most southerners appeared willing to overlook the numerous constitutional issues
raised by Roosevelt's actions in Panama because they believed acquiring the Panama Canal
Zone was an economic necessity. Judge Henry C. Sheffield, of Georgia, complained to a
friend that he feared Democrats in Congress from the South would mount a challenge to
the Panama scheme for purely partisan reasons. "I am sorry to hear this," Sheffield stated,
"and had expected better o f the Democrats, and especially the Southern Democrats."
Most southerners, he continued, did not care which party got credit for the canal, they
merely wanted the canal finished. In conclusion, the Georgian noted,
It has always been insisted that the South was to be especially benefited
by the canal, and now when it seems that the president has adopted
the course that seems likely to give it to us in short order, the Democrats
rise up and oppose it. The people are with the president on this question,
and if the Democrats adopt the plan suggested, they are going to bring
the party into ridicule and contempt. The people want the canal and they
want it the quickest way possible, and this stuff about not being fair to
Columbia is the merest twaddle 41
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The editor of the South's leading commercial publication, Dixie, expressed further
dismay at the opposition o f some southern Democratic Senators to the Panama Canal
Treaty. Like Sheffield, articles in Dixie blasted opponents of the canal for placing
partisanship above the economic interests of the southern people. "With the exception of a
few hair splitting people," the editor claimed, "the South is a unit in favor of the digging of
the isthmian canal." The Dixie editorial further proclaimed that the region's business
interests did not care where the canal was dug, just so it was completed. When asked,
most southerners would probably advise the government to "Dig it [the canal] where you
can place men, the material and machinery and get the work completed the quickest!" The
canal, he predicted, would mean explosive economic growth for all of the South's
seaboard cities from Norfolk to Galveston; cities and towns in the interior would also
benefit from additional trade opportunities for their agricultural and manufactured goods.
Given the great importance of the canal to the South, the editor did not see how any one,
"especially business men o f the South," could find any objection to the ratification of the
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.42
In a special message to the Senate on January 4, 1904, Theodore Roosevelt
presented the Panama Canal Treaty for ratification. The president claimed his actions in
Panama had been justified to protect the interests and safety of the United States; he also
urged the Senate to pass the treaty so that construction of the canal could begin
immediately for the benefit of all of civilization. Roosevelt's speech probably did little to
influence either the debate in the Senate or the final vote on the treaty. Most members had
already made up their mind how they would vote. And if Roosevelt sought to defend his
actions to the public, few southerners required such a noble and moralistic explanation.
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The rhetoric of southern Senators during debate of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty
reflected the region's commitment to an isthmian canal. Although Southern Democratic
senators were highly critical of Roosevelt's methods, they accepted the independence of
Panama as an accomplished fact and, therefore, saw no reason to reject a canal treaty with
the new republic. Most important, however, southern Senators recognized the enormous
support for the treaty among their constituents. In a speech before the Senate, Augustus
Bacon of Georgia, condemned Roosevelt's conduct in Panama; but defeating the treaty
would in no way reverse the situation in the isthmus or amend relations with Columbia.
As a representative of the people of Georgia, Bacon felt it was his duty to vote in
accordance with the wishes of the vast majority of his constituents who favored
ratification. As for his colleagues from the South who threatened to oppose the measure,
Bacon reminded them that the people "of the whole South have been striving for this canal
for fifty years, and they are naturally impatient of anything which they think will cause any
additional delay in the beginning and prosecution of the work of building an isthmian
canal."43
On February 23,1904, the Senate ratified the Hay-Bunau-Varilla by a vote of 66
to 14. A split among Democrats provided the margin of victory as a majority of southern
Democrats abandoned their party and supported the president's measure. Of the southern
Senators who cast votes on the treaty, eleven voted for ratification; only eight opposed.
Given the highly charged partisan atmosphere associated with Roosevelt's handling of the
Panama affair, the defection of eleven southern Democratic senators indicated the
importance of the canal project to the South.44
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After the Spanish-American War, New South prophets continued their campaign
to impress upon other southerners the importance of overseas commercial expansion.
McKinley's handling of the war, and especially the situation in the Philippines, however,
angered most southerners and fueled greater suspicion and cynicism toward the
expansionist policies of the Republican administration. More aware of the region's
political and social sensitivities, New South prophets more clearly embraced a policy of
neocolonialism after 1900. Neocolonialism, they understood, would provide new overseas
markets for southern goods without challenging southerners' deeply-held beliefs regarding
republican government or white supremacy. During public debate on the question of the
Open Door in China, most southerners supported the efforts of Secretary of State Hay to
use diplomatic means to maintain open markets in China. When confronted by the Boxer
Rebellion, few in the South objected to direct American military intervention because the
Administration of William McKinley had no far-reaching territorial designs in China.
In 1904, with the passage of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, construction of an
American owned canal in the isthmus proceeded. The beginning of the construction of an
isthmian canal represented the culmination of over a decade of foreign policy activism
among New South prophets who had campaigned tirelessly before Congress and the
southern public to build support for the canal. As the single most important foreign policy
goal of southern politicians and commercial interests for over a decade, few southerners
seriously challenged the methods employed by Roosevelt to obtain a canal zone.
Southerners wanted a canal built under exclusive American control and defended by
United States arms; the canal agreement reached by Roosevelt and Hay satisfied these
concerns. Most important, by not involving the United States in a war against Columbia
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over Panama, and by not seeking the annexation of more than just a narrow strip of land
across the isthmus, Roosevelt's handling of the canal issue provoked little concern among
southerners that the construction of a canal would accelerate American militarism,
transform republican institutions or, seriously complicate the nation's race question with
the introduction of millions of non-white people.
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Conclusions

After the depression of 1893, southerners paid more attention to the foreign affairs
of the nation than at any time since the Civil War. Led by a small group of New South
prophets, primarily progressive editors, entrepreneurs, and leading commercial interests,
the region moved closer toward embracing a more assertive foreign policy with the goal of
obtaining greater access to overseas markets for southern goods. Foreign markets, some
southerners claimed, could relieve the suffering caused by the depression and guarantee
the future economic prosperity of the South. A few of the prophets even suggested direct
intervention with military force in overseas territory and the creation of colonies as
acceptable goals of American foreign policy. More important, the New South prophets
waged a persistent campaign in support of freer trade and the construction of an isthmian
canal to facilitate the exchange of goods from southern ports. By 1894, the prophets'
campaign combined with the South's depressed economy to produce renewed interest in
foreign markets across regional and occupational lines. Farmers and industrialists, from
commercial centers along the coast to rural points in the interior, supported the acquisition
of foreign markets as a means to provide economic uplift for the entire region.
Despite the success of the prophets' in creating greater public awareness of foreign
policy issues, their tactics faced considerable criticism from the southern white majority.
Most southern whites, while sympathetic to free trade, expressed hostility to direct
American intervention in the affairs of other nations. Public discussions of foreign policy
concerns in the South revealed a region tom between tradition and modernity. Unlike the
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prophets, most southerners interpreted world events based on their own experiences and
recollections of war, defeat, occupation, and race adjustment. Events of the past shaped
their understanding of current world events. Since the Civil War had brought death and
destruction to virtually every part of the South, most whites in the region opposed the use
of force to either resolve foreign policy disputes or to conquer foreign territory.
Southerners, more than persons from any other region, understood the horrors of war and
were reluctant to pursue policies likely to involve the United States in a war with a foreign
power. Consequently, when the United States confronted Great Britain and Spain in the
1890's, most southerners supported forceful diplomacy rather than armed conflict to
resolve the crisis.
White southerners' unpleasant memory of Reconstruction also created opposition
to an aggressive foreign policy and the forcible acquisition of overseas territories. During
Reconstruction, the South had been occupied by the United States military. Most whites
chafed at the military occupation of their region and the imposition of state governments
opposed by the white majority. According to many southerners, the federal government,
in carrying out these policies ignored the principle of the consent of the governed, and
thus, violated the Constitution. In the 1890's, southerners understood colonies to be
similarly incompatible with republican government. Under the Constitution, people could
not be held as subjects in colonial status Yet with the annexation of Hawaii, and the
forcible acquisition of the Philippines, the United States again violated the fundamental
principles of the Constitution. America's new colonies, most southerners claimed, would
lead again to an expansion in the power of the executive branch and a dramatic increase in
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the size of the army. Acquiring colonies, in other words, was seen as the entering wedge
of militarism and imperialism.
The opposition of many southerners to American overseas expansion also rested
on white racism. More than any other factor, racist attitudes led most in the South to
oppose the annexation of foreign territories inhabited by non-white people. Non-white
people, southerners contended, were inherently inferior and incapable of governing
themselves. Their introduction into the American body politic, white racists claimed,
would dilute the nation's racial homogeneity and seriously complicate the nation's race
problem. Most important, though, southerners feared that the inclusion of millions of non
whites as citizens of the United States would make it more difficult for the South to
maintain segregated political and social institutions. Millions of new non-white citizens,
electing political representatives with a different racial perspective, would undoubtedly
pressure the federal government to use its power against the "Jim Crow" South. The
South's racial fears were only compounded by the spectre of increased power in
Washington as the result of the expansion of American sovereignty to overseas
possessions.
The Spanish-American War proved to be a decisive event in the creation of a new
southern foreign policy consensus. The South's overwhelming support for the war
stemmed from the region's humanitarian concern for Cubans suffering under Spanish
misrule and from the South's desire to avenge the destruction of the Maine. After these
goals were accomplished, most southerners proclaimed, the war should end. Rather than
ending American military involvement after concluding a peace treaty with Spain, the
Republican president, William McKinley, prosecuted a war against Filipino rebels. The
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Philippines, according to most southerners, had become a spoil of war that the
Republicans wanted to exploit for their own selfish reasons. The three year war in the
Philippines merely confirmed the worst fears of southerners that northern Republicans had
larger designs in carrying out their foreign policy. Many prophets, too, became fearful of
the implications of annexing territory overseas on the nature of the American republic and
struggled to define a foreign policy that both respected the unique concerns of white
southerners without abandoning the goal of obtaining foreign markets for southern goods.
With the lessons of the Spanish-American War firmly in mind, the New South
prophets championed neo-colonialism as the best course of action for the South, and the
nation. According to the prophets, the superiority of American products and institutions
were better tools to pry open foreign markets than the use of force. The southern
majority, long fearful of militarism in the federal government and the annexation of foreign
territory, easily embraced the concept. Neo-colonialism, southerners agreed, could be
pursued without involving the United States in more onerous forms of intervention.
Consequently, when John Hay announced the "Open Door" policy toward China in 1899,
it was greeted with near universal acclaim in the South.
By 1904, a virtual consensus on the goals and aims of American foreign policy had
emerged in the South. Desirous of economic uplift for their region, most southerners
embraced the tenets of neo-colonialism. In this regard, the South favored free trade, the
Open Door, and greater access to world markets. Nonetheless, unlike other sections of
the country, the South had been far less willing to use military force to seize markets or
territory. Similarly, southerners had been far less supportive of plans to annex overseas
territories populated by non-white people. The foreign policy consensus that emerged
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after 1900 was produced by the campaign waged by the New South prophets,
disillusionment with the war in the Philippines, a distrust over Republican control of the
army and other instruments of foreign policy, and a desire to maintain socio-political
control over African-Americans in the South unhindered by the introduction of additional
non-white people into the American body politic.
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University Press, 1973), pp. 46-76. See also Lester Langley, The Cuban Policy of the
United States (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. 23-51. For a
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Newspaper account of episode in New York Tribune. 13 March 1895, p. 1.
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15. First quote is Birmingham State Herald. 15 Oct. 1895, p. 4. Second quote is
from Columbiana fAla.1 The People's Advocate. 24 Oct. 1895, p. 2. Third quote is from
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35. First quote is from Homer (La.) Guardian Journal. 4 March 1896, p. 2.
Parke's comments in Thomas Parke, diary entry, 14 March 1896, Dr. Thomas Parke
Papers, Birmingham Public Library, Birmingham, Alabama. See also Birmingham State
Herald. 3 March 1896, p. 4, (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen. 5 March 1896, p. 2, and a
resolution supporting recognition by the Mississippi Legislature in 54th Cong., 1st. sess.
Congressional Record (13 March 1896), vol. 28, pt. 3, p. 2763.
36. Quote is from (Fayetteville) Arkansas Sentinel. 10 March 1896, p. 2. See also
Pine Bluff Commercial. 2 March 1896, p. 2. For continued coastal opposition see New
Orleans Daily Picayune. 22 Feb. 1896, p. 4, and 29 Feb. 1896, p. 4. For an excellent
discussion of the impact of racial attitudes on American foreign policy, see Rubin Weston,
Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions in American Foreign
Policy. 1893-1946 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972). ,
37. Quote is from Greenwood (Miss.) Southern Farmer. 1 April 1896, p. 2. See
also Galveston Daily News. 4 March 1896, p. 4. Second quote is from Texas Farm and
Ranch as reprinted in (Benton. La.) Bossier Banner. 2 April 1896, p. 2. The fears of the
possible high costs of war were not without foundation. Since the rules for eligibility of
veterans' benefits were liberalized in 1879, pensions had become a significant drain on the
Treasury. In fact, total pensions paid to eligible Union veterans and their dependents was
over 250% greater than the actual cost of the war. For figures and calculations, see
Historical Statistics of the United States, p. 1140.
38. 54th Cong., 1st. sess. Congressional Record (2 March 1896), vol. 28, pt. 3, p.
2354-2355.
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39. Ibid., (4 April 1896), vol. 28, pt. 4, pp. 3586-3587.
40. Ibid., p. 3587. See also the comments of Tazewell Ellettof Virginia in Ibid.,
pp. 3581-3586.
41. House vote in Ibid., (6 April 1896), pp. 3627-3628.
42. Perez, Jr., Cuba, pp. 164-168.
43. Quote is from ('Charlotte') Star of Zion. 10 Sept. 1896. Similar comments
found in Ibid., 15 Oct. 1896, p. 2. A good discussion of African-American foreign policy
opinion is Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., "Black Americans and the Quest for Empire, 18981903.” The Journal of Southern History 38 (Nov. 1972): 545-566.
44. First quote is from New Orleans Daily Picayune. 7 April 1896, p. 4. Second
quote is from Mobile Daily Register. 8 April 1896, p. 4.
45. Savannah Morning News. 19 May 1896, p. 4.
46. John A. S. Greenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics. Strategy and
American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy. 1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1966), pp. 190-192.
47. Harry W. Readnour, "General Fitzhugh Lee, 1835-1905 : A Biographical
Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1971), pp. 223-234.
48. Langley, Cuban Policy, pp. 93-94.
49. The most comprehensive study of Grover Cleveland remains Allan Nevins,
Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1932).
For discussion of the bond issue, refer to Nevins, pp. 656-665. See pp. 677-704 for
discussion of Cleveland's unpopular monetary policy and the South.
50. First quote is from (Natchitoches) Louisiana Populist, 31 July 1896, p. 3.
Justice Samuel McEnery’s remarks ("the true feeling") are in New Orleans Daily Picayune.
5 Aug. 1896, p. 2. See also Shreveport Times. 6 Oct. 1896, p. 5.
51. Tampa Morning Tribune. 20 Aug. 1896, p. 2.
52. Party platforms contained in National Party Platforms. 1840-1964. comp, by
Kirk Porter and Donald Johnson (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 97-100
and 107-109.
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53. Cleveland's final message to Congress is in Letters and Addresses of Grover
Cleveland, edited by Albert Ellery Bergh (New York: The Unit Book Publishing Co.,
1909), pp. 383-389.
54. Ofiher. Unwanted War, pp. 31-32.

Ch. 4
1. Shreveport Times. 2 March 1897, p. 8.
2. Mobile Daily Register. 29 Jan. 1898, p. 4.
3. McKinley's presidential campaign is ably discussed in Lewis Gould, The
Presidency of William McKinley (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980), pp. 120. Gould estimated that Hanna raised almost $4 million from the business community
during the campaign.
4. Estimates of American investments in Cuba are in Cleona Lewis, America's
Stake in International Investments (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1938),
pp. 590-591 and 615-616. The American Sugar Trust is discussed in Ernest May*
Imperial Democracy. The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1961), pp. 115-116.
5. Quote is in Gould, Presidency, pp. 34-35.
6. Lewis Gould, The Spanish-American War and President McKinley (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1982), pp. 27-28.
7. "American citizens . .." is from Franklin (La.) Banner-Democrat. 6 March
1897, p. 2. "Extreme cruelty . . . " is from Columbiana (Ala.l People's Advocate. 11
March 1897, p. 2. A slightly more moderate view is expressed in (Little Rock) Arkansas
Democrat. 2 March 1897, p. 4. See DeConde, American Foreign Policy, p. 340, and
Offiier, Unwanted War, p. 44.
8. 55th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record (6 April 1897), vol. 30, pt. 1, p.
617. Text of resolution and vote appears on Ibid., (20 May 1897), vol. 30, pt. 2, p. 1186.
9. See Sam Acheson, "Joseph W. Bailey and the Spanish War," Southwest
Review 17 (Autumn 1931): 142-143, and Ofiher, Unwanted War, p. 45.
10. 55th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record (20 May 1897), vol. 30, pt. 2, p.
1190. Two other southern congressmen, Leonidas Livingston (Ga.) and Henry Clayton
(Ala.), made extensive remarks supporting Bailey and recognition in Ibid., pp. 1196-1199.
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11. Williams in 55th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record (20 May 1897), vol.
30, pt. 2, pp. 1193-1194.
12. Wheeler's comments in 55th Cong., 1st sess.. Congressional Record (20 May
1897), vol. 30, pt. 2, pp. 1197-1198. Also appears in Wheeler Family Papers, "Cuba and
Liberty," Printed Speeches, pp. 69-72, Alabama Department of Archives and History,
Montgomery, Alabama. Wheeler's experiences from his service in the Civil War to the
Spanish-American War are detailed in John P. Dyer. From Shiloh to San Juan: The Life of
Fightin' Joe Wheeler (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992). Fora
typical denunciation of "business interests" see Shreveport Times. 19 May 1897, p. 4
13. First quote is from Pine Bluff (Ark.) Commercial. 16 July 1897, p. 2. Felton's
comments are from Rebecca Latimer Felton, "Cuba and the United States," Handwritten
article, no date, Rebecca Latimer Felton Collection, University of Georgia Library,
Athens, Georgia. See also fFavettevillel Arkansas Sentinel. 1 June 1897, p. 4.
14. Galveston Daily News. 1 July 1897, p. 4. See also Felton, "Cuba and
Liberty."
15. "over a l ot . . . " is from Thomas R. Roulhac to Robert McKee, 22 May 1897,
Robert McKee Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery,
Alabama. "The cut throats . . ." is from Pine Bluff Commercial. 2 Aug. 1897, p. 2.
Felton, "Cuba and Liberty," also contains numerous racist references to the insurgents.
The influence of race on southern attitudes toward Cuba is discussed in Tennant
McWilliams, New South, pp. 50-51.
16. May, Imperial Democracy, pp. 107-111. See also Foner, Spanish-CubanAmerican War, pp. 173-175, and Offner, Unwanted War, pp. 51-53.
17. Langley, Cuban Policy, pp. 97-98.
18. Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, pp. 126-129, and Gould, The SpanishAmerican War, pp. 30-31.
19. Quote is from Shreveport Times. 6 Oct. 1897, p. 4. See also Birmingham
Age-Herald. 26 Oct. 1897, p. 4.
20. Tennant S. McWilliams, Hannis Tavlor: The New Southerner as an American
(University, Ala.: The University of Alabama Press, 1978), pp. 21-36.
21. Hannis Taylor, "A Review of the Cuban Question in Its Economic, Political,
and Diplomatic Aspects." North American Review 165 (Nov. 1897): 610. Martha Ashley
Girling, "Southern Attitudes Toward the Cuban Question, 1896-1898" (M. A. Thesis,
Mississippi State University, 1960), pp. 11-15, suggests that Taylor's article had a major
impact on southern attitudes and crystallized support for intervention. Girling probably
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overstated the importance of Taylor's remarks on southern public opinion; her study
focused primarily on southern politicians, a group more sympathetic to Taylor's pleas for
intervention than the public.
22. Taylor, "A Review of the Cuban Question," pp. 633-634. Taylor's emphasis
on humanitarianism is also revealed in a speech delivered at Cornell University in 1897.
An account of the presentation appears in McWilliams, Hannis Tavlor. pp. 35-36.
23. "Message of the President," 6 Dec. 1897, Foreign Relations. 1897, vii-xxxiv.
See also Gould, Spanish-American War, p. 31, and Ofiher, Unwanted War, pp. 86-87.
24. Perez, Cuba, pp. 148-149.
25. Langley, Cuban Policy, pp. 99-101, and Ofiher, Unwanted War, pp. 92-93.
26. 55th Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Record Group 233,
"Petitions on Cuba." National Archives, Washington, D.C. Copy of resolution also in
55th Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Record Group 46, "Petitions on
Cuba." National Archives, Washington, D.C. Donald's visit to Cuba probably resulted
from his interest in agricultural commerce. For a brief biographical sketch of Donald, see
Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Mississippi, vol. I (Chicago: The Goodspeed
Publishing Co., 1891), pp. 656-657.
27. Dinsmore's comments are from 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record
(19 Jan. 1898), vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 769.
28. Dinsmore's quote is from 55th Cong.. 2nd sess.. Congressional Record (19
Jan. 1898), vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 770. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898. p. 246, notes almost
universal opposition to war among business interests up until March of 1898. See also
Chester, Sectionalism, p. 142.
29. Austin Statesman. 20 Jan. 1898, p. 4.
30. Shreveport Times. 28 Jan. 1898, p. 4. For additional commentary on
obstructionism of big business, see Birmingham Age-Herald, 25 Jan. 1898, p. 4,
(Natchitoches'! Louisiana Populist. 4 Feb. 1898, p. 1, and Austin Statesman. 10 Feb. 1898,
p. 4. Popular notion of business influence on McKinley and Republicans' Cuban policy is
discussed in Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the SpanishAmerican War (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1974), pp. 6-7.
31. The best discussion of events surrounding the acquisition and publication of
the de Lome letter is Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, pp. 232-235.
32. Dupuy de Lome to Don Jose Canalejas, n.d., Foreign Relations. 1898, pp.
1007-1008.
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33. H. Wayne Morgan. William McKinley and His America (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1963), p. 356. See also Walter LaFeber, The New Empire, p. 347. The
importance of the press and the publication of the de Lome letter is emphasized in Marcus
Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War: A Study in War Propaganda
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1932), pp. 92-96.
34. Quote is from Pine Bluff CArlO Commercial. 11 Feb. 1898. p. 2. George
Auxier, "Middle Western Newspapers and the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898,"
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review 26 (March 1940): 523-534, suggested that local
editors could, and did, provide an editorial counter-balance to many of the sensational
stories emanating from New York. Even the Pine Bluff editor, mentioned above, advised
moderation toward de Lome's letter, "if he ever wrote it, which we doubt." Overall, the
volume of editorial comment on de Lome's letter in the southern press is remarkably
circumspect. Perhaps southerners were less sensitive to personal insults against a
Republican president.
35. Foner. Spanish-Cuban-American War, pp. 227-228, Gould, Spanish-American
War and McKinley, pp. 32-33, and Ofiher, Unwanted War, p. 100.
36. Gould, Spanish-American War, pp. 35-36, and Ofiher, Unwanted War, pp.
122-123. Most comprehensive account of the facts surrounding the explosion is Hyman
Rickover, How the Battleship Maine was Destroyed (Washington, D.C.: Dept. ofNavy,
Naval History Division, 1976). Rickover concluded that the blast was caused by the
overheating of forward powder magazines. Neither Spanish nor Cuban treachery was
involved.
37. "Maine-public opinion construct" advocated by Walter Millis. The Martial
Spirit (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 19311 John Dobson. America's Ascent: The
United States Becomes a Great Power. 1880-1914 (DeKalb, 111.: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1978), and David Trask, The War with Spain in 1898. The Macmillan
Wars of the United States, edited by Louis Morton (New York: Macmillan, 1981).
Chester, Sectionalism, p. 143, makes the same argument for the South.
38. For survey, see Birmingham Age-Herald. 18 Feb. 1898, p. 4.
39. New Orleans Daily Picayune. 8 March 1898, p. 4. See also Baton Rouge
Daily Advocate. 18 Feb. 1898, p. 2, and Mobile Daily Register. 29 Jan. 1898, p. 4.
40. First quote is from Mobile Daily Register. 24 Feb. 1898, p. 4. Second quote
is from Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. 18 Feb. 1898, p. 2.
41. First quote is from ('Charlotte. N.C.J The People's Paper. 18 Feb. 1898, p. 2.
Second quote is from fUniontown. Ala.I Canebrake Herald. 16 Feb. 1898, p. 2.
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42. Savannah Morning News. 19 Feb. 1898, p. 4. See also Birmingham AeeHerald. 18 Feb. 1898, p. 4.
43. Quote is from Pine Bluff ('Ark.') Commercial. 28 Feb. 1898, p. 2. See also
Tampa Tribune. 19 Feb. 1898, p. 4. The concerns of Mississippi cotton growers are in
Donald B. Kelley, "Mississippi and 'The Splendid Little War1of 1898," Journal of
Mississippi History 26 (May 1964): 123-134. Floridians'fears discussed in William J.
Schellings, "The Advent of the Spanish-American War in Florida, 1898," Florida
Historical Quarterly 39 (April 1960): 311-329.
44. First quote is from (Charlotte) The People's Paper. 18 Feb. 1898, p. 2.
Second quote is Donelson Caffery to wife, Bethia, 23 Feb. 1898, in Scrapbook, vol. 2, pp.
277-278, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. See
also Henry Waring Ball, diary entry, 16 Feb. 1898, vol. 3, p. 28, Mississippi Department
of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi. In addition, see John Patterson to mother,
Mary Patterson, 24 Feb. 1898, Patterson Family Collection, North Carolina Department of
Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina. Southern concern over the loss of
northern investment capital discussed in C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South.
1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 291-293.
45. (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen, 17 March 1898, p. 2. See also article from
Helena (Ark.) World reprinted in Pine Bluff (Ark.) Commercial. 28 Feb. 1898, p. 2.
Article in Uniontown (Ala.) Canebrake Herald. 16 March 1898, p. 2, contains discussion
of editor with local notables of Marion County, Alabama. He found consensus against
war. See also Lake Providence (La.l Banner Democrat. 5 March 1898, p. 2
46. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (17 March 1898), vol. 31, pt. 3,
p. 2916-2919. Background and analysis of Proctor's comments in Linderman. Mirror of
War, pp. 37-49, and Offner, An Unwanted War, pp. 130-134.
47. Reaction of religious community discussed in Pratt, Expansionists of 1898. pp.
279-289. An unsatisfactory challenge to Pratt that more closely examines the religious
press of the South is Nicholas W. Wood, "The Reaction of a Segment of the Religious
Press to the Cuban Civil War in 1898: A Reevaluation" (M. A. Thesis, University of
Virginia, 1975). Business reaction is ably discussed in Pratt, pp. 243-44, LaFeber, New
Empire, pp. 390-394, and May, Imperial Democracy, p. 152.
48. Local editors exercising discretion see Wilkerson, Public Opinion, pp. 127131, and Thomas Clark, The Rural Press and the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1948), pp. 72-111. An editor expressed his contempt for the
"yellow press' in (Baton RougeJ Daily Advocate. 23 March 1898, p. 2. Other criticism of
press found in Lyman Cotten to mother, 9 March 1898, Lyman Cotten Papers, Southern
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
and Henry Waring Ball, Diary Entry, vol. 3,10 March 1898, Mississippi Department of
Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.
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49. First quote is from Fort Smith (Ark.l Weekly Elevator. 25 March 1898, p. 4.
Second quote is from ('Savannah! Morning News. 29 March 1898, p. 4. See also
Lafayette (La.l Advertiser. 9 April 1898, p. 4.
50. This brief account of events surrounding the president and the report of the
Naval Court of Inquiry is further discussed in Gould, Spanish-American War, pp. 41-43.
Different interpretations of McKinley's motives are found in Beisner, From the Old
Diplomacy, pp. 126-129.
51. Quotes are from New Orleans Daily Picayune. 19 March 1898, p. 4. Public
hysteria surrounding the release of the Naval Court's report is found in May, Imperial
Democracy, pp. 133-147. Action of New Orleans' commercial bodies is from Congress,
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Record Group 46, "Petitions on Cuba," National
Archives, Washington, D.C. Augusta reaction found in Augusta Herald. 6 April 1898,
n.p., as found in William Fleming Scrapbook, vol. 6, p. 55, University of Georgia Library,
Athens, Georgia. In addition, for persistent commercial opposition in Mobile, see
McWilliams, New South, pp. 60-61.
52. First quote is Donelson Caffery to son, Donelson Caffery, Jr., 9 April 1898, in
Scrapbook 6, p. 142, Caffery Family Papers, Manuscript Department, Hill Memorial
Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. Second quote is in Louisiana Planter
and Sugar Manufacturer, 23 April 1898, p. 260. Although opposed to intervention and
war, many of the South's sugar producers were not extremely assertive in their views.
Most probably accepted the idea that Cuba would someday enter the American Union;
consequently, their efforts focused on streamlining and consolidating their own industry to
make it competitive in the long term. See Marshall Schott, "Louisiana Sugar and the
Cuban Crisis, 1895-1898," Louisiana History 31 (summer 1990): 265-272, J. Carlyle
Sitterson, Sugar Country: The Cane Sugar Industry in the South. 1753-1950 (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1953), pp. 330-341, and John Heitmann, The
Modernization of the Louisiana Sugar Industry. 183-1910 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1987), pp. 248-249.
53. Sally Tarry to Rebecca Farrar, 2 April 1898, John Bullock Papers, Manuscript
Department, William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. See also
Fort Smith (Ark.l Weekly Elevator. 25 March 1898, p. 4, and (Charlotte. N.C.l The
People's Paper. 8 April 1898, p. 2.
54. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (4 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4,
pp. 3494-3499.
55. Fleming's speech reprinted in Augusta Herald. 10 March 1898, n.p., in William
Fleming Scrapbook, 1897-1899, pp. 58-59, William Fleming Papers, University of
Georgia Library, Athens, Georgia. Second quote is (Dalton! North Georgia Citizen. 24
March 1898, p. 4. For additional examples of reconciliation, see speech by Joseph
Wheeler in the House of Representatives on 8 March 1898 in Joseph Wheeler, Printed
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Speeches, Box 151, Folder 8, Wheeler Family Papers, Alabama Department of Archives
and History, Montgomery, Alabama. See also Austin Statesman. 26 March 1898, p. 4.
An excellent discussion of the themes of reconciliation and redemption is Gaines Foster,
Ghosts, pp. 145-149. Richard Wood, "The South and Reunion, 1898," Historian 31
(May 1969): 417-418, emphasizes brief coalescence around reconciliation theme in early
1898. See also John Weems. The Fate of the Maine (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1958), pp. 167-168 and Lewis Gould, Spanish-American War and McKinley.
pp. 37-42, for discussion of restraint of Americans until the release of the Court of
Inquiry.
56. Lee's comments in Confederate Veteran 6 (April 1898), p. 156.
57. New Orleans Times Democrat. 18 March 1898, p. 4. See also Shreveport
Times. 18 March 1898, p. 4, Austin Statesman. 26 March 1898, p. 4, and Natchitoches
fLa.l Populist. 1 April 1898, p. 2.
58. Foster, Ghosts, p. 146.
59. Offiier, Unwanted War, p. 136.
60. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Record Group 233, 29
March 1898, "Petitions on Cuba," National Archives, Washington, D.C.
61. New Orleans Times Democrat. 30 March 1898, p. 4. See also Homer (La.J
Guardian Journal. 30 March 1898, p. 2, and Fort Smith ("Ark.l Weekly Elevator. 1 April
1898, p. 4.
62. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (11 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4,
p. 3703. Support for Butler's position found in T. R. Robertson to Marion Butler, 11
April 1898; Morrison Caldwell to Marion Butler, 11 April 1898; and, J. B. Alexander to
Marion Butler, 13 April 1898, Marion Butler Papers, Southern Historical Collection,
University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Ch. 5
1. Butler's remark in 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (12 April
1898), vol. 31, pt. 4, p. 3733.
2. Quotes are from Sallie Cotten, Speech at Women's Exposition on 11 May
1898, reprinted in Charlotte Observer. Lyman Cotten Papers, Southern Historical
Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
3. Moore's comment from (Charlotte) Star of Zion, 9 June 1898, p. 3.
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4. McKinley's message to Congress discussed in Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy
to the New, pp. 127-128, Gould, McKinley and the SAW. pp. 47-49, Morgan, America's
Road, pp. 61-63, and Offher, Unwanted War, pp. 182-183.
5. Bailey's comments are in Sam Acheson, Joe Bailey, p. 105. Bryan quoted in
55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (16 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4, p. 3990.
Reaction of many other Democrats in Morgan, America's Road, pp. 62-63.
6. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (11 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4,
pp. 3703-3704.
7. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (12 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4,
pp. 3731-3733. Butler's resolution was never voted on. On April 13, minority report
from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee supported the recognition of Cuban
independence. Minority report was signed by four members, including Roger Mills of
Texas, and John W. Daniel of Virginia. See Ibid., (13 April 1898), p. 3776.
8. Ibid., pp. 3815-3816.
9. Ibid., pp. 3815-3821.
10. Offher, Unwanted War, p. 188.
11. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (16 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4,
p. 3965.
12. Caffery referred to as the "senator of the Sugar Trust" in Franklin fLa.l
Banner Democrat. (16 April 1898), p. 2. His objection to recognition in 55th Cong., 2nd
sess.. Congressional Record (16 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4, pp. 3954-59. Remarks of
McEnery in Ibid., p. 3973.
13. Bacon's comments in Ibid., pp. 3949-3950. See also Ofiher, Unwanted War.
pp. 188-89.
14. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (16 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4,
pp. 3949-3950.
15. Ibid., p. 4105.
16. Vote on Turpie-Foraker in Ibid., p. 4105. See also Gould, SAW and
McKinley, p. 50, and Langley, The Cuban Policy of the U.S.. p. 109.
17. Quote from (Uniontown. Al l Canebrake Herald. 13 April 1898, p. 2. See
also comments from H. M. King to Joseph Wheeler, 13 April 1898, Wheeler Family
Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomeiy.
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18. Austin Statesman. 21 April 1898, p. 4.
19. Ethel Hutson to father, Charles Hutson, 23 April 1898, Hutson Family Papers,
Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans. Report of a
demonstration of cadets at Texas A. and M. University in which Weyler is burned in effigy
on the football field is found in Mary Hutson to daughter, Ethel Hutson, 29 April 1898,
Hutson Family Papers.
20. First quote is Henry Hutson to parents, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Hutson, 14
April 1898, Hutson Family Papers, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University,
New Orleans. Second quote is Willis Brewer to Robert McKee, 23 April 1898, Robert
McKee Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery. Third quote
is Joseph Wheeler to Governor Joseph Johnston, 16 April 1898, Wheeler Family Papers,
Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery. See also Frank Carter to
Marion Butler, 27 April 1898, Marion Butler Papers, Southern Historical Collection,
University o f North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. During the war,
approximately 43,000 southerners volunteered for service in the armed forces. Volunteers
from the South constituted over one-fifth of all volunteers nationally. A compilation of
United States volunteers can be found in 55th Congress, 3rd session, House Report No.
2192, "Reimbursement o f States and Territories for Expenses Incurred, etc. in the War
with Spain."
21.
Offer of New Orleans U.C.V. camps found in Circular Letter No. 84, from
U.C.V. Adjutant General's Office, 3 May 1898, United Confederate Veterans Collection,
Louisiana Historical Association Collection, Tulane University, New Orleans. Florida
U.C.V. camp resolution in Tampa Tribune. 3 May 1898, p. 2. For examples of offers of
service from individual Confederate veterans, see Thomas Rosser to John W. Daniel, 20
April 1898, and 25 May 1898, John W. Daniel Papers, Alderman Library, University of
Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, and Spier Whitaker to Marion Butler, 21 April 1898,
Marion Butler Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina
Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Resolution from Grand Army of the Republic and
Josephus Daniels' quote are in (Raleigh. N.C.) Farmer and Mechanic. 16 May 1898, p. 4.
Josephus Daniels, too, embraced vision of the New South and saw the war as an
opportunity to promote reconciliation. See Joseph Morrison, Josephus Daniels: The
Small-d Democrat (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 12-15.
For additional comment on enthusiasm of Confederate veterans for war, see Natchitoches
(La.) Populist. 1 April 1898, p. 3.
22.
Long quote is from John B. Gordon, U.C.V. General Orders No. 204, 28 May
1898, United Confederate Veterans Collection, Louisiana Historical Collection, Tulane
University, New Orleans. A good biography of Gordon that examines both his
nationalism and his commitment to the social order of the Old South is Ralph L. Eckert,
John Brown Gordon: Soldier-Southemer-American (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1989). At the U.C.V. Reunion in Atlanta, the members unanimously
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passed resolutions pledging their loyalty to the Union and their willingness to support the
president. Text of resolutions found in Houston Post. 22 July 1898, p. 4.
23.
"deprecated war" is from Opelousas Courier. 16 April 1898, p. 1. "War
shouts" is from Frank Richardson to his daughter, 14 April 1898, Southern Historical
Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. "War
scare" is in Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer. 23 April 1898, p. 260. See also
(Baton Rouge) Daily Advocate. 14 April 1898, p. 2. Declining production and value of
Cuban sugar (see Tables I and II) is from Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1899.
pp. 341-345.
TABLE I
Quantity and Value of Sugar Imported from Cuba
Year_____________________In Pounds___________________ In Dollars
1894
2,127,497,454
63,147,485
1895
1,845,762,623
40,100,180
1896
1,093,171,312
24,102,835
1897
576,260,997
11,953,987
1898______________________ 440.225.111________________ 9.828.987
Impact of declining Cuban sugar production on domestic market (Table II) from Ibid., p.
213.
TABLEn
Wholesale and Retail Price of Sugar, 1895-1898
(in cents per pound)
Year
Wholesale Price_____________ Retail Price
1895
4.2
5.3
1896
4.5
5.6
1897
4.5
5.6
1898_________________________ 5J)_____________________ 5.9
24.
For comment on the perceived impact of war on cotton, see Homer (La. I
Guardian Journal. 13 April 1898, p. 2, and The Southern Planter (Richmond, Va.), 59
(May 1898): 236. Lacroix's comments are in Louis de Lacroix to Marion Butler, 27 April
1898, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Press. See similar
comments in article from Texas Farm and Ranch reprinted in St. Helena (La.) Echo. 30
April 1898, p. 1. See also quote from Birmingham Ledger reprinted in Mobile Daily
Register. 16 April 1898, p. 4.
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25. First quote is from New Orleans Daily Picayune. 20 April 1898, p. 4. Second
quote is from Ruston (La.-) Leader, reprinted in Ibid., 18 April 1898, p. 8. Other quotes
from Southern Planter 59 (May 1898): 236.
26. "really for ulterior political purposes" is from New Orleans Daily Picayune. 22
April 1898, p. 4. Long quote is from Dixie 14 (May 1898): 21-23. See also Savannah
Morning News. 14 April 1898, p. 4, and Mobile Daily Register. 16 April 1898, p. 4, and
19 April 1898, p. 4. The persistent opposition to war of the editor of the Mobile paper
editor is discussed in Tennant McWilliams, The New South Faces the World: Foreign
Affairs and the Southern Sense of Self 1877-1950 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1988), pp. 56-62. Regarding the nefarious influence of "the Money
Power," see Walter Clark to Marion Butler, 14 April 1898, Marion Butler Papers,
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina.
27. Grandmother's remarks are from Mina Weil to daughter, Gertrude Weil, 21
April 1898, Gertrude Weil Papers, North Carolina Department of Archives and History,
Raleigh, North Carolina. Second quote is from Mary Hutson to son, Henry Hutson, 22
April 1898, Hutson Family Papers, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University,
New Orleans, Louisiana. Block quote is from St. Helena (La! Echo. 6 May 1898, p. 1.
Influence of memory of Civil War on popular attitudes regarding Spanish-American War is
discussed in John Joseph Leffler, "From the Shadows Into the Sun: Americans in the
Spanish-American War." (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas, 1991).
28. Quotes are from Sallie Cotten, Speech at Women's Exposition on 11 May
1898, reprinted in Charlotte Observer. Lyman Cotten Papers, Southern Historical
Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
29. Addie Daniels' quote is from Addie Daniels to mother, Mary Daniels, 2 May
1898, Josephus Daniels Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. For other
expressions of southern women's' anxiety and concern over war see Eleanor Patterson to
mother, Mary Patterson, 17 May 1898, Patterson Family Papers, North Carolina
Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina, and Mrs. Albert Coble to
husband, Albert Coble, 5 July 1898, Albert L. Coble Papers, Manuscript Department,
William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
30. The organization of the "Girl's Home Guard" in Charlotte is discussed in
(Raleigh! Farmer and Mechanic. 3 May 1898, p. 2. The papers of the Louisiana Women's
War Relief Association are part of the Louisiana Historical Association Collection at
Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans. Of special importance
in this collection are Mrs. Thomas Cotes to Mrs. Josephine Ellis, 2 Aug. 1898; Mollie
Gray to Mrs. J. B. Richardson, 2 Aug. 1898; and, Mrs. J. Pinckney Smith to Mrs.
Josephine Ellis, 3 Aug. 1898. Final quote on southern women during the war is from
Confederate Veteran 6 (Nov. 1898): 512.
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31. The best work on African-Americans and American foreign policy during the
period remains Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans and the White Man's Burden.
1898-1903 (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1975). See also his "Black
Americans and the Quest for Empire, 1898-1903," Journal of Southern History 38 (Nov.
1972): 545-566.
32. Quote is from Booker T. Washington, Hampton Institute Anniversary Speech,
21 April 1898, Booker T. Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. See
also Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans, pp. 4-24.
33. Mass meeting in New Orleans reported in New Orleans Daily Picayune. 26
April 1898, p. 8. Other incidents of black support in Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans, pp.
62-81. Examples of the rejection of black volunteers in Austin Statesman. 26 May 1898,
p. 4, and (Little Rock) Arkansas Democrat. 8 July 1898, p. 2.
34. Samuel Robertson to David Boyd, 30 April 1898, David Boyd Papers,
Manuscript Department, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. Similar comment found in Joseph Wheeler to David Boyd, 26 April 1898,
David Boyd Papers, Manuscript Department, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, "howling, frantic mob" incident from Robert L.
Bullard, Diary, Book 1, pp. 91-94, Robert Lee Bullard Papers, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. Violence against black volunteers discussed in Gatewood, Jr., Black
Americans, pp. 114-115. Impact of racist foreign policy on domestic race relations also
discussed in Daniel Schirmer. Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine
War (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 101-103.
35. Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans, pp. 29-34.
36. Quote from ('Charlotte') Star of Zion. 9 June 1898, p. 3. A black Tennessee
clergyman expressed similar concerns in (Charlotte') Star of Zion. 22 Sept. 1898, p. 3.
37. (Charlotte') Star of Zion. 27 Oct. 1898, p. 4. African-American
disillusionment also seen in Southern Workman and Hampton School Record. 27 (Sept.
1898): 190. Booker T. Washington plead for additional rights for African-Americans after
the war in Booker T. Washington, Address at the Thanksgiving Peace Jubilee Exercises,
16 Oct. 1898, Booker T. Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Ch. 6
1. Clark Howell in St. Louis Globe Democrat reprinted in Beeville (Tx.l Bee. 29
Dec. 1899, p. 2.
2. Savannah Morning News. 19 June 1900, p. 4.
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3. Hannis Taylor's speech appeared in (Raleighl News and Observer. 2 June 1898,
p. 6.
4. Quotes from Matthew Butler, Address to the Empire State Society of the Sons
of the American Revolution, 4 July 1898, Matthew C. Butler Papers, South Caroliniana
Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. Other expressions of
reunion in Nashville Christian Advocate reprinted in Confederate Veteran 6 (Aug. 1898):
370, and (FavettevilleJ Arkansas Sentinel. 6 Sept. 1898, p. 1.
5. Richard Wood "The South and Reunion, 1898," The Historian 31 (May 1969):
430. The conduct of the War Department is ably discussed in Graham Cosmas, An Army
for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War (Columbia, Mo.: The
University of Missouri Press, 1971), pp. 251-284. See also Gould, SAW and McKinley
pp. 71-72. Examples of southern disenchantment with the War Department's prosecution
of the war found in Confederate Veteran 6 (July 1898): 304, and 7 (Aug. 1898): 360.
See also John Hammond to Kathryn Hammond, 13 July 1898, Hammond, Bryan and
Cumming Family Papers, South Caroliniana University of South Carolina Library,
Columbia, South Carolina; John Mosby to John W. Daniel, 7 Aug. 1898, John W. Daniel
Papers, Manuscripts Department, Alderman Library, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia; and, Frank Stringfellow to Miss Lutie, 26 Aug. 1898, Frank
Stringfellow Papers, Manuscripts Department, Alderman Library, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia.
6. Matthew Butler to Russell Alger, 26 Sept. 1898, Matthew Butler Papers, South
Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. "As a body.
.." in (Little Rock) Arkansas Democrat. 20 July 1898, p. 2. "The Cubans will..." in
Houston Post. 20 July 1898, p. 4. Last quote is from (Uniontowa AIT Canebrake Herald.
6 July 1898, p. 2. See also Beeville (Tx.) Bee. 12 Aug. 1898, p. 2.
7. Taylor's views on Cuba and expansion in McWilliams, Tavlor. pp. 38-43.
8. John T. Morgan, "What Shall We Do with the Conquered Islands," North
American Review 166 (June 1898): 641-649. Morgan’s racial attitudes and the territorial
question are examined in Joseph Baylen and John Moore, "Senator John Tyler Morgan
and Negro Colonization in the Philippines," Phvlon 29 (Spring 1968): 65-75, and Fry,
Morgan, pp. 183-185.
9. John T. Morgan, "The Territorial Expansion of the United States,"
Independent 50 (July 1898): 10-12. Other examples of southern support for maintaining
possessions for strategic and commercial reasons in Thomas Rosser to John W. Daniel
Papers, 31 July 1898, John W. Daniel Papers, Manuscripts Department, Alderman
Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, and Houston Daily Post. 12 Sept.
1898, p. 4.
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10. The Caribbean Islands as part of America's "natural domain" discussed in
platform of Texas Democratic Convention as published in Houston Post, 4 Aug. 1898, pp.
2-3, and in interview with Congressman William Terry in (Fayetteville! Arkansas Sentinel.
13 Sept. 1898, p. 2.
11. Public Opinion. 4 Aug. 1898, p. 135. For examples of editorials critical of
McKinley's Philippine policy, see (Ft. Smith! Weekly Elevator. 5 Aug. 1898, p. 2, and
(Little Rock! Arkansas Democrat. 4 Nov. 1898, p. 2. Another survey of the national
press by the New York Herald in Jan. 1899 confirmed a majority of southern newspaper
editors opposed expansion. Survey in Wheeler Family Scrapbook, 9 Jan. 1899, Wheeler
Family Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama.
12. First quote is from William Tarry to Sally Tarry Harrison, 7 July 1898, John
Bullock Papers, Manuscript Department, William Perkins Library, Duke University,
Durham, N.C. Second quote is from (Charlotte! People's Paper. 24 June 1898, p. 2. See
also (Little Rock! Arkansas Democrat. 8 July 1898, p. 2, and article from Nashville
American reprinted in Beaumont Weekly Enterprise. 13 Aug. 1898, p. 4. In addition, see
comments in Opelousas (La.l Courier. 14 Jan. 1899, p. 1.
13. Texas Farm and Ranch article reprinted in Bceville (Tx.l Bee. 7 Oct. 1898, p.
2. See also Houston Daily Post. 7 Nov. 1898, p. 4, and 21 Dec. 1898, p. 4. High cost of
empire also condemned in (Little Rock! Arkansas Democrat. 21 Jan. 1899, p. 2.
14. Texas State Democratic Convention reported in Austin Statesman. 4 Aug.
1898, pp. 1 and 4.
15. Southern opposition to retaining Philippines as a pretext for American
militarism discussed in Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Petition from 73
residents of Gillespie County, Texas, against the retention of the Philippines, 55th Cong.,
3rd. sess., submitted 7 Dec. 1898. See also Houston Post. 15 Aug. 1898, p. 4,
(Fayetteville! Arkansas Sentinel. 6 Sept. 1898, p. 1, and (Ft. Smith! Weekly Elevator. 7
Oct. 1898, p. 4. Militarism and the U.S. Constitution discussed in (Little Rock! Arkansas
Democrat. 1 Feb. 1899, p. 2. A broad range of social and economic factors involved in
creating anti-annexation sentiment is found in David Healy, U.S. Expansionism: The
Imperialist Urge in the 1890's (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp.
214-237, and Robert Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists. 1898-1900
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985). Both works deal primarily with
northern attitudes; neither adequately explores the sources of anti-imperialist thought in
the South. See also H. W. Brands, Bound to Empire: The United States and the
Philippines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 24-29.
16. "nine millions of savages" from Senator James Berry (D-Ark.) in (Littie Rock!
Arkansas Democrat. 19 Aug. 1898, p. 2. "fate of the working man" and "overrun" from
Austin Statesman. 11 Aug. 1898, p. 4. See also New Orleans Semi-Weekly TimesDemocrat. 3 Feb. 1899, p. 4.
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17. Confederate Veteran 6 (Nov. 1898): 512. See also comments from Senator
Donelson Caffery (D-Ark.) in interview in Nashville American reprinted in (Little Rock!
Arkansas Democrat. 21 Nov. 1898, p. 2, and article in (Hamilton. Ala.t Marion Countv
News. 1 Dec. 1898, n.p., in Scrapbook of mounted clippings, John Bankhead Papers,
Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama.
18. 55th Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Record Group 46,
Petitions on Philippines, 1898-1899, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
19. For discussion of Treaty of Paris, see Morgan, America's Road, pp. 84-110,
and Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New, pp. 132-135. An overview of
McKinley's decision to acquire the Philippines is in Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army
and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War. 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 8-9.
20. Gould. SAW and McKinley.
21. McLaurin's comments are in 55th Cong., 3rd sess., Congressional Record (13
Jan. 1899), vol. 32, pt. 1, p. 642. See also similar comments by Stephen Mallory of
Florida in Ibid., (26 Jan. 1899), p. 1067.
22. First quote is from Senator Horace Chilton of Texas in Ibid., (4 Feb. 1899),
vol. 32, pt. 2, p. 1445. Long quote from Alexander Clay in Ibid., (24 Jan. 1899), vol. 32,
pt. 1, p. 964.
23. Ibid., p. 964.
24. Ibid, (6 Jan. 1899), p. 432.
25. Aguinaido, Philippine nationalism and the Spanish-American War discussed in
Trask, War With Spain, pp. 398-410, Cosmas, Army for Empire, p. 192, and Welch,
Response to Imperialism, pp. 12-14.
26. Berry’s comments in 55th Cong, 3rd sess. Congressional Record (31 Jan.
1899), vol. 33, pt. 2, p. 1298. For role of southerners in debate, see Edwina Smith,
"Southerners on Empire: Southern Senators and Imperialism, 1898-1899," Mississippi
Quarterly 31 (1978): 84-107.
27. Money's remarks in Ibid, (3 Feb. 1899), p. 1421. See also remarks of
Alexander Clay in Ibid, (24 Jan. 1899), vol. 33, pt. 1, p. 964.
28. Grenville and Young, Politics. Strategy and American Diplomacy. 286-287,
and LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 408-411.
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29. Caffery's speech in 53rd Cong., 3rd sess., Congressional Record (6 Jan. 1899),
vol. 32, pt. 1, p. 438. Meeting of Louisiana Sugar Planter’s Association discussed in
Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer. 21 Jan. 1899, pp. 34-37.
30. 53rd Cong., 3rd sess., Congressional Record (13 Jan. 1899), p. 641. See also
comments of Horace Chilton of Texas in Ibid., (4 Feb. 1899), vol. 32, pt. 2, p. 1447.
31. Trade figures from Statesman's Year-Book. 1898 reprinted in Ibid., (14 Feb.
1899), p. 1831.
32. Clay's remarks in Ibid., (24 Jan. 1899), vol. 32, pt. 1, p. 967. See also speech
by Augustus Bacon of Georgia in Ibid., (18 Jan. 1899), p. 737.
33. Ibid., (3 Feb. 1899), vol. 32, pt. 2, p. 1417. See also Hernando Money,
"Expansion—Past and Prospective: Conquest and the Constitution," The Arena 23 (April
1900): 337-342, and Brands, Bound to Empire, pp. 28-31.
34. Racial concerns during debate over the Philippines discussed in Beisner,
Twelve Against Empire, pp. ix-x; Healy, U.S. Expansionism, pp. 14-21; Christopher
Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man." Journal of
Southern History 24 (August 1958): 319-331; and Rubin Weston, Racism in U.S.
Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions in American Foreign Policy. 1893-1946
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972)
35. 55th Cong., 3rd sess., Congressional Record (6 Jan. 1899), vol. 32, pt. 1, pp.
434-436.
36. Tillman in Ibid., (2 Feb. 1899), vol. 32, pt. 2, p. 1389. McLaurin in Ibid., (13
Jan. 1899), vol. 32, pt. 1, p. 639. See also speech by Stephen Malloiy of Florida in Ibid.,
(26 Jan. 1899), vol. 32, pt. 2, pp. 1067-1070. Tillman's racial views discussed in Francis
B. Simkins, "Ben Tillman’s View of the Negro," Journal of Southern History 3 (May
1937): 161-174.
37. 55th Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Record Group 46,
Petitions on Philippines, 1898-1899, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
38. "half-civilized" from New Orleans Times-Democrat. 6 Feb. 1899, p. 4. "to
haul down the flag" in (Little Rock') Arkansas Gazette. 9 Feb. 1899, p. 4. "the duty of the
American people" in Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. 13 April 1899, p. 2. See also (Little
Rock! Arkansas Gazette. 11 Feb. 1899, p. 4, and speech by Matthew Butler delivered at
Gaffney, South Carolina in Matthew Butler Scrapbook, 4 July 1899, Matthew Butler
Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South
Carolina.
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39. Senate vote in 55th Cong., Senate, Journal of the Executive Proceedings of
the Senate. (6 Feb. 1899), vol. 31, pt. 2, p. 1284. Discussion of events leading up to final
vote in Welch, Response to Imperialism, pp. 17-20.
40. McLaurin's comments printed in New York Times (7 Feb. 1899), p. 1. Vote
analyzed in Chester, Sectionalism. Politics and American Diplomacy, pp. 144-147.
Senatorial intrigue discussed in Gould, S.A.W. and McKinley, pp. 117-118. Role of
Bryan examined in Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New, p. 141, and Coletta,
Bryan, pp. 233-234. Some anti-annexationists speculated that the attack at Manila had
been orchestrated by the administration to win votes. This suspicion raised in Donelson
Caffery to Lide Caffery, 5 Feb. 1899, Caffery Family Papers, Southern Historical
Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
41. Fry, Morgan, pp. 176-181, and Joseph Baylen and John Moore, "Senator John
T. Morgan and Negro Colonization in the Philippines," Phvlon 29 (1968): 65-75. See also
Montgomery Advertiser. 12 Sep. 1899, p. 4.
42. Wheeler's speech in Charleston News and Courier. 12 May 1899, p. 8. See
commentary on his speech in (Little Rockl Arkansas Gazette. 18 May 1899, p. 4, and
New Orleans Times-Democrat. 13 May 1899, p. 4. See also similar comments from John
Barrett before Texas Industrial Convention in Dixie 15 (Nov. 1899): 22, and Governor
Dan Jones of Arkansas in (Little Rock! Arkansas Democrat. 6 Dec. 1899, p. 4.
43. Quote from (Little Rocki Arkansas Gazette. 30 Jan. 1900, p. 4. See also a
partial reprint of McLaurin's speech for the Manufacturer's Record in Ibid., 6 Feb. 1900, p.
4.
44. Mooney quote in Memphis Commercial Appeal. 3 May 1899, p. 2. See also
Thomas H. Baker, The Memphis Commercial Appeal: The History of a Southern
Newspaper (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), pp. 198-201. Clark's
comments in St. Louis Globe Democrat reprinted in Beeville (Tx.l Bee. 29 Dec. 1899, p.
2. See also Atlanta Constitution. 22 May 1899, p. 4. Articles commenting on New South
press and the Philippines in (Little Rockl Arkansas Gazette. 2 Jan. 1900, p. 4, and Baton
Rouge Daily Advocate. 27 July 1899, p. 2. Many of the New South editors who
supported McKinley's policy of expansion were goldbug Democrats. Their papers were
often aligned with local business community and opposed free silver and Bryanism.
Nonetheless, their editorial position on questions of foreign policy stemmed more from
their concern for economic growth in their communities and the South than on blind
partisanship.
45. Welch, Response to Imperialism, pp. 24-30. See George Briggs to family, 3
May 1899, Willis Briggs Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North
Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
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46. (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen. 4 May 1899, p. 4. See also Homer (La.)
Guardian-Joumal. 3 May 1899, p. 2, and Montgomery Southern Argus 26 May 1899, p.
2.

47. Houston Herald in Austin Statesman. 11 May 1899, p. 4. See also (Dalton)
North Georgia Citizen. 4 May 1899, p. 2; Austin Statesman. 13 May 1899, p. 4; and, Lake
Charles Daily American. 26 May 1899, p. 2.
48. "to convince" in Ft. Smith (Ark.) Weekly Elevator. 23 June 1899, p. 4.
"things will drag" in Savannah Morning News. 12 June 1900, p. 4. See also Tampa
Morning Tribune. 19 Aug. 1899, p. 4, and Mrs. Richard McMaster to Richard McMaster,
Jr., 30 July 1899, Richard McMaster Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of
South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina.
49. Quote in (Charlotte) Star of Zion. 24 May 1900, p. 1. See also letter from T.
Thomas Fortune to Booker T. Washington, 5 May 1900, Booker T. Washington Papers,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., and Gatewood, Black Americans, pp. 191-193.
50. Long quote is from Helena (Ark.) Reporter. 1 Feb. 1900, p. 2. See also
(Charlotte) Star of Zion. 9 March 1899, p. 7, and 26 July 1900, p. 7. See also Gatewood,
Black Americans, pp. 184-191 and 219-263.
51. First quote is from Lake Charles Daily American. 19 July 1899, p. 2. Long
quote is from Danville Register reprinted in Tampa Morning Tribune. 28 Sept. 1899, p. 4.
52. Birmingham Age-Herald. 19 Aug. 1899, p. 4. See also Brands, Bound to
Empire, pp. 27-30, for discussion of northern anti-imperialist and Populist condemnation
of militarism.
53. Quote is from Frank Evans to Albert Evans, 14 Nov. 1899, Evans (Nathaniel
and Family) Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia,
South Carolina. See also Linn, U.S. Army, pp. 12-20; Brands, Bound to Empire, pp. 5057; and, Henry Graff, ed., American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. xiv.
54. William J. Bryan, "The Issue for 1900," North American Review 170 (June
1900): 753-771. See also Coletta, Brvan. pp. 238-255, and Kendrick Clements, William
Jennings Brvan: Missionary Isolationist (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
1982), pp. 34-36.
55. Birmingham Age-Herald. 5 April 1900, p. 4. See also Savannah Morning
News. 2 May 1900, p. 4. Increased Southern opposition to war discussed in Daniel
Schirmer, Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War (Cambridge:
Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 149-150. Extent of southern support for Bryan's
anti-imperialism plank in B. F. Whitner to Bob Hemphill, 17 Feb. 1900, Hemphill Family
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Papers, Manuscript Department, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham,
North Carolina.
56. Brewer's speech in Willis Brewer, Printed Speeches, 12 April 1900, Willis
Brewer Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama.
Many of these ideas also expressed by Sydney Bowie, a Populist candidate for Congress in
Alabama, who insisted that the nation could not survive "half republic and half empire."
His comments found in ('Columbiana. Ala.l The People's Advocate. 18 Oct. 1900, p. 2.
57. Candler's remarks printed in New Orleans Times Democrat, 27 April 1900, p.
10. Brief biography of Candler, including his service in the Confederate Army and
conservative politics in postbellum period, in Kenneth Coleman and Charles Gurr, eds.,
Dictionary of Georgia Biography. Vol. I (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983),
pp. 162-163. See also anti-imperialist attitudes of Murphy Foster and Samuel McEnery
expressed in New Orleans Semi-Weekly Times Democrat. 22 May 1900, pp. 1-2, and of
Joseph Bailey in (Little Rockl Arkansas Gazette. 23 June 1900, p, 4. Popular anti
imperialist poem written by Populist Jerry Simpson printed in St. Helena (La.) Echo. 4
May 1900, p. 2. A scathing partisan attack against Republicans appears in Benjamin
Tillman, "Bryan or McKinley: The Present Duty of American Citizens: For Bryan: Part II:
Causes of Southern Opposition to Imperialism," North American Review 171 (Oct.
1900): 439-446.
58. Coletta, Brvan. pp. 263-271, and Paul Glad, The Trumpet Soundeth: William
Jennings Brvan and His Democracy. 1896-1912 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1960), pp. 75-76.
59. First quote is from Savannah Morning News. 9 Aug. 1900, p. 4. "the people"
in St. Helena (La.l Echo. 14 Sept. 1900, p. 3. Opposition of Charleston News and
Courier. New Orleans Picayune, and Mobile Register in Literary Digest 21 (11 Aug.
1900): 153-154. "the republic" is from Charleston News and Courier in Ibid., p. 154.
60. Felton's comments in Atlanta Journal reprinted in (Dalton) North Georgia
Citizen. 19 Sept. 1900, p. 4. Former first lady of the Confederacy, Mrs. Jefferson Davis,
opposed annexation, largely due to racial concerns. For her attitudes, see Mrs. Jefferson
Davis, "White Man's Problem: Why We Do Not Want the Philippines," The Arena 23
(Jan. 1900): 1-4.
61. Welch. Response to Imperialism, pp. 67-71. Problems faced by Democrats in
making imperialism the paramount issue discussed in J. L. M. Curry to Manly Curry, 12
July 1900, J. L. M. Curry Papers, Manuscript Department, William Perkins Library, Duke
University, Durham, North Carolina, and in Felix Robertson to Dr. J. O. Scott, 19 Aug.
1900, Felix Robertson Papers, Manuscript Department, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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62. Thomas Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on
Imperialism?," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review 24 (June 1937): 43-52.
63. Election results from Sven Petersen, A Statistical History of the American
Presidential Elections (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1968), pp. 64-69.
64. Brands, Bound to Empire, pp. 30-31.

Ch. 7
1. Sidney Story, "A Plea for the Nicaragua Canal," OurDay 19 (Dec. 1900):
697-703.
2. H. C. Sheffield to James Griggs, 13 Nov. 1903, James Griggs Papers, Southern
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
3. China, the United States and the Open Door are discussed in DeConde, History
of American Foreign Policy, pp. 360-365; Michael Hunt, The Making of a Special
Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1983), pp. 152-154; Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 29-30.
4. Comments from Memphis Commercial-Appeal reprinted in Public Opinion 28
(21 June 1900): 773. See also James Lindgren, "The Apostasy of a Southern AntiImperialist: Joseph Bryan, the Spanish-American War, and Business Expansion," Southern
Studies 2 (Summer 1991): 151-178, for an insightful discussion of the appeal of neo
colonial policies to southern anti-imperialists.
5. Dixie 16 (July 1900): 40.
6. Macon (Ga.) News in Ibid., p. 40.
7. J. L. M. Cuny to son, Manly, 5 Aug. 1900, J. L. M. Curry Papers, Manuscript
Department, William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C. Hay's Open Door
policy also praised in Tampa Morning Tribune. 30 Aug. 1900, p. 4, and (Little Rock)
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